Christina Mae Stroud v. Jimmy Stroud

Citation: Not availableDocket: M1999-02239-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; July 26, 2001; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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In the case of Christina Mae Stroud (Read) v. Jimmy Ray Stroud, the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed a post-divorce appeal from the mother, Christina Mae Stroud, challenging the trial court's decision not to overturn a 1995 contempt order against her. The contempt order resulted in a ten-day jail sentence for Stroud and a judgment of $10,274.85 awarded to the father, Jimmy Ray Stroud, for attorney fees and expenses incurred due to her alleged interference with his visitation rights.

The couple, divorced in 1991, shares a daughter born in 1989, with joint custody established via a Marital Dissolution Agreement that designated the mother as the primary custodian. Following the mother's relocation to South Carolina in 1993, the father filed a contempt petition in 1995, claiming she had obstructed his visitation and alleging unfounded sexual abuse accusations against him.

Notably, the mother did not appear at the contempt hearing, leading the probate court to find her in willful contempt, resulting in the jail sentence and judgment against her, which the court deemed necessary for the child’s best interests. In 1999, the mother sought to have the contempt ruling set aside, arguing that the father's child support arrears surpassed the judgment amount. The appellate court ultimately affirmed the trial court's ruling, concluding that the original contempt order and judgment remained valid.

On October 29, 1999, the trial judge transferred jurisdiction of a child custody case to South Carolina after determining that no parties remained in Tennessee. The judge ordered the transfer of the complete case record to the Family Court for the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit in South Carolina and upheld the contempt order and probate court judgment. The court declined to consider evidence regarding the Father's child support payments, deferring that issue to the South Carolina and Mississippi courts. 

The case is reviewed de novo without presumption of correctness regarding legal conclusions. The trial court found that the contempt order against the Mother was valid and not subject to being set aside, citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202, which mandates a one-year limit for post-conviction relief petitions. The court classified the Mother’s actions as willful contempt, resulting in a ten-day jail sentence without the possibility of early release, indicating a finding of criminal contempt.

The Mother challenged the validity of the contempt sentence on two grounds: insufficient notification of criminal charges in the summons and the absence of a hearing in her presence. Constitutional protections for criminal defendants, including presumption of innocence and adequate notice, were emphasized. The notice for criminal contempt must clearly inform the accused of the charges and be distinguishable from civil suits, as established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Gompers. Additionally, Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 42(b) mandates that any prosecution for criminal contempt must include timely notice detailing the hearing's date and essential facts of the contempt charge.

Mother asserts that the notice she received was insufficient to inform her of the criminal nature of the charges against her and failed to indicate the possibility of incarceration. According to case law, criminal contempt convictions can be reversed for lack of adequate notice if relief is sought in a timely manner. Additionally, Mother contends that Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 mandates a defendant's presence during proceedings. The Tennessee Supreme Court has previously ruled that a judgment is void if a defendant is tried, convicted, and sentenced in their absence. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that if a defendant, having been notified of the trial date and their right to attend, voluntarily absents themselves, they may waive their right to be present. The court emphasized the necessity of a high standard of proof to establish that the defendant was aware of the trial date and that their absence was voluntary, citing a public interest in the fairness of judicial proceedings. Mother argues that no compelling reasons justified the trial proceeding in her absence and criticizes the trial court for not considering alternative measures to secure her attendance. While she has raised valid challenges to the contempt conviction that warrant further examination, the initial determination must focus on whether her challenges are time-barred. Relief is available for void convictions if a defendant can demonstrate a violation of constitutional rights, but there are statutory limitations for seeking such relief.

