Court: Supreme Court of the United States; May 2, 1966; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Chief Justice Waeren, delivering the Court's opinion, addresses South Carolina's bill of complaint, which seeks a declaration that certain provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 violate the Federal Constitution and an injunction against the Attorney General's enforcement of these provisions. The Court has original jurisdiction based on a constitutional controversy between a State and a citizen of another State. Given the lack of factual disputes and South Carolina's urgency for a ruling before the June 1966 primary elections, the Court expedited the hearing without appointing a special master.
Recognizing the case's national significance, the Court invited participation from all States as amici curiae, with several submitting briefs and some arguing the case orally. The arguments presented were measured and constructive despite the emotional context. The Voting Rights Act aims to eradicate racial discrimination in voting, with Congress believing it necessary to implement stringent remedies for widespread voting discrimination and to enhance existing measures for localized instances.
The Act derives its authority from Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, empowering Congress to take appropriate actions against racial discrimination in voting. The Court concludes that the challenged provisions of the Act are a legitimate means for Congress to fulfill its constitutional duties, thus denying South Carolina's request for an injunction. The constitutional validity of the Act is assessed against its historical context; Congress undertook extensive hearings and deliberations, resulting in overwhelming support in both chambers. The legislative process revealed Congress's recognition of the deep-rooted problem of voting discrimination and the need for more robust measures than previously attempted, as documented in the House and Senate committee reports.
The Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in 1870, was followed by the Enforcement Act of 1870, which criminalized the obstruction of voting rights. Subsequent amendments introduced federal oversight of elections, but enforcement weakened over time, leading to the repeal of many provisions in 1894, with minimal impact on ongoing voting discrimination. From 1890 onward, several Southern states enacted literacy tests and other measures aimed at disenfranchising Black voters, exploiting the high illiteracy rates among Black adults compared to white adults at that time. These discriminatory laws included grandfather clauses and alternative tests that exempted white voters. Key Supreme Court cases invalidated various discriminatory practices, such as grandfather clauses (Guinn v. United States; Myers v. Anderson), procedural hurdles (Lane v. Wilson), and the white primary (Smith v. Allwright; Terry v. Adams). Discriminatory voting tests were condemned in several cases, revealing a persistent pattern of discrimination against Black voters, who faced more stringent requirements than white voters. Recent Justice Department evidence indicated that discriminatory practices were pervasive in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, with white applicants often receiving leniency while Black applicants faced rigorous scrutiny. Attempts by Congress to address voting discrimination included the Civil Rights Act of 1957, which empowered the Attorney General to seek injunctions against racial voting interference, and amendments in the Civil Rights Act of 1960 that enhanced litigation capabilities against states and allowed courts to register voters in areas of systemic discrimination.
Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 aimed to expedite the resolution of voting discrimination cases and prohibited certain disqualification tactics against African American voters. However, it failed to significantly improve voter registration among African Americans, with minimal increases in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, where white voter registration remained substantially higher. Challenges included the labor-intensive preparation for voting lawsuits, slow litigation processes, evasion of court orders by local officials, and ineffective federal registration provisions due to procedural complexities. Notably, Dallas County, Alabama, served as a key example of this ineffectiveness, where despite federal intervention, Negro registration barely increased over four years amid widespread discrimination.
The House Committee on the Judiciary emphasized the prolonged struggle for voting rights, describing it as a failure to uphold constitutional rights. Recognizing these issues, Congress proposed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which aimed to eliminate racial discrimination in voting through a series of stringent remedies. Key provisions included the suspension of literacy tests for five years, the requirement for federal review of new voting regulations to prevent discrimination, and the assignment of federal examiners to register qualified voters. Additional measures were included to address ongoing discrimination.
