Donald Miller v. Choo Choo Partners

Citation: Not availableDocket: E2001-00007-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; July 13, 2001; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Donald and Terry Miller filed a lawsuit against Choo Choo Partners, L.P. seeking damages for injuries sustained by Mr. Miller after he fell while entering a bathtub at the Chattanooga Choo Choo Hotel. The jury awarded Mr. Miller $1,000,000 for his injuries and $175,000 to Mrs. Miller for consortium damages. The defendant appealed, arguing that it was entitled to a directed verdict due to insufficient evidence linking its negligence to Miller's injuries. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. 

Mr. Miller, employed by Komatsu Mining Equipment, was in Chattanooga on business when the incident occurred on April 2, 1996. While stepping into the bathtub, he grabbed a wall-mounted bar that detached, causing him to fall and injure his right hip. Following his return to Peoria, he sought medical attention for persistent low back pain, which was eventually diagnosed as a disc herniation requiring surgery. 

Miller also experienced neck pain after the fall but initially did not report it, believing it was fatigue-related. Later, he underwent a second surgery for a herniated disc in his neck. The case highlights the sequence of medical treatment following the fall and establishes a connection between the incident and subsequent injuries, leading to the jury's ruling in favor of the plaintiffs.

Miller did not resume work following neck surgery, stating that his job performance was "extremely hampered" due to back and neck surgeries. The jury ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding Miller $1,000,000 and Mrs. Miller $175,000, which the trial court later reduced from $1,500,000 and $250,000, respectively. The defendant appealed on several grounds: (1) the trial court's refusal to grant a directed verdict due to insufficient evidence of causation between Miller's fall and his injuries, (2) the admission of expert testimony, (3) the admission of Miller's medical expenses, (4) the jury's verdict being excessively contrary to law and evidence, and (5) the denial of the defendant's special jury instructions. The plaintiffs countered that the court erred in reducing Miller's award. The defendant argued for a directed verdict, claiming the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the defendant's negligence caused Miller's injuries. The review standard for directed verdicts requires evidence to lead to only one conclusion, favoring the non-moving party. The causation of medical conditions typically requires expert testimony, which must not be speculative. The court emphasized that while plaintiffs need to show that it is more likely than not that the defendant's actions caused the injuries, a mere possibility is insufficient, and a directed verdict is warranted in cases of pure speculation.

A jury cannot base a verdict on merely possible causes of death, as established in Palace Bar, Inc. v. Fearnot, 269 Ind. 405, 381 N.E.2d 858, 864 (1978). An expert medical opinion must go beyond mere possibility to be admissible; it should reflect a professional judgment on the most likely cause among potential causes (Kirschner v. Broadhead, 671 F.2d 1034, 1039 (7th Cir. 1982)). The characterization of a cause as "conceivable," "possible," or "probable" does not determine admissibility (Trapp v. 4-10 Investment Corp., 424 F.2d 1261, 1268 (8th Cir. 1970)). A medical opinion that is purely speculative lacks the necessary basis for a finding of fact (Martin v. United States, 284 F.2d 217, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1960)) and is inadmissible as evidence.

In the case at trial, the plaintiffs argued that Miller's injuries were due to a fall at the defendant's hotel, presenting video depositions from Dr. Richard Schock and Dr. J. Richard Lister. Dr. Schock indicated that he believed Miller's back problems were caused by the fall, but acknowledged he could not definitively link the herniated disc to the incident, stating it "could have exacerbated" the condition. Dr. Lister agreed that Miller's lumbar spine issues could be related to the fall but stated he could not confirm the causal relationship, indicating uncertainty about what caused the recurrent disc herniation.

Dr. Schock and Dr. Lister provided testimony indicating a causal relationship between Miller's fall and his back injuries. Dr. Schock believed the fall caused the back issue, while Dr. Lister connected the fall to Miller's pre-existing recurrent disc disease, noting that the disc herniation could be consistent with the fall. Although Dr. Lister expressed uncertainty about the original cause of the disc herniation, this ambiguity is viewed in favor of the plaintiffs, as it does not negate their causal relationship testimony. The court determined that the jury should weigh the doctors' testimonies and that the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict regarding the negligence claim linked to Miller’s low back condition.

Regarding Miller’s neck injury, Dr. Schock acknowledged that previous neck surgeries make a patient more susceptible to subsequent injuries, attributing Miller’s degenerative disc disease to hereditary factors. He stated that falls could exacerbate this condition, but he could not definitively say the fall caused the neck injury. While Dr. Schock confirmed that Miller's symptoms could be related to the fall, his testimony concerning the neck injury was less definitive than that for the low back injury. The plaintiffs' theory suggests that Miller's fall aggravated a pre-existing condition, and there remains sufficient evidence of causation to consider.

