Jason Blake Bryant filed a Petition for Post-conviction Relief on September 26, 2001, after the trial court denied his initial request following a hearing. The appeal, which included claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and an involuntary guilty plea, was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee. The court, led by Judge Jerry L. Smith and joined by Judges David H. Welles and Robert W. Wedemeyer, upheld the trial court's ruling, confirming that the judgment was appropriate as per Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.
The factual background involved a 1997 incident where Bryant and five associates, armed with firearms, attempted to steal a car for a trip from Kentucky to Louisiana. They encountered the Lillelid family at a rest stop in Greene County, Tennessee, where they forcibly abducted them. The family was later shot, resulting in the deaths of three members and serious injury to a child. The group fled to Mexico but was apprehended in the Lillelid's van. All participants, except for Bryant and another juvenile, faced the death penalty, and they ultimately pleaded guilty to multiple counts of first-degree murder and attempted murder. The trial court sentenced them to life without parole for the murder convictions and twenty-five years for attempted murder, with all sentences to be served consecutively. The appellate court affirmed these sentences, and the state supreme court declined further review.
The petitioner submitted a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on September 23, 2001, which was filed with the trial court on September 26, 2001. According to Rule 28.2(G) of the Tennessee Supreme Court, if a document is delivered for mailing by the filing deadline, it is considered timely filed. The trial court conducted a hearing on the petition, evaluated witness testimony, and ultimately dismissed it. The petitioner is appealing this dismissal.
In reviewing the appeal, the court will uphold the post-conviction court's findings of fact unless the evidence significantly contradicts those findings. The review of legal conclusions is de novo, meaning no presumption of correctness applies. The petitioner raises multiple arguments, starting with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during both trial and appeal. To succeed on this claim, the petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice. Deficient performance is assessed against the standard of competence expected in criminal cases, while prejudice requires showing a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed if not for the deficiencies.
The appellate court will not reassess factual findings from the post-conviction court, which are presumed correct unless proven otherwise. However, issues of counsel's performance and its impact on the defense are treated as mixed questions of law and fact, warranting de novo review. The petitioner cannot rely on hindsight to criticize trial strategy, and relief is not granted for sound but unsuccessful tactical choices, provided those choices followed adequate case preparation by counsel.
The petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial, citing several key failures: 1) lack of challenge to his transfer from juvenile court despite mental health issues; 2) failure to request an acceptance hearing post-transfer; 3) inadequate investigation of his social history; 4) engagement of an unqualified mental health expert; 5) unsuccessful pursuit of a severance; 6) lack of a developed defense theory; 7) misguided advice to accept a plea offer; 8) allowing sentencing by the trial court instead of a jury; and 9) failure to establish a mitigation strategy.
Regarding the transfer from juvenile court, the petitioner argues that his counsel's strategy to contest the transfer was inadequate. His counsel had filed a motion against the transfer, which the juvenile court denied on July 28, 1997. The counsel believed that asserting the petitioner’s mental health issues could portray him negatively, potentially labeling him as a "compulsive psycho-path." Counsel opted against a comprehensive mental evaluation to avoid this risk, relying instead on evaluations from Dr. Thomas Schacht and Dr. Don Larkin, both of whom deemed the petitioner competent for trial and not mentally ill.
At the post-conviction hearing, the petitioner presented testimony from Dr. Bruce Seidner, who criticized the brevity of Dr. Schacht's evaluation. However, the petitioner failed to provide evidence that his trial counsel did not request an acceptance hearing. To succeed in a post-conviction relief petition, the petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice. The court found that the trial counsel's strategy, aimed at preventing the perception of the petitioner as a psychopath, was reasonable and effective in attempting to avoid transfer to criminal court. Therefore, no deficiency in counsel's performance was established in relation to the juvenile court proceedings.
The petitioner argued that trial counsel was ineffective in several respects regarding his representation. He filed a motion contesting the transfer to juvenile court and sought an acceptance hearing. The juvenile court ruled in favor of the transfer, and it was determined that the petitioner did not demonstrate deficient performance by his trial counsel during the post-conviction hearing.