Section 8 permits the appointment of federal poll-watchers in locations already assigned federal examiners. Section 10 (d) exempts voters in areas covered by Section 4 (b) from paying past poll taxes for state and local elections. Section 12 (e) allows for balloting by individuals denied access to polls where federal examiners are present. The Act broadly prohibits voting discrimination on racial grounds (Section 2) and enhances litigation procedures to challenge such discrimination (Sections 3, 6 (a), and 13 (b)). Section 4 (e) exempts citizens educated in foreign-language American schools from English literacy tests. Sections 10 (a) and (c) support constitutional challenges against poll taxes in state and local elections, while Sections 11 and 12 (a) and (d) impose civil and criminal penalties for interference with the rights protected by the Act.
South Carolina has not contested several sections, including Sections 2, 3, 4 (e), 6 (a), 8, 10, 12 (d) and (e), and 13 (b). Therefore, judicial review of these sections will occur in future litigation. The challenge to Sections 11 and 12 (a) and (c) is considered premature as no individual has faced the criminal sanctions they authorize. The review currently focuses on Sections 4 (a), (d), 5, 6 (b), 7, 9, 13 (a), and certain procedural elements of Section 14, which are actively enforced in South Carolina.
The coverage formula applies to any state or political subdivision if two conditions are met: the Attorney General identifies a "test or device" in use as of November 1, 1964, and the Census Director finds that less than 50% of voting-age residents were registered or voted in the 1964 presidential election. These findings are final upon Federal Register publication and are not subject to judicial review. The term "test or device" encompasses various voter requirements, including literacy, educational achievement, moral character, or qualifications verified by others. Section 4 (c) allows for the termination of statutory coverage if an area secures a declaratory judgment proving that no discriminatory tests or devices were used in the past five years, with the Attorney General's consent if no contrary evidence exists. Discrimination incidents that are rare, promptly corrected, and unlikely to recur do not count as violations under this section.
No area can seek a declaratory judgment for five years following a federal court's final decision confirming discrimination via tests or devices. Such actions are adjudicated by a three-judge panel, with appeals directly to the Court. South Carolina was included in the Act's coverage on August 7, 1965, alongside Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Virginia, 26 counties in North Carolina, and one county in Arizona. Additional counties in Arizona, Hawaii, and Idaho were added later. Alaska and certain counties in Arizona and Idaho have petitioned for declaratory judgments to end their statutory coverage.
In jurisdictions covered by Section 4(b) of the Act, individuals cannot be denied voting rights due to non-compliance with tests or devices. Consequently, South Carolina is temporarily prohibited from enforcing its literacy and property tax qualifications for voter registration. The Attorney General has deemed the property requirement inseparable from the literacy test, and South Carolina has not contested this determination. Similar suspensions apply to other covered regions.
Voting qualifications or procedures that differ from those in effect as of November 1, 1964, cannot be imposed unless approved by the Attorney General or through a declaratory judgment confirming no racial discrimination. South Carolina modified its voting laws in 1965 to extend polling hours but has not sought judicial review or submitted this change for Attorney General approval, although the Attorney General does not contest it.
In areas under Section 4(b), the Civil Service Commission must appoint voting examiners if the Attorney General receives credible complaints from at least 20 residents about racial disenfranchisement or determines that examiners are necessary to uphold the Fifteenth Amendment. The Attorney General must assess factors, including non-white to white registration ratios and evidence of compliance efforts. These determinations are not subject to court review and take effect upon publication in the Federal Register.
Examiners appointed to evaluate voting qualifications will follow regulations set by the Civil Service Commission, including specific times, places, and procedures. Individuals meeting state voting requirements must be promptly added to a list of eligible voters, which examiners must submit monthly to state or local officials for inclusion on official voting rolls. Those listed can vote in elections held more than 45 days after their names are transmitted. Examiners can remove individuals from the voting list if they lose eligibility under state law or if successfully challenged. Challenges must be filed within 10 days of public listing, supported by affidavits from two witnesses, and served to the individual challenged. A hearing officer will decide on the challenge within 15 days, with a petition for review possible within an additional 15 days, heard by the relevant circuit court, which will affirm unless the decision is clearly erroneous. Individuals listed can vote pending final decisions. Listing procedures may terminate if the Attorney General certifies all listed individuals are on voting rolls, or if a declaratory judgment confirms sufficient voter registration among non-white residents. A political subdivision can petition for termination, and the Director of the Census's determinations are final and non-reviewable. Federal examiners have been active in South Carolina, Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi since 1965, with extensive use of the challenge procedure. No subdivision has sought to withdraw examiners as of now. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is challenged on grounds of exceeding Congressional powers, encroaching on state authority, violating state equality, due process, and the separation of powers.
