Court: Supreme Court of the United States; June 8, 1964; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Mr. Justice Clark delivered the Court's opinion regarding a criminal contempt proceeding initiated by the United States at the direction of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Governor Ross R. Barnett and Lieutenant Governor Paul B. Johnson of Mississippi were charged with willfully disobeying restraining orders from the Court of Appeals. They sought to dismiss the charges, requested a jury trial, and filed motions to sever and strike various allegations. The Court of Appeals, split on the jury trial right, certified the issue to the Supreme Court, which ruled the alleged contemners do not have a right to a jury trial.
The case stems from James Meredith's attempt to enroll at the University of Mississippi in 1961. After being denied admission, Meredith sued in federal court, which initially denied relief, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision and mandated the District Court to provide relief. A single judge's stay was later lifted, and the Court issued an injunctive order compelling the University officials to admit Meredith and prevent discriminatory practices in his admission process. This order was to remain effective until full compliance was achieved. A subsequent injunction from the District Court ordered the University officials to register Meredith by September 13, 1962.
When compliance appeared uncertain, the United States sought to intervene in the Court of Appeals, which authorized its participation as amicus curiae in all related proceedings to uphold judicial integrity. Meanwhile, the Mississippi Legislature enacted measures to obstruct Meredith's admission, which were subsequently enjoined by the federal government. On September 20, Meredith's attempts to gain admission were thwarted, prompting contempt motions from both him and the United States against key University officials.
The Board of Trustees acquitted individuals from wrongdoing, asserting that they had no authority over Meredith’s application, which was under Governor Barnett's jurisdiction. Following this, the United States sought a contempt order against the Board in the Court of Appeals, citing a prior order from July 28. An en banc hearing revealed the Board's willingness to admit Meredith, leading to a September 24 court order that revoked Barnett’s agency appointment and required Registrar Robert B. Ellis to facilitate Meredith's admission on September 25.
On September 24, the United States initiated an ancillary action against several Mississippi officials, alleging that Governor Barnett was actively resisting court orders and infringing upon Meredith's constitutional rights. The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order against these officials on September 25, preventing them from obstructing the court's prior orders.
Subsequently, it was reported that Governor Barnett knowingly obstructed Meredith's registration attempt, prompting the court to issue a show-cause order for his contempt on September 28. Lieutenant Governor Johnson received a similar order on September 26. Following hearings, the court found Barnett in civil contempt and imposed a daily fine of $10,000 unless he complied by October 2. Johnson was fined $5,000 a day for his contempt.
On September 30, President Kennedy issued a proclamation urging compliance with court orders and deployed U.S. Marshals and armed forces to enforce these orders. Meredith was subsequently registered at the university under federal protection, despite initial rioting. The Court of Appeals later appointed the Attorney General to prosecute the contempt proceedings against Barnett and Johnson under Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The Court of Appeals issued a show-cause order for criminal contempt at the Attorney General's request, citing a temporary restraining order from September 25, an injunctive order from July 28, and a District Court order from September 13. The central issue is whether the alleged contemners have a right to a jury trial on these charges. The Court evaluates this question without considering other claims in the case or their merits.
Historically, the Judiciary Act of 1789 empowered federal courts to punish contempt as recognized by common law. However, following the 1831 Act, Congress limited federal courts' ability to impose summary contempt punishments to specific instances of misbehavior in court settings or disobedience to lawful court orders. These provisions are now encapsulated in 18 U.S.C. 401. The alleged contemners argue that Congress restricted this power further in 1914 through the Clayton Act, which guarantees a jury trial for contempt arising from disobedience to district court orders, provided the conduct also constitutes a criminal offense. However, the Clayton Act excludes jury requirements for contempt relating to lawful orders in cases brought in the name of the United States.
Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure articulates that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial when mandated by Congress. The Court examines the alleged right to a jury trial under these statutes and the Constitution.
Governor Barnett and Lieutenant Governor Johnson assert that the United States sought the Court of Appeals' orders to circumvent the District Court and deny them a jury trial. The Court finds no evidence supporting this claim, noting that the Court of Appeals acted within its jurisdiction after having been frustrated by the lower court's actions. They also contest the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction based on procedural matters related to remanding the case to the District Court, but the Court declines to address these procedural irregularities at this stage.
