Russell Wellington v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: M2002-01090-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; September 10, 2002; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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In the case of Russell Wellington v. State of Tennessee, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee vacated the trial court's dismissal of Wellington's lawsuit for failure to prosecute. Wellington, a pro se inmate, initially filed a claim with the Claims Commission, alleging mistreatment by prison staff, including physical assault and denial of medical care, and sought damages totaling $18,000. He requested a transfer of his case to Davidson County Chancery Court due to related pending litigation, but this request was denied by the Claims Commissioner. Wellington later amended his claim to include an assault allegation under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 

The court explained that the Claims Commission operates with separate dockets, including a small claims docket subject to specific procedural rules, which restricts the ability to appeal decisions and allows for claims to be moved to the regular docket. The court previously upheld the dismissal of some defendants in a related case but reversed the dismissal regarding five others, indicating potential violations of the Eighth Amendment and the Tennessee Constitution. The court's decision to vacate the dismissal and remand the case emphasizes procedural issues related to the consolidation of cases and the handling of claims within the Claims Commission framework.

Allegations made by Mr. Wellington may substantiate a judgment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional rights deprivation under color of law. The State's argument that Mr. Wellington waived his § 1983 claims by filing a Claims Commission case was rejected, with the court emphasizing that Tennessee Code Ann. § 9-8-307(b) aims to prevent inconsistent judgments rather than impede pro se plaintiffs. The circuit court is deemed the proper venue for the alleged assault by five guards, while the Claims Commission is more suitable for addressing negligent conduct by other Department employees. On October 27, 2000, ALJ Marion Wall found the State liable for failing to provide timely medical and dental care, awarding Mr. Wellington $3,000. The record included sworn allegations of assault and negligence, with no counter-evidence presented by the State, which did not contest the claims despite multiple communications. According to T.C.A. § 9-8-307(e), the State is liable for negligent care. The claims against the four individuals were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction unless a motion to transfer to Circuit Court was filed within thirty days. The Commission expressed reluctance to transfer the case to Davidson County Chancery Court due to ongoing, inappropriate proceedings there. On November 9, 1999, Mr. Wellington's § 1983 claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over individual employees. Following Mr. Wellington's objections to transferring the negligent conduct claims to Circuit Court, discussions continued about the pending case. On December 29, 2000, the State filed a motion to supplement its transfer request, arguing for consolidation with the Circuit Court case to resolve the matter on its merits.

The State requested the transfer of Mr. Wellington's case to the Claims Commission's regular docket for a hearing in February 2001. However, on January 4, 2001, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) vacated a prior award of $3,000 to Mr. Wellington and transferred the case to Davidson County Circuit Court, citing that a related action was pending based on the same incident. A notice from the Circuit Court on March 4, 2002, warned Mr. Wellington that his case would be dismissed for lack of prosecution unless he filed a motion to set the trial or sought an exemption from the one-year rule within thirty days. Mr. Wellington did not respond by the deadline, leading to an Order of Dismissal on April 17, 2002. He subsequently filed a motion for relief from the dismissal, arguing that the case was consolidated with another case (Ledford) and was not inactive, stating that he had a motion for summary judgment pending in the consolidated case. The State did not respond to this motion, nor did the trial court rule on it before Mr. Wellington filed a Notice of Appeal. There is no record of a consolidation order for the cases, despite Mr. Wellington's claims and the State's original request for consolidation. The transfer statute permits such transfers for a fair resolution of claims arising from the same facts, which the State argued applied here. Mr. Wellington claimed he did not receive notice of the pending dismissal order and provided a log of his incoming legal mail for March 2002, though this argument was not presented to the trial court and could not be considered on appeal. The ALJ noted that the State had filed a motion to transfer within the required timeframe.

A request was made to transfer the case to the Circuit Court of Davidson County under T.C.A. § 9-8-404(a)(b), where a related action is pending. The State indicated that the First Circuit Court had not consolidated the case with Wellington v. Ledford, Doc. No. 00C-3405, and did not assert that any consolidation motion was filed. The court noted that if a consolidation motion had been pending at the time of notice of dismissal, Mr. Wellington should not be penalized for failure to prosecute. The State was responsible for seeking consolidation as previously represented, and any inaction in the transferred lawsuit was attributed to the State, not Mr. Wellington. According to the transfer statute, if a claim is not consolidated for trial, it must be returned to the Claims Commission. The State's argument for dismissal based on Mr. Wellington's failure to set the case for trial or seek an exemption disregards the State's obligation to consolidate. 

Mr. Wellington filed a motion to set aside the dismissal but appealed before a ruling was made. The trial court’s dismissal for failure to prosecute is vacated, and the case is remanded for the trial court to decide whether to transfer the case back to the Claims Commission or to consolidate it with Wellington v. Ledford, considering the validity of the transfer. Mr. Wellington should also be allowed to challenge the Commission's authority to transfer his claim post-decision on the merits under small claims rules. The trial court did not have the opportunity to address these issues, making remand appropriate. Costs of the appeal are imposed on the State of Tennessee.