Claims have been made that the review of new voting rules mandated by Section 5 violates Article III by requiring the District Court to provide advisory opinions. It is argued that the assignment of federal examiners in Section 6(b) infringes on due process by eliminating judicial review of administrative findings and disrupts the separation of powers by assigning judicial roles to the Attorney General. Additionally, the challenge procedure in Section 9 is said to violate due process due to its expedited nature. South Carolina and some amici curiae assert that Sections 4(a) and 5, supported by Section 14(b), violate due process by confining litigation to a distant forum.
However, several of these claims can be dismissed. The term 'person' in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not extend to the States, a stance that has not been supported by any court. Similarly, the Bill of Attainder Clause and the principle of separation of powers are viewed as protections for individuals rather than states, and states lack standing to invoke these provisions against the Federal Government.
The objections to the Act are framed within the broader question of whether Congress has appropriately exercised its powers under the Fifteenth Amendment regarding the States. The standards for reviewing this question are established by the language and intent of the Fifteenth Amendment, prior judicial interpretations, and constitutional doctrines, asserting that Congress may employ rational means to enforce the prohibition of racial discrimination in voting against state powers. The Fifteenth Amendment explicitly states that citizens' right to vote cannot be denied or abridged based on race, color, or previous condition of servitude, and this provision has been interpreted as self-executing, invalidating discriminatory state voting practices. States maintain broad authority over voting conditions, but the Fifteenth Amendment prevails over conflicting state actions.
State actions that operate solely within a state's own interests are protected from federal judicial review; however, this protection does not apply if state actions are used to violate federally protected rights, as established in Gomillion v. Lightfoot. South Carolina argues that allowing Congress to enforce rights under the Fifteenth Amendment undermines the judiciary's authority. In contrast, Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment explicitly grants Congress the power to enforce its provisions through appropriate legislation, indicating that Congress holds primary responsibility for implementing rights established in Section 1. This authority has been historically recognized, with Congress having enacted and upheld legislation aimed at combating racial discrimination in voting, such as the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960.
The Supreme Court has affirmed Congress's broad remedial powers under the Fifteenth Amendment, indicating that legislation must be appropriate and consistent with the Constitution's scope. Chief Justice Marshall's framework dictates that as long as the legislative end is legitimate and within constitutional bounds, any means used to achieve that end are constitutional. The Court has reiterated this principle across various contexts related to the Civil War Amendments.
Therefore, the argument that Congress can only prohibit general violations of the Fifteenth Amendment and cannot create specific remedies is rejected. Congress's powers are comprehensive and unbounded by such limitations, as reaffirmed by Chief Justice Marshall's assertion that Congress's legislative powers are complete and only constrained by the Constitution itself.
Congress utilized its authority under the Fifteenth Amendment to enact the Voting Rights Act of 1965, implementing remedies for voting discrimination that activate without prior legal adjudication. This approach was justified due to the inadequacy of case-by-case litigation in addressing widespread discrimination and the delays caused by legal obstacles. Congress aimed to shift the advantage from those perpetrating discrimination to the victims after a lengthy history of resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment.
The Act targeted a limited number of States and political subdivisions known for significant voting discrimination, reflecting Congress's awareness of the issue's geographic prevalence. This selective approach did not violate the doctrine of state equality, as it relates solely to state admission to the Union, not to remedies for subsequent local injustices.