The alleged contemners argue that Section 402, which grants a jury trial for contempt charges in 'any court of the District of Columbia,' should apply to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. They claim that to avoid discrimination prohibited by the Due Process Clause and to comply with the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the section should be interpreted to apply to all Courts of Appeals. However, it is clarified that at the time the Clayton Act was enacted, the trial court in the District was referred to as the 'Supreme Court of the District of Columbia,' not the United States District Court, necessitating the inclusion of 'any court of the District of Columbia' for consistency with local judicial terminology. Legislative history indicates that the bill pertains only to orders from district courts and that contempt of orders from other courts remains unchanged.
The show-cause order issued by the Court of Appeals cites violations of three injunctions: the initial Court of Appeals order from July 28, the District Court's order of September 13, and the Court of Appeals' September 25 order directed at the alleged contemners. The alleged contemners claim that the District Court's September 13 order superseded the earlier order, rendering the September 25 order insignificant; however, the continuity of jurisdiction from the July 28 order undermines this argument. The September 25 order is deemed significant as it directly relates to the contemners’ actions.
Furthermore, the alleged contemners contend that since the contempt motion involves a District Court order, the requirements of Sections 402 and 3691 necessitate a jury trial. It is argued that it would be inconsistent for the Court of Appeals to punish contempt of its own orders without a jury while being unable to do so for contempt of a District Court order. The court rejects this notion, asserting that Congress did not intend to provide preferential treatment based on the number of orders violated. Lastly, the claim that individuals charged with criminal contempt possess a constitutional right to a jury trial has been repeatedly dismissed, with precedent set in Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
Criminal contempts are not entitled to a jury trial as a constitutional right, as established by a long-standing line of case law. Courts possess the authority to summarily handle contempt matters, a power that has been recognized historically in both state and federal law, unless explicitly restricted by statute. Historical statutes from the Colonial era imposed limited punishments for specific offenses but did not establish a framework that limited the summary contempt power to trivial offenses. The Judiciary Act of 1789 affirmed that U.S. courts could impose fines or imprisonment for contempt, reflecting the intent of lawmakers familiar with the Constitution. Subsequent state statutes with limitations on contempt punishment do not undermine the standard that existed at the time of the Constitution’s adoption.
No federal case supports the notion that courts’ summary contempt powers are confined to minor offenses. Early cases illustrate the courts’ discretion to punish contempt without being limited to trivial matters. Since 1957, penalties for contempt have increased, but these cases did not address constitutional issues regarding punishment. Mississippi has upheld the principle of summary contempt for over a century, recognizing that defendants in such cases are not entitled to a jury trial. Federal precedents from as early as 1812 confirm that courts inherently possess the power to fine for contempt, with later cases reiterating the authority to proceed summarily in specific situations.
Contempt of court proceedings are not subject to the right to a jury trial, as established in Eilenbecker v. District Court. Justice Miller noted the historical understanding that courts possess the inherent authority to enforce their orders and maintain dignity without jury assistance. Justice Brewer in In re Debs affirmed that a court's power to issue orders includes the power to punish disobedience, emphasizing that such inquiries are a core function of the court. In United States v. Shipp, Justice Holmes reiterated this principle, asserting the court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt without a jury, clarifying that the court acts not for personal interest but to uphold the law. Holmes further addressed the classification of contempts, noting that while they can be punishable offenses, they are not typically considered crimes entitled to jury trials. Chief Justice White in 1919 echoed this sentiment, stating that the power to punish contempt is constitutionally sanctioned and not constrained by general trial rights. Justice Sutherland, in Michaelson v. United States, upheld the constitutionality of specific provisions regarding contempt, clarifying that they apply narrowly to contempt that obstructs justice in the court's presence and do not extend to other forms of noncompliance. The Court remains open to revising its interpretations when warranted, even for longstanding precedents.
The legal precedent established by numerous federal and state cases over the past 150 years affirms the principle that a court's authority to impose fines and imprisonment for contempt is essential to its existence. This principle, articulated over a century ago in *Watson v. Williams*, remains pertinent today. The Court has responded negatively to the certified question regarding the limitations of contempt powers. An appendix details relevant statutes and historical cases concerning contempt punishments in colonial courts, noting that comprehensive records of appellate decisions were largely unavailable until the 19th century, with even fewer records from colonial trial courts. Despite these limitations, it appears that when the Constitution was adopted, contempt was not widely seen as excluding serious misconduct, with any existing limitations being narrowly defined.
Specific references from Connecticut's Code