The petitioner claimed trial counsel failed to adequately investigate his social history. However, trial counsel testified that he engaged an investigator and mitigation specialist, Chris Brown, who compiled a social history and mitigation report. He also visited the petitioner’s hometown to review evidence. Family witnesses at the post-conviction hearing stated they had not met the investigator but confirmed meeting with trial counsel. While the family members testified about trial counsel's meetings in Kentucky, they did not provide sufficient evidence to establish ineffective assistance. The trial court found that the investigation into the petitioner’s background was adequate and noted that other sources of social history, including criminal and medical records, were available. The court concluded that even if the investigation had been deficient, it was unlikely to have altered the outcome, given the weight of the psychiatric evaluation and the petitioner’s criminal history.
Additionally, the petitioner contended that trial counsel was ineffective for selecting Dr. Granacher as a mental health expert, claiming the evaluation was inadequate. Trial counsel stated he was referred to Dr. Granacher, who characterized the petitioner as a follower, supporting the defense argument that he was not a leader in the offense. Dr. Seidner, another psychiatrist, criticized the evaluation for lacking certain tests but acknowledged Dr. Granacher’s competence. He later admitted that his critique was based on a misunderstanding of the context of Dr. Granacher's testimony, which was intended to mitigate the petitioner’s sentence. Ultimately, the trial court affirmed that trial counsel's performance was adequate in these matters.
The petitioner failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel was ineffective in hiring Dr. Granacher, as even a witness for the petitioner acknowledged the unfairness of his criticism after understanding the context of Granacher’s testimony. Consequently, the trial court correctly concluded that the hiring of Dr. Granacher did not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Regarding the motion to sever, the trial counsel did file a motion and argued for fundamental fairness, asserting the unfairness of jointly trying a juvenile with an adult. The trial court denied the severance, a decision that was upheld on interlocutory appeal, indicating that trial counsel had adequately represented the petitioner in this regard.
The petitioner contended that his trial counsel did not develop a sufficient defense strategy. However, trial counsel testified that he aimed to prove the petitioner was not the shooter and highlighted factors such as the petitioner’s youth, susceptibility, and psychological issues. The trial court affirmed that a defense theory was effectively developed, and even if alternative strategies were proposed in hindsight, this does not equate to ineffective representation.
Lastly, the petitioner claimed ineffective assistance related to his guilty plea, asserting he was misled into accepting an unfair plea agreement to protect his co-defendants from the death penalty. He expressed concerns about the potential death penalty for one co-defendant. During the plea allocution, the trial judge confirmed the petitioner understood the waiver of rights, with trial counsel affirming he had reviewed the plea agreement with the petitioner. Trial counsel also testified about discussing the plea offer and the likelihood of conviction, suggesting that the evidence against the petitioner was compelling. The petitioner did not provide sufficient evidence to support his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel concerning the guilty plea.
The petitioner believed that his best chance for receiving a life sentence was before a trial judge familiar with severe factual scenarios, as he considered a jury likely to be unsympathetic. He claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging that his family was not consulted about his plea and was not invited to the plea hearing. Family members testified to this lack of consultation and exclusion, while trial counsel asserted that the family was involved in the decision and invited to the hearing. The trial court found no merit to the petitioner’s claims, concluding that trial counsel effectively engaged with the petitioner’s family during plea negotiations and that the plea was fair and not skewed. The court emphasized that there is no precedent indicating a guilty plea is involuntary due to motivations based on friendship or concern for others. The appellate court deferred to the trial court's credibility determinations regarding the testimony of trial counsel versus the family members.
Additionally, the petitioner contended that his trial counsel was ineffective during the sentencing hearing, arguing that counsel allowed the trial judge to impose a sentence, failed to develop a social history, and omitted important exculpatory evidence. Trial counsel believed that a trial judge would be more lenient than a jury. The trial court ruled that the counsel's representation was effective and that the decision to have the trial judge conduct the sentencing was a strategic choice that could not be second-guessed. The court reaffirmed the validity of the guilty plea and noted that trial counsel’s failure to call a specific witness and to present comprehensive mitigation evidence did not demonstrate ineffective assistance.
At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel recalled taking a statement from Dawn Miller at Greene County Jail, where she claimed Crystal Sturgill indicated the petitioner was not the shooter. Sturgill allegedly gestured to Dean Mullins, who denied the petitioner’s involvement and pointed to Joe Risner’s cell. However, trial counsel deemed Miller's statement insufficient to counter the petitioner's confession and the assertions of five other defendants identifying him as the shooter. The petitioner did not call Miller as a witness, which is typically necessary to demonstrate that the absence of a witness resulted in a denial of critical evidence prejudicial to the petitioner. The court noted it could not speculate on the potential impact of Miller's testimony without her presence at the hearing, leading to the conclusion that trial counsel was not ineffective for not presenting her.