The coverage formula for Section 4(b) of the Act has faced criticism for being poorly designed and for overlooking local conditions unrelated to racial discrimination. However, Congress based its decisions on reliable evidence of voting discrimination in the affected areas. The Act specifically applies to Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, where substantial discrimination has been documented, as well as to Georgia, South Carolina, and parts of North Carolina, which had some evidence of recent discrimination. Congress was entitled to use various sources of information to identify these areas and impose new remedies.
Evidence of actual voting discrimination in the specified areas reveals two key characteristics: the use of tests and devices for voter registration and a voting rate in the 1964 presidential election at least 12 points below the national average. These factors are significant as tests historically facilitate discrimination, and low voting rates indicate widespread disenfranchisement. Consequently, the coverage formula is deemed rational both in theory and practice, justifying the imposition of new remedies on the remaining States and political subdivisions under the formula, unless they demonstrate a recent absence of substantial voting discrimination.
Congress is not restricted by statutory presumptions applicable to criminal cases when enacting civil remedies connected to the Fifteenth Amendment. The formula's exclusion of certain localities lacking voting tests, despite evidence of discrimination by other means, is irrelevant because Congress targeted the misuse of tests and devices, the primary concern prompting the new remedies. Additionally, the Act enhances existing remedies for voting discrimination in other regions.
Legislation need not uniformly address all aspects of a problem, provided the distinctions are based on practical experience. There are no exempt States or political subdivisions with recent discrimination records involving tests and devices, reinforcing the formula's rationality. The Act allows for the termination of special coverage at the request of States and political subdivisions that have not experienced substantial discrimination in the past five years.
Regarding litigation, Congress may limit cases under this provision to a single court in the District of Columbia, exercising its constitutional authority to establish inferior federal tribunals. Current regulations require claims against the United States over $10,000 to be filed in the Court of Claims, and until 1962, suits against federal officers were exclusively in the District of Columbia. There is no indication that Congress overstepped constitutional limits in these litigation provisions, maintaining the Act's reasonableness.
South Carolina argues that the termination procedures in question impose an unreasonably high burden of proof on states and political subdivisions seeking relief from the Act. However, the Attorney General clarified that an area only needs to provide affidavits from voting officials confirming a lack of racial discrimination in the past five years and may counter any opposing evidence from the Federal Government. Section 4(d) stipulates that an area does not need to disprove every instance of voting discrimination to obtain relief, making the burden of proof manageable, especially since states have unique knowledge of their voting practices. The Act prohibits judicial review of the Attorney General's and Census Director's findings that initiate the coverage formula, countering Alabama's claim of arbitrary imposition of remedies; Congress has previously permitted withdrawal of judicial review in similar administrative contexts. The findings in question rely on objective statistical data and routine analyses, which are unlikely to be disputed. If the formula is misapplied, affected areas may seek judicial termination of coverage, provided they have not engaged in recent voting discrimination, serving as an alternative to direct judicial review. The Act's remedies include the temporary suspension of existing voting qualifications, with South Carolina citing the precedent that literacy tests are not inherently unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment. Nonetheless, it acknowledges that such tests can be used to perpetuate discrimination, which has occurred in many states, including South Carolina. The Act's suspension of literacy tests for five years following substantial voting discrimination is deemed a legitimate response, supported by precedent in Fifteenth Amendment cases.
States that previously allowed white illiterates to vote could not justifiably complain about the registration of Black illiterates diluting their electorates. Congress understood that maintaining existing voting tests, regardless of future fair administration, would entrench past discrimination favoring unqualified white voters. Instead of mandating a complete re-registration of all voters, which could unduly burden white voters who had held the franchise for years, Congress opted for less drastic measures.
The Act enforces a suspension of new voting regulations until they are reviewed by federal authorities to ensure compliance with the Fifteenth Amendment. This approach, while potentially seen as an overreach of congressional power, is justified under exceptional circumstances recognized by the Court. Congress was aware that some States had previously devised new discriminatory voting rules to circumvent federal court mandates, leading them to act decisively against such maneuvers.
