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Diamond v. Diamond
Citations: 458 S.E.2d 303; 20 Va. App. 481; 1995 Va. App. LEXIS 504Docket: 1300941
Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia; June 13, 1995; Virginia; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Claudia S. Diamond appealed a divorce decree issued by the Circuit Court of the City of Hampton, claiming she did not receive the requisite notice prior to its entry. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, stating that the procedural history was uncontested. Wife was personally served with her husband Roy L. Diamond's bill of complaint on March 2, 1994, but did not file any responsive pleadings. She attended a hearing on May 24, 1994, where she requested a continuance to hire counsel, which was denied. During the hearing, she challenged the husband's evidence and made demands for alimony and retirement benefits but waived her right to sign the depositions. The commissioner prepared a report based on the hearing findings, which was sent to the wife, who did not object to its content. The trial court entered the final decree on June 13, 1994, after confirming she received a copy. The wife argued that the decree should be voided for failing to comply with Rule 1:13, which requires that drafts of orders be endorsed by counsel or that reasonable notice be given to all counsel of record. The court noted that compliance with this rule could be modified at the court's discretion and that a decree violating this rule is void. The commissioner found that the wife had "ample notice" of the proceedings, a point she did not contest on appeal. The court clarified that the definition of "counsel of record" under Rule 1:5 indicated that the wife had not formally entered her appearance in the case as she neither signed a pleading nor notified the other parties or the clerk in writing. Her presence and comments at the depositions did not constitute written notice. Therefore, the court concluded that Rule 1:13 did not apply to her, and the decree was valid. The judgment was affirmed.