J.D. Hickman v. Board of Parole

Citation: Not availableDocket: M2001-02346-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; May 31, 2002; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

In the case J.D. Hickman v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court's dismissal of an inmate's motion for declaratory relief, which sought access to records held by the Board under the Tennessee Public Records Act. The inmate, J.D. Hickman, claimed that the Board failed to respond to his request for information, constituting a violation of his rights under both the Tennessee Constitution and the U.S. Constitution. The trial court denied Hickman's motion for summary judgment, concluding that he had not met the requirements for a mandatory injunction, but allowed him to reapply for specific documents with advance payment for copies.

The Board initially filed a motion to dismiss, arguing lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), which the trial court rejected, clarifying that Hickman relied solely on the Public Records Act. Hickman then moved for summary judgment, asserting there were no factual disputes. The Board countered with an affidavit from its General Counsel, Teresa Thomas, who stated that the Board had no record of receiving Hickman’s request and outlined their procedures for compliance with the Public Records Act.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of summary judgment but reversed the outright dismissal of Hickman's motion, remanding the case for further proceedings. The opinion was delivered by Judge Patricia J. Cottrell, with concurrence from Judges Ben H. Cantrell and William C. Koch, Jr.

Tennessee citizens wishing to inspect records from the Board of Probation and Parole must visit the records location during business hours, as main parole files are held at the Central Office in Nashville, with other records at field offices statewide. Copying records costs $0.20 per page, payable in advance, and additional shipping charges may apply for large requests. If individuals cannot visit, they may request copies via contact with the Board, specifying the records sought, with payment required beforehand. Ms. Thomas indicated that Mr. Hickman's requested information was not maintained as he specified and included confidential elements, necessitating manual retrieval. Mr. Hickman’s unauthenticated request form aimed to verify correspondence with the Board. The trial court denied his motion for summary judgment and dismissed his case, clarifying that he was seeking mandatory injunctive relief rather than a declaration of rights under the Tennessee Public Records Act. The court pointed out procedural errors in his filing and noted that his request for records did not demonstrate irreparable harm, despite his entitlement to public records per Cole v. Campbell. Mr. Hickman contended on appeal that he was seeking a declaration of rights under the Public Records Act, asserting that he should receive requested documents with costs charged to the Board.

Access to governmental records in Tennessee is governed by the Tennessee Public Records Act, which mandates that all state, county, and municipal records be open for inspection by citizens during business hours, barring specific legal exceptions. Citizens can request access either by visiting in person or by identifying documents in writing to the records custodian, who may charge a fee for copies. If access is denied, the Act allows citizens to petition for judicial review in the chancery court of the county where the records are located or in Davidson County for state departments. Upon petition, the court may require the officials to justify the denial of access, placing the burden of proof on them. The Act emphasizes broad interpretation to promote public access to records and outlines a clear judicial review process for denials. Additionally, Mr. Hickman's motion for summary judgment was denied by the trial court due to a material factual dispute regarding whether the Board received his request for public records.

Summary judgment is appropriate in civil cases that can be resolved solely on legal issues, but not when genuine disputes over material facts exist. A summary judgment should only be granted when undisputed facts support the conclusion that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The burden is on the party seeking summary judgment to demonstrate compliance with procedural requirements and entitlement to relief. If the motion is properly supported, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present specific facts for resolution by a trier of fact. Judicial review under the Public Records Act is available for parties whose requests for public records have been denied. In this case, a factual dispute arose regarding whether Mr. Hickman’s request for records was received and denied by the Board. The Board claimed it did not receive the request, while Mr. Hickman alleged he received no response. The court concluded there was a material factual dispute and recognized the Board's statement of denial based on its knowledge of the request during litigation. The trial court indicated that Mr. Hickman was not entitled to relief due to a lack of demonstration of irreparable harm, but this was contested. It was determined that a citizen seeking access to government records only needs to meet the requirements outlined in the Public Records Act, and the Act allows for judicial review and access to records upon a favorable judgment without needing to meet additional injunction criteria.

A citizen denied access to public records does not need to demonstrate “irreparable harm” to seek court intervention, as established by legislative policy promoting maximum access to such records. If the court finds that access was wrongfully denied, it is required to order the disclosure of the records. The trial court's dismissal of Mr. Hickman’s petition based on the lack of irreparable harm was incorrect. Although the court acknowledged Mr. Hickman’s right to access public records, it failed to mandate the Board to produce specific documents as requested. Mr. Hickman’s request included detailed inquiries such as the names and TDOC numbers of inmates eligible for parole, the calculation of risk factors, institutional conduct records, and specific statistics regarding parole denials. He sought comprehensive data on various felonies, including both violent and non-violent offenses, with particular attention to first-time offenders and specific criteria concerning their parole status and institutional behavior.