Limitations on litigation to the District Court for the District of Columbia and placing the burden of proof on the regions seeking relief were deemed appropriate. The Act automatically suspends any voting regulations enacted after November 1, 1964, creating an immediate controversy for States wishing to implement recent amendments.
Additionally, the Act allows for the appointment of federal examiners to identify qualified voters, including a streamlined challenge process. This measure addresses historical abuses by voting officials in certain jurisdictions who have used various tactics to disenfranchise Black voters, often in defiance of federal court rulings. Congress recognized that simply suspending problematic voting rules would not effectively address ongoing discrimination, hence the necessity for a more robust response.
To prevent the abuse of voter registration processes and to address errors or fraud in listings, the statute establishes several mechanisms. It allows for both judicial challenges and the ability for examiners to remove names independently. Fraudulently obtaining a listing is deemed a criminal act. The Attorney General is tasked with determining which political subdivisions require federal examiners, countering claims of arbitrary use of this authority by ensuring standards based on the demographic registration ratios and evidence of good-faith efforts to prevent voting discrimination. Special termination procedures provide indirect judicial review, allowing for the withdrawal of federal examiners where they are unnecessary. Congress, after nearly a century of resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment, has empowered the Attorney General with tools to combat voting discrimination effectively. Many affected jurisdictions have expressed readiness to comply with legitimate restrictions. The court affirms that the Voting Rights Act is a valid implementation of the Fifteenth Amendment, which aims to ensure that millions of non-white Americans can participate equally in governance. The court dismisses the bill of complaint, reaffirming the Act's purpose to eliminate race-based voting discrimination and establish equal voting rights.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is enacted to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, prohibiting any voting qualifications or practices that deny citizens the right to vote based on race or color. It also allows for federal examiners to be appointed in states or subdivisions where the Attorney General identifies violations, ensuring effective enforcement of voting rights.
To eliminate the continuing effects of discriminatory voting practices and prevent future occurrences, the following measures are established:
1. If the Attorney General initiates a proceeding under statutes enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment and the court finds that a test or device has been used to deny a citizen's voting rights based on race or color, the court must suspend the use of such tests or devices in the affected state or political subdivision for a determined appropriate period.
2. In cases where violations of the Fifteenth Amendment warrant equitable relief, the court shall retain jurisdiction for an appropriate duration. During this time, no new voting requirements or practices may be enforced unless proven not to deny or abridge voting rights based on race or color. Exceptions apply if such changes are submitted to and not objected by the Attorney General within sixty days; however, this does not preclude future actions to challenge these voting practices.
3. Citizens shall not be denied the right to vote in any election due to non-compliance with tests or devices in jurisdictions where prior determinations have been made. A state or subdivision may seek a declaratory judgment from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to confirm the absence of such discriminatory practices for five years prior to the action. However, no declaratory judgment can be issued for five years after a prior court judgment has confirmed the existence of discriminatory voting practices.
An action under this subsection is adjudicated by a three-judge court per section 2284 of title 28 of the United States Code, with appeals directed to the Supreme Court. The court retains jurisdiction for five years post-judgment and can reopen cases if the Attorney General alleges the use of discriminatory tests or devices affecting voting rights based on race or color. If the Attorney General finds no evidence of such discrimination within the preceding five years, he must consent to the judgment.
The provisions apply to any state or political subdivision that, as of November 1, 1964, employed any test or device, and where less than 50% of eligible voters were registered or voted in the 1964 presidential election. Determinations by the Attorney General or the Census Director are not subject to court review and are effective upon Federal Register publication.
“Test or device” refers to any requirement for voting or registration that necessitates demonstrating reading, writing, educational achievement, moral character, or qualifications verified by others. A state or subdivision is not deemed to have used such tests or devices if incidents were minimal, corrected promptly, their effects eliminated, and recurrence unlikely.
Congress asserts that to uphold the rights of individuals educated in non-English classrooms under the Fourteenth Amendment, states cannot condition voting rights on English literacy. Individuals who completed the sixth grade in schools where English was not the primary language cannot be denied the right to vote due to English literacy issues, although states with different educational standards must recognize equivalent education levels.
