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Freedman v. Maryland
Citations: 13 L. Ed. 2d 649; 85 S. Ct. 734; 380 U.S. 51; 1965 U.S. LEXIS 1732; 1 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1126Docket: 69
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; March 1, 1965; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Mr. Justice Brennan addressed the constitutionality of the Maryland motion picture censorship statute (Md. Ann. Code, 1957, Art. 66A) in the case involving the appellant, who exhibited the film "Revenge at Daybreak" without prior submission to the State Board of Censors, as required by § 2. The State acknowledged that the film would have received a license if submitted correctly, yet the appellant was convicted. The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the conviction, asserting that the statute did not violate First and Fourteenth Amendment protections. The Supreme Court reversed this decision, clarifying that reliance on the precedent set in Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago was misplaced. The narrow question in Times Film was whether prior restraint is unconstitutional under all circumstances, and the Court had held that constitutional protection against prior restraints is not absolute. The appellant's argument differed from that in Times Film; he contended that § 2, in conjunction with the broader statutory framework, posed a risk of unduly suppressing protected expression. Particularly concerning was the lack of a time limit for the Board's decision-making process, which could delay the exhibition of films. The statute required films to be submitted for review, but if disapproved, the exhibitor faced a lengthy appeals process without initial judicial oversight. Consequently, the Court recognized that the statute effectively barred the exhibition of disapproved films until a successful appeal was made, thus constituting an invalid prior restraint on expression. The procedures for review and appeal outlined in the statute further underscored the potential for undue suppression of protected artistic expression. A right of appeal exists from the Baltimore City Court's decision to the Maryland Court of Appeals, governed by standard appeal procedures. There are no statutory provisions for judicial involvement in film censorship procedures, nor guarantees of timely judicial review, which historically has shown significant delays—approximately four months for initial determinations and six months for appellate vindication, as illustrated in United Artists Corp. v. Maryland State Board of Censors. The Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that the appellant, by not submitting the film to the Board, could only challenge § 2 of the statute and lacked standing to contest other provisions. The appellant argues that § 2 constitutes an invalid prior restraint, interconnected with the overall statutory framework, rather than asserting independent invalidity of the other provisions. Established legal precedents affirm that individuals can challenge statutes delegating excessive licensing discretion, regardless of their own licensing status. The appellant’s concerns about the Maryland censorship framework's potential overreach provide sufficient standing for this challenge. While the Court does not determine if the Maryland statute is overly broad, it recognizes the appellant's argument regarding inadequate judicial safeguards against censorship, paralleling issues seen in statutes with excessive administrative discretion. The Supreme Court has established a presumption against the constitutional validity of prior restraints on expression, emphasizing that states must consider the implications for protected speech when adopting obscenity procedures under the Fourteenth Amendment. The censorship system for motion pictures poses significant risks to constitutionally protected speech by shifting the burden onto the exhibitor or distributor, rather than the censor. Censors, whose primary role is to impose restrictions, may not adequately protect free expression rights compared to an impartial court. If seeking judicial review is made overly burdensome, the censor's decision could effectively become final. To avoid constitutional issues, any noncriminal censorship process must include specific safeguards: 1. The burden of proof that a film is unprotected expression must lie with the censor, as established in precedent. 2. While advance submission of films for review may be required, this process must not give the censor's decision an aura of finality regarding what constitutes protected expression. Only judicial determinations made in adversarial proceedings can validly impose final restraints. 3. Statutory or judicial assurances are needed that the censor will either issue a license or initiate court proceedings within a specified short time frame. Any pre-judicial restraint must be limited to preserving the status quo for the shortest necessary period. 4. A prompt final judicial decision is essential to reduce the chilling effect of any temporary denial of a license, as even an administrative refusal can deter exhibitors. The Maryland procedural scheme fails to meet these requirements by placing the onus on the exhibitor to prove the film’s protection status after a censor disapproval, while also prohibiting exhibition pending judicial review. This could result in potential criminal charges for showing a film without a license, despite no court having ruled on its obscenity. The Maryland statute lacks provisions for timely judicial review, leading to the reversal of the appellant's conviction. The statute fails to safeguard against undue restrictions on protected expression, rendering the requirement for prior submission of films to the Board an invalid prior restraint. The state has discretion on how to incorporate necessary procedural safeguards. A referenced model from Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown highlights a New York procedure that allows for a judicial determination of obscenity before any sales restraint, mandating a hearing promptly after an issue is joined, with a decision required shortly thereafter. This contrasts with the chilling effect of prior censorship. The nature of the motion picture industry necessitates prompt judicial determinations, as films are scheduled for exhibition in advance. Suggested reforms include allowing early submissions to ensure timely adjudications before scheduled showings, to avoid costly and prolonged litigation. The statute mandates that all films must be submitted for approval by the Maryland State Board of Censors, which determines the moral appropriateness of films, while news reels are exempt from examination. A film is deemed obscene if its primary effect is to substantially arouse sexual desires, outweighing its other merits. Films are deemed to debase or corrupt morals if their primary focus is erotic or pornographic, or if they depict sexual immorality, lust, or lewdness as desirable or acceptable behavior. Additionally, films that incite crime are characterized by themes presenting criminal acts or contempt for the law as positive or acceptable, or that promote the use of narcotics and habit-forming drugs. The appellant contests the constitutionality of specific sections: § 6 for vagueness under the Due Process Clause, § 11 for imposing inspection and licensing fees as an invalid tax on free speech, and § 23 for granting exemptions to certain exhibitors, claiming it violates equal protection. However, the court refrains from addressing these constitutional challenges. The Maryland Court of Appeals has consistently reversed the Board's disapproval of films in reported cases. An appendix from the American Civil Liberties Union lists states with similar statutes to Maryland’s and notes that many municipal ordinances are inactive.