A person in custody under a court sentence must petition for post-conviction relief within one year of the highest state appellate court's final action or, without an appeal, from when the judgment became final. This one-year period is strictly enforced and cannot be extended for any reason, including legal provisions that might typically allow for tolling. The right to file a petition is extinguished after this period. The term "in custody" has been broadly interpreted by the Tennessee Supreme Court to include any potential restraint on liberty, as seen in the cases of *Albert v. State* and *State v. McCraw*. In these cases, individuals who had completed their sentences but faced restrictions, such as voting rights, were still considered "in custody." Although the mother in the current case was not incarcerated for her contempt conviction, her unserved sentence represents a possibility of restraint, making her subject to the one-year filing requirement. Despite this, due process considerations can occasionally toll the limitations period, as illustrated in *Williams v. State*, where circumstances prevented a timely filing due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The court in *Williams* allowed for an evidentiary hearing to assess the reasons for the late filing.

More than twenty-one months post-conviction, the defendant submitted a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, claiming denial of due process and ineffective assistance of counsel during the appellate process. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the defendant did not file for timely post-conviction relief per the statute but hesitated to dismiss the petition as "indisputably time-barred." Citing Seals v. State, the Court emphasized that strict adherence to the statute of limitations should not impede a petitioner’s reasonable opportunity to assert a claim, particularly when there might be extenuating circumstances, such as possible attorney misrepresentation, that hindered timely filing. The Court underscored that tolling the statute of limitations is warranted when a petitioner faces circumstances beyond their control, like mental incompetence or attorney misconduct.

However, the mother involved provided no justification for her four-year delay in seeking post-conviction relief and did not claim any circumstances beyond her control, leading the Court to deny her motion to set aside a contempt conviction as time-barred. 

In a separate matter, the probate court awarded the father $10,274.85 in 1995 for fees and expenses incurred in enforcing court orders, deemed reasonable and necessary for maintaining the father-child relationship. The court characterized this judgment as “in the nature of child support,” which could have legal implications for enforcement but did not relieve the father of his child support obligations. The Court clarified that a modification of child support is only permissible upon a significant variance from the guidelines, noting no modification request or evidence of a change in circumstances was presented in the 1995 order or the current record.

Mother's petition sought to establish that a 1995 child support judgment was satisfied, asserting that the amount owed did not exceed the judgment, rather than requesting the judgment be voided or set aside. During the hearing, Mother’s counsel requested the court to formally acknowledge the satisfaction of judgment and indicated readiness to provide evidence of Father's child support payment history. However, the trial court refused to consider this evidence, stating that the judgment remained valid and that issues related to nonpayment should be addressed in Mississippi or South Carolina courts. The trial court confirmed that both Mother and Father retained rights to enforce their respective support awards, but any modification or enforcement issues must be handled in those other jurisdictions.

Tennessee law grants exclusive jurisdiction over child support orders to the issuing tribunal, which retains that jurisdiction as long as any party or the child resides in the state, unless all parties consent to a different jurisdiction. In this case, no relevant parties remained in Tennessee, thus eliminating the state's jurisdiction to modify the child support order. The statute referenced is part of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, adopted in Tennessee, which outlines that jurisdiction persists as long as one party or the child resides in the issuing state. Mother mentioned initiating custody modification proceedings in South Carolina. The Tennessee Supreme Court has indicated that while the comments to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act are not legally binding, they provide significant interpretive guidance. The text implies that jurisdiction can be lost if the conditions for its retention are not met.

If all relevant parties—the obligor, individual obligee, and child—have permanently left the issuing state, that state lacks the necessary connection to justify jurisdiction for modifying obligations. The issuing tribunal is also without current information regarding the involved parties, and public funds should not be spent on such processes. The trial court correctly declined to consider evidence about the Father's payment history or to declare the judgment satisfied, as Tennessee lacks the appropriate nexus to modify the case. The trial court’s refusal to set aside the criminal contempt judgment is affirmed due to the petition being time-barred, and it is also affirmed that the court had no jurisdiction to modify the judgment. The case is remanded for any further necessary proceedings, with costs assessed to the appellant, Christina Mae Stroud Read, with execution permitted if necessary.