The Board bears the burden of justifying its denial of Mr. Hickman's access to records. In its response to his summary judgment motion, the Board claimed that some records were confidential, not maintained in the requested format, and that a manual search would be excessively burdensome. The Board referenced Tenn. Comp. R. Regs. 1100-1-1-.14 concerning the confidentiality of parole and clemency records, asserting that such confidential records are exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act, as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. 10-7-301(2). The Board is empowered to establish rules regarding the privacy and use of these records, particularly concerning social, physical, mental, psychiatric, and criminal information of inmates.

While the Board identified confidentiality in its court filings, it failed to specify which parts of Mr. Hickman's request pertain to confidential records. On appeal, the Board did not reaffirm its confidentiality claims or clarify what information was protected, making it impossible to assess the validity of the Board's justification. The Tennessee Supreme Court has indicated that agencies must disclose public portions of records while redacting confidential information, as referenced from a Kansas Supreme Court case. The Kansas ruling emphasized the agency's duty to segregate disclosable material from nondisclosable information, aligning with the intent of public record accessibility.

An agency is required to maintain public records, but the inclusion of confidential material can impede public access. The Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in the Tennessean case suggests that agencies may have an obligation to redact confidential information from otherwise public records, particularly when such information can be electronically deleted. The current case lacks clarity on what information the Board deems confidential and whether it resides in a computerized system or only in physical records, preventing a resolution on these confidentiality issues.

The Board also presented additional reasons for not fulfilling Mr. Hickman’s request, as explained in Teresa Thomas's affidavit. She stated that the requested information is not available in the format he sought; inmate records are organized by individual inmate numbers, and compiling data for all inmates eligible for parole would require a special computer run. Specifically, some requested data, such as the Risk Factor points for inmates, is only recorded on individual files, necessitating manual searches of physical records.

The Public Records Act defines a "public record" broadly, encompassing all materials created or received in connection with governmental business. To determine if a document qualifies as a public record, it must have been made or received as per legal requirements during official business activities. The Board contends that some of the requested information does not exist in any record it has created or received, implying that Mr. Hickman's request would necessitate the creation of a new record by compiling data from numerous existing ones. The Tennessean case previously addressed the issue of creating new records, concluding that once information is entered into a computer system, distinguishing between information and records becomes largely impractical.

The Court ruled that the Nashville Electric Service (NES) was required to disclose requested information, as the request did not necessitate creating a new record but focused on format and access. NES had the information in its computer system but not in the requested format, and it could be extracted with a custom computer program. The Court affirmed that agencies can charge for the actual costs incurred in producing records, as outlined in the Public Records Act. The Act permits citizens to request copies of records without personal inspection if they can adequately identify the documents, although the custodian is not obligated to conduct searches for them. The Board, in relation to Mr. Hickman's requests, must produce non-confidential information from its computer system, and can charge him for the costs, including programming. However, some information, like individual inmate scores, may not be readily available without a manual search, which the Court indicated is not a requirement under the Public Records Act.

A Public Records Act request is distinct from a discovery request in litigation. Citizens can inspect records in person; however, if they cannot, the agency must still provide the requested records without having to compile or create new records from numerous individual files. Agencies are obligated to copy and send identifiable documents to nonappearing requestors upon payment of reasonable costs but are not required to conduct searches or compile statistics. Specifically, the Board is not required to review every parole-eligible inmate's file to gather specific information for a requestor. If a requestor, like Mr. Hickman, asked for a specific document, such as the “guidelines form” for parole-eligible inmates, the Board would need to provide it if not confidential, but this would involve manual retrieval similar to an in-person request.

The Board asserted that requestors must follow established procedures, including providing a specific description of the records sought and prepaying costs. While the trial court noted Mr. Hickman could make another request, it was unclear what aspect of his request lacked specificity. The Board did not indicate an inability to identify the requested records, even though Mr. Hickman phrased his request broadly regarding a class of inmates rather than specifying individual documents. The precedent from the Tennessean case illustrated that a general request can still be valid if the agency can identify the records relevant to the request.

The Board must provide a specific justification for denying access to each requested item to enable proper judicial review. While the Board is not obligated to disclose confidential records, it failed to identify which parts of Mr. Hickman's request pertain to such records, preventing the court from determining the legitimacy of any denials. The Public Records Act does not permit denial of access based solely on claims that compliance would be burdensome or expensive. Additionally, the Board is allowed to require Mr. Hickman to prepay reasonable costs for producing records, including any special processing fees, but has not specified these costs or requested payment prior to providing access. The trial court's dismissal of the case is reversed since entitlement to records under the Public Records Act does not necessitate proof of irreparable harm, and the case is remanded for further proceedings to assess whether the Board has justified its denial of access. Costs from the appeal are assigned to the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, while Mr. Hickman has acknowledged his responsibility for the reasonable costs of obtaining copies.