The court also evaluated the effectiveness of trial counsel’s actions during the appeal, addressing specific claims: 1) that trial counsel advanced incorrect reasoning regarding the Rule 10 Appeal concerning the Motion to Sever; 2) failed to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court after the denial of the Motion to Sever; 3) did not respond to a Showcause Order that could have allowed an independent review of the appeal; and 4) inadequately presented the merits of the petitioner’s appeal. The same two-prong standard for ineffective assistance of trial counsel applies to appellate counsel. While the State argued that these claims should be waived due to lack of argumentation and citation, the court opted to assess their merits. Ultimately, the petitioner did not demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective, and the issues raised were deemed without merit.
The petitioner claims ineffective assistance of trial counsel regarding his Rule 10 Appeal, arguing that counsel failed to address the inequity between juvenile and adult defendants in plea negotiations and did not seek permission to appeal the trial court’s denial of a motion to sever. These points are deemed tactical decisions, and the court finds no evidence that counsel’s choices were uninformed or that he was unprepared. Thus, the court concludes that trial counsel's performance was not deficient.
In the Direct Appeal section, the petitioner argues that trial counsel only appealed the sentencing issue post-plea. The court notes that a guilty plea generally waives the right to appeal previous non-jurisdictional defects, but not the sentence itself. Therefore, the claim of ineffective assistance in this regard is also found to lack merit.
Regarding trial counsel’s brief, the petitioner contends that it inadequately represented his appeal of the sentence. However, the court states that merely attaching a brief as an appendix does not incorporate it into the record. Decisions on which issues to raise are within counsel's discretion, and the court sees no indication of inadequate preparation or uninformed choices by the trial counsel.
Finally, the petitioner alleges ineffective assistance because trial counsel did not respond to a Showcause Order from the court, which could have allowed for separate consideration of the direct appeal from sentencing. Counsel could not recall whether he responded but mentioned participating in related conference calls. The court does not find this argument persuasive. Overall, all claims of ineffective assistance are deemed without merit.
The decision to participate in a consolidated appeal is deemed a tactical choice by appellate counsel, and without evidence of an uninformed decision or lack of preparation, there is no basis to challenge this strategy. Consequently, the trial counsel's performance is not considered deficient, rendering this issue meritless.
The petitioner claims his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary, asserting violations of due process rights due to the trial court's refusal to sever juvenile defendants from adults, the "all or nothing" plea offer, and deficiencies in the plea allocution. According to U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a guilty plea must represent a voluntary and intelligent choice among available options, assessed through the totality of circumstances, including the defendant's intelligence, familiarity with the legal process, representation by competent counsel, and the reasons behind the plea.
The petitioner also contends that he could not enter plea negotiations freely, fearing severe consequences for co-defendants if he did not accept the plea. However, package deal pleas are permissible in Tennessee, and previous rulings affirm that such plea agreements do not infringe upon defendants' rights. The court noted that concerns about co-defendants do not invalidate a plea's legitimacy, as established in similar cases.
Several factors beyond the factual circumstances can influence a defendant's decision to plead guilty, such as reducing stress for the defendant and their family, eliminating certain consequences, and minimizing potential exposure to harsher penalties. In the case of the petitioner, despite his concern for co-defendants, this did not invalidate his plea. Although he was not facing the death penalty, his plea could result in a sentence of life with parole instead of life without parole, which a jury would likely impose. The trial court's denial of the motion to sever and the nature of the plea did not compromise the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of the plea.
The petitioner also contended that the trial court’s en masse allocution at the guilty plea hearing violated his due process rights. Previous rulings determined that such allocution did not meet necessary standards, as the trial court did not receive individual responses from each defendant. Despite this insufficiency, the court found evidence that the petitioner entered his plea knowingly and intelligently. Notably, the petitioner had an individual exchange with the trial court regarding his reading and comprehension abilities, confirming his understanding of the plea. Unlike other co-defendants, he was specifically asked about his understanding of the waiver of rights. Additionally, the validity of the guilty plea is assessed based on the defendant's intelligence, familiarity with criminal proceedings, representation by competent counsel, and the reasons for choosing to plead guilty to avoid more severe penalties.
Determining the voluntariness and intelligence of the petitioner's guilty plea, the court referenced Blankenship v. State, highlighting that the petitioner had a seventh-grade education at the time of the plea but later completed his G.E.D. His below-average I.Q. did not hinder his ability to succeed academically. Despite having two prior juvenile offenses, his experience with the criminal justice system was limited. The petitioner received competent legal representation from trial counsel, who had 25 years of experience and was qualified to handle death penalty cases. Counsel thoroughly explained the plea offer, its implications, and confirmed that the petitioner had no questions at that time. The petitioner expressed a desire to plead guilty to avoid further loss of life, a statement which the counsel did not believe compromised the plea's validity.
At the post-conviction hearing, the trial court established that the attorney fully elucidated the plea, which included pleading guilty to three counts of first-degree murder, with potential sentences ranging from concurrent life with parole eligibility to life without parole. The petitioner understood he was waiving his right to a jury trial and all pretrial matters. Although the petitioner mentioned concerns for co-defendants, he decided to accept the plea, and there was no evidence presented to substantiate claims of coercion. The petitioner’s parents were present during discussions and expressed no reservations. The court noted that the allocation transcript demonstrated the trial court explained every right and consequence clearly. The petitioner claimed he disengaged from the questions and merely echoed co-defendants' responses, yet the allocution record contradicted this assertion, indicating a comprehensive understanding of the plea process.
Petitioner addressed key issues individually and provided appropriate responses, notably differing from other defendants regarding his literacy. He admitted to pleading guilty on the basis of his guilt and demonstrated the ability to understand and articulate during hearings, despite an I.Q. of 85. He earned a G.E.D. while incarcerated and did not question or attempt to withdraw his plea during the two-week period between the plea and sentencing. No objections were raised on his behalf regarding the plea, leading to the conclusion that the plea was entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, with any allocution deficiencies deemed harmless error.
Petitioner also contended that the charging instrument was defective and violated due process as per Jones v. United States and Apprendi v. New Jersey, arguing that the lack of aggravating circumstances in the indictment rendered it constitutionally flawed. Apprendi establishes that aggravating factors must be included in the indictment to enhance a sentence. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Ring v. Arizona, which deemed certain capital sentencing procedures unconstitutional, built upon Apprendi's principles. However, the Tennessee Supreme Court, in State v. Dellinger, determined that Apprendi does not apply to Tennessee's capital sentencing scheme, a view reiterated by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals in subsequent cases. The reliance on juries for sentencing decisions in Tennessee distinguishes it from the issues addressed in Ring, affirming that the principles in Apprendi do not affect Tennessee's capital sentencing framework.
The Supreme Court outlined several reasons why Apprendi does not apply to the Tennessee capital sentencing scheme:
1. The aggravating factor in this case, a prior conviction, is specifically excluded from the Apprendi holding, which pertains to enhancement factors other than prior convictions.
2. The death penalty for first-degree murder falls within the statutory range established by the legislature, and Apprendi applies only to enhancement factors that exceed the statutory maximum. The Court clarified that its decision does not invalidate state capital sentencing procedures that require judges to find aggravating factors for imposing the death penalty, as judges do not determine the existence of factors that elevate a crime to capital status but rather decide on the imposition of the maximum penalty.
3. Tennessee law mandates that district attorneys notify capital defendants at least thirty days prior to trial of their intent to seek the death penalty, specifying the aggravating circumstances, which satisfies due process and notice requirements.
4. The capital sentencing procedure in Tennessee necessitates that juries determine statutory aggravating circumstances.
5. Tennessee statutes require that juries find any statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, thus complying with Apprendi’s standard.
The court concluded that Apprendi is not applicable to Tennessee capital sentencing cases, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ring does not alter this conclusion. The petitioner’s argument regarding the unconstitutionality of his indictment under Apprendi was dismissed, especially as he had pled guilty and waived his right to a jury sentencing. Consequently, his due process rights were not violated.
Additionally, in post-conviction proceedings, the petitioner raised several issues regarding trial counsel’s records. He contended that the trial court wrongly denied post-conviction counsel the ability to review trial counsel’s time and disciplinary records and to depose trial counsel. Discovery in post-conviction proceedings is governed by specific Tennessee statutes and Supreme Court rules, allowing discovery only under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.
The court rules require the trial court to order the State to disclose all relevant information under Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure when a post-conviction petition presents a colorable claim. Rule 28, section 6(C)(7) mandates State compliance with discovery under Rule 16. However, Rule 16 does not include provisions for depositions, which are instead covered under Rule 15, leading to the conclusion that depositions are not permitted in post-conviction proceedings. Even if depositions were allowed, they were unnecessary in this case as trial counsel was present and examined during the proceedings.
Rule 16 outlines the State's obligation to permit the defendant to inspect various forms of evidence that are material to the defendant's defense or intended for use by the State. Specifically, trial counsel's time records are not discoverable under Rule 16 since they are not within the State's control or intended for use in the State's case. Although trial counsel's disciplinary records may be deemed to be in the possession of the State, their relevance under Rule 16 remains questionable.
The court's interpretation of "material" in Rule 16, as established in State v. Thomas Dee Huskey, aligns more closely with federal standards than with state civil procedure definitions. The concept of materiality requires that the pretrial disclosure of evidence must significantly alter the proof in the defendant's favor, indicating that the evidence must have a substantial impact on the defense's case preparation.
Evidence must significantly aid in uncovering admissible evidence, assisting witness preparation, corroborating testimony, or aiding impeachment and rebuttal to be considered material. In State v. Hershel Clark, the court concluded that trial counsel’s disciplinary records were not materially relevant to the case, as their existence would not demonstrate ineffective assistance. Consequently, the trial court appropriately denied the discovery of these records, which are also confidential under Tennessee Supreme Court rules.
The petitioner further contended that the trial court erred by denying funds for an expert witness in his post-conviction proceedings. Under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28, funds may only be authorized for indigent petitioners in capital cases, which does not apply here as the petitioner, a juvenile, was not death-eligible and received a life sentence without parole. The petitioner’s argument that his case should be treated as capital due to his co-defendants' status was rejected.
Additional claims raised by the petitioner included: the exclusion of Professor Daniel Foley's testimony regarding sentencing jurists; denial of due process due to a non-lawyer judge in the Juvenile Court; improper designation of the hearing officer; alleged violations of his right to a fair appellate tribunal related to the motion to sever; insufficient appellate review of sentencing; and denial of Supreme Court review. Claims lacking appropriate support or references will be deemed waived by the court.
A ground for relief is waived if the petitioner or their attorney did not present it in any competent court proceeding unless the claim is based on a newly recognized constitutional right with retroactive application or was not presented due to state action violating constitutional rights (Tenn. Code Ann. 40-30-206(g), State v. Benson). The petitioner sought to present expert testimony from Professor Daniel Foley to argue that the trial judge was the toughest sentencing judge in Tennessee, aiming to demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel for allowing a waiver of jury sentencing. However, the petitioner failed to argue why the trial court erred in excluding this evidence or to provide supporting authority, leading to a waiver of this issue. Even if the issue were not waived, the trial court's discretion over expert testimony admissibility was not abused (State v. Ballard). The petitioner also referenced ineffective assistance regarding the waiver of jury sentencing, which had been previously addressed and found meritless, as the petitioner chose to plead guilty knowing he would be sentenced by the trial court.
Additionally, the petitioner claimed that his due process rights were violated during juvenile proceedings due to a non-lawyer judge presiding and mislabeling of the hearing officer. However, this claim also falls outside the waiver exceptions and is therefore waived. Lastly, the petitioner alleged due process violations by the Court of Criminal Appeals and the Tennessee Supreme Court at various stages of his case.
The petitioner contends that trial counsel inadequately argued that plea negotiations were compromised due to the juvenile defendants' ineligibility for the death penalty, suggesting this should have been raised in the Rule 10 Appeal. He questions whether the responsibility lies with the attorney for not recognizing the impact of joinder on plea negotiations, with the Court for not addressing these concerns, or with the Supreme Court for not anticipating the outcome without severance. The petitioner also claims that his right to a thorough sentencing review was violated due to the superficial treatment of this matter in the Court's direct appeal opinion. He urges the Court to critically assess its own performance, asserting flaws in what was not articulated in the opinion.
However, the Court finds these issues waived, noting the petitioner failed to provide any legal authority to support his claims regarding the Court's review or the Supreme Court's denial of review. The Court concludes that the petitioner’s arguments regarding violations of his rights are meritless. Additionally, the petitioner raises a cumulative error claim, attributing various failures—including ineffective assistance of counsel and shortcomings in judicial processes—to a broader systemic failure of the Tennessee Judicial Branch. The Court has addressed these concerns and found no significant errors in the majority of the complaints. Consequently, the Court affirms the trial court's decision to deny the petition for post-conviction relief.