States or political subdivisions that wish to enact or administer any voting qualifications or procedures different from those in effect on November 1, 1964, may file for a declaratory judgment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. This action aims to establish that the new voting measures do not deny or abridge the right to vote based on race or color. Until a court judgment is entered, individuals cannot be denied the right to vote due to non-compliance with these new measures, unless the state's chief legal officer submits them to the Attorney General, who does not object within sixty days. A court action under this section will be heard by a three-judge panel, with appeals directed to the Supreme Court.
Additionally, if the Attorney General certifies that he has received complaints from twenty or more residents alleging denial of voting rights based on race or color, or if he believes such complaints to be valid, he may initiate the appointment of examiners. The Civil Service Commission is responsible for appointing these examiners to maintain voter eligibility lists for elections. Appointees will not be bound by standard civil service regulations, except for certain provisions of the Act of August 2, 1939.
Partisan political activity is prohibited, with the Commission authorized to designate individuals in the federal service to serve in specified positions with their consent. Examiners and hearing officers can administer oaths. Examiners will assess applicants’ qualifications for voting at locations designated by the Civil Service Commission. Applications must confirm the applicant is not registered to vote elsewhere. Individuals found qualified per state law will be added to an eligible voter list, which can be challenged without legal repercussions under section 12. The examiner will certify and send this list monthly to election officials and the Attorney General, ensuring public access to these lists prior to elections. Voters on this list can vote unless removed according to specific procedures. Each eligible voter will receive a certificate confirming their voting eligibility. Removal from the list may occur if challenged successfully or if the individual loses eligibility under state law. Additionally, the Civil Service Commission may assign personnel to observe elections in subdivisions, ensuring eligible voters can vote and that votes are accurately tabulated. Any challenges to the eligibility list will be addressed by a hearing officer appointed by the Civil Service Commission under prescribed regulations.
Challenges to a person's listing must be filed within ten days of the listing's public availability at a designated Civil Service Commission office. Such challenges require affidavits from at least two individuals with personal knowledge of the facts and a certification of service to the challenged individual at their residence. The Commission will determine the challenge within fifteen days. A petition for review of the decision can be filed in the relevant U.S. Court of Appeals within fifteen days of receiving the decision, but a hearing officer's decision can only be reversed if deemed clearly erroneous. Individuals listed may vote while awaiting resolution.
The Civil Service Commission is responsible for prescribing regulations regarding application procedures, eligibility lists, and removals, in consultation with the Attorney General. The Commission can issue subpoenas to compel testimony and document production, with district courts having jurisdiction to enforce compliance and punish contempt.
Congress has found that requiring a poll tax as a voting prerequisite disproportionately affects individuals of limited means, lacks a legitimate connection to state interests in election conduct, and can deny voting rights based on race or color. Consequently, Congress declares that such requirements abridge the constitutional right to vote in certain areas.
The Attorney General is empowered to initiate legal actions on behalf of the United States to seek declaratory judgments or injunctive relief against the enforcement of any poll tax as a voting prerequisite, particularly those established after November 1, 1964. These actions can target states or political subdivisions, with jurisdiction allocated to U.S. district courts and proceedings conducted by a three-judge panel, ensuring expedited hearings. During ongoing litigation, citizens in affected regions cannot be denied the right to vote due to unpaid poll taxes if they attempt payment at least 45 days prior to an election, regardless of state law stipulations. Payment must be acknowledged by an examiner, who is responsible for forwarding it to the appropriate state or local official.
Additionally, any person acting under the authority of law must not obstruct eligible voters or fail to count and report their votes. Coercion or intimidation related to voting, including attempts to influence others to vote or assist with voting, is prohibited. Violations involving false information for voter registration or voting purposes, including conspiracy to facilitate such actions or offering or accepting payment for voter registration or voting, are punishable by fines up to $10,000 or imprisonment for up to five years. This provision specifically applies to elections for federal offices.
Individuals who knowingly falsify or conceal material facts, or make false statements within the jurisdiction of an examiner or hearing officer, face a penalty of up to $10,000, five years of imprisonment, or both. Violations of rights secured by specified sections or attempts to deprive individuals of these rights also carry similar penalties. Actions such as destroying or altering ballots or official voting records within one year of an election are punishable by the same fines and imprisonment. Conspiracy to violate these provisions or interfere with secured rights is similarly penalized.
The Attorney General is authorized to seek preventive relief against individuals engaging in prohibited acts, including injunctions to ensure voting rights are upheld. If individuals allege they were denied the right to vote, examiners must notify the Attorney General, who can then petition the district court for immediate action to ensure their votes are counted before election results are finalized. This remedy does not exclude other legal remedies available under state or federal law.
U.S. district courts have jurisdiction over proceedings related to these matters, allowing individuals to assert their rights without needing to exhaust administrative remedies. Listing procedures for examiners can be terminated in political subdivisions when the Attorney General notifies the Civil Service Commission, or when a court determines that over 50% of nonwhite voting-age residents are registered to vote.
All individuals identified by an examiner for a political subdivision must be registered on the appropriate voting rolls, and there must be no reasonable basis to believe that individuals will be denied their voting rights due to race or color. Examiners appointed by the court can have their listing procedures terminated by petitioning the Attorney General. Additionally, the Attorney General can request the Director of the Census to conduct surveys necessary for determining compliance with voting rights. The District Court for the District of Columbia has jurisdiction to mandate such surveys if the Attorney General's refusal is deemed arbitrary.
Criminal contempt cases under this Act are governed by the Civil Rights Act of 1957. Only the District Court for the District of Columbia or appellate courts have jurisdiction to issue declaratory judgments or injunctions related to this Act. The terms "vote" or "voting" encompass all actions necessary for effective voting, including registration and ballot counting. A "political subdivision" refers to counties or parishes, or any other state subdivision responsible for voter registration.
In declaratory judgment actions, subpoenas for witnesses can be served nationwide, but those outside a 100-mile radius require court permission. Certain amendments to Section 2004 of the Revised Statutes are made, including the removal of the term "Federal" in specific subsections and the repeal of a subsection related to voting. The Attorney General and Secretary of Defense are tasked with studying voting preconditions that may discriminate against Armed Forces members and must report findings and recommendations to Congress by June 30, 1966.
The Act explicitly protects the voting rights of individuals registered under state laws, ensuring that such rights cannot be denied or negatively impacted. It authorizes necessary appropriations to implement the Act's provisions. Should any part of the Act be deemed invalid, the remaining sections and their applications to different persons or situations will remain unaffected. The document references historical context, including the support of various states in relation to South Carolina and the Attorney General, as well as various congressional hearings and records. It highlights the historical disenfranchisement of African Americans, particularly through literacy tests and other discriminatory practices established during the South Carolina Constitutional Convention of 1895, which aimed to restrict black voting rights. The document also notes the educational restrictions placed on African Americans prior to the Civil War and the subsequent establishment of segregated public schools in the South.
Brown v. Board of Education and the 1959 Commission on Civil Rights Report highlight systemic discrimination in voting practices against African Americans. Several court cases illustrate this, including United States v. Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, where discriminatory actions by registrars were evident. For instance, a white applicant in Louisiana was deemed capable of interpreting the state constitution based solely on a written statement, while in Alabama, a white individual with no formal education was enrolled after a registrar completed his application. In contrast, registrars in Mississippi imposed stricter requirements on Black applicants, such as requiring them to interpret complex legal provisions and denying registration to educated Black individuals. The Fifth Circuit Court mandated equitable treatment for Black applicants, leading to legislative changes that imposed stricter registration requirements for all, effectively undermining the intended equality. Key legislative references include sections of the Voting Rights Act and various congressional reports that documented the discriminatory practices and legislative responses.