Dr. Schock’s testimony indicates that Miller's pre-existing degenerative disc condition makes him more susceptible to injury from trauma than someone without such a condition. Although Dr. Schock could not definitively link Miller's fall to the aggravation of his neck issues, he confirmed that Miller's pre-existing condition predisposes him to injury from falls. This statement, while open to interpretation, must be viewed favorably for the plaintiff when considering the appropriateness of a directed verdict. Dr. Schock also suggested that there could be a correlation between Miller's symptoms and the fall, implying a hypothetical relationship rather than dismissing causation entirely. The court emphasizes that the jury should weigh this testimony, which provides a reasonable basis for concluding that the defendant's actions may have caused Miller's neck problems. The court criticizes Judge Swiney's focus on the word "could," noting that the admissibility of expert opinions should not hinge on the terminology used by the physician. The testimony did not outright deny that the fall could have contributed to Miller's condition, indicating that it supports the plaintiff's position.

Expert testimony has been presented that supports causation but is also countered by the same experts, impacting the weight of their initial claims. It is determined that evaluating this evidence is the jury's responsibility. Medical experts are not expected to provide legally precise testimony, but their evidence must still meet established standards. Judge Swiney’s dissent suggests that Dr. Lister's statements fail to establish causation, particularly his admission of uncertainty regarding the original cause of Miller’s disc herniation. However, this uncertainty is interpreted as not indicating ambiguity about Miller’s current back condition. The majority opinion favors the interpretation that supports the plaintiff's position on directed verdicts. Additionally, it emphasizes Dr. Schock’s testimony linking Miller's back problems to the fall, which should not be disregarded. The court concludes that the evidence, viewed favorably for the plaintiffs, sufficiently meets the causation standard required. The trial court did not err in its decision regarding directed verdicts on Miller’s neck condition, and the testimonies of Dr. Schock and Dr. Lister were appropriately admitted. The defendant's objections regarding the admissibility of Dr. Lister's characterization of Miller's honesty and the phrasing of questions to Dr. Schock were considered, with any potential errors deemed harmless or resolved, leading to the conclusion that these objections lack merit.

The defendant challenges the trial court's admission of evidence regarding Miller's medical expenses, arguing that the plaintiffs did not prove causation for Miller's neck injury, thus warranting exclusion of related expenses. The court disagrees, affirming that expert testimony sufficiently established causation and that the plaintiffs demonstrated the necessity and reasonableness of the $30,534.91 in medical expenses. Dr. Schock and Dr. Lister testified to the necessity of their services and the reasonableness of charges from other providers. The court finds that even if some expenses were inadequately justified, this would not render the overall award excessive.

The defendant further claims the remitted verdict is excessive. The court asserts its obligation to uphold the jury's verdict if material evidence supports it, emphasizing that Miller's injuries led to significant medical expenses and economic losses totaling $411,846. Despite a brief return to work post-surgery, ongoing pain severely limited Miller's job performance and everyday activities, including personal care and hobbies. The plaintiffs also highlighted the emotional toll and impacts on their intimate life. Given this evidence, the court concludes that the remitted verdict is not excessive. Additionally, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court improperly remitted the jury's verdict, noting that damage calculations are typically the jury's domain, although the court can suggest remittitur for excessive awards.

Under T.C.A. 20-10-102(a), if a party refuses a remittitur, a new trial must be granted. If accepted under protest, the party may appeal the trial court's finding of an excessive verdict. Remittitur reviews follow Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d), requiring evaluation of whether evidence preponderates against the trial court's judgment. The court determined the jury's verdict was excessive and remittitur appropriate, ruling adversely to the plaintiffs.

The defendant contended that the jury was inadequately instructed on the plaintiffs' burden regarding causation, while the plaintiffs argued the instructions were sufficient and any errors did not warrant a new trial. Jury charges are assessed as a whole for reversible error. A charge is not invalid if it fairly defines legal issues and does not mislead the jury. The trial court can deny a requested instruction if its substance is covered elsewhere.

The defendant's requests included needing expert testimony for causation and definitions of cause in fact. The trial court sufficiently instructed the jury on causation, stating they must determine if the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries. The definition provided encompassed cause in fact. The court also found no error in not instructing on the "reasonably certain" standard for expert testimony, as this pertains to admissibility, a legal matter for the court, not the jury.

The trial court's refusal to provide the jury instructions requested by the defendant was not erroneous. The defendant argued that the jury should be instructed to require competent expert medical proof that Miller's medical expenses were caused by the defendant and that these expenses were necessary and reasonable. Additionally, the defendant contended that damages should not be awarded for any medical expense not substantiated by expert testimony indicating causation due to the defendant’s negligence and the necessity and reasonableness of those expenses. However, the court found no reversible error in not giving these instructions, as it adequately addressed the plaintiffs' burden of proving causation for Miller's injuries and the necessity and reasonableness of the incurred medical expenses. The lack of a specific instruction requiring expert testimony for establishing necessity and reasonableness was deemed harmless, given that these facts were sufficiently established through the expert testimony of Dr. Schock and Dr. Lister. The trial court's judgment is affirmed, with costs of the appeal taxed to the appellant, Choo Choo Partners, L.P., and the case is remanded for enforcement of the trial court’s judgment and collection of assessed costs according to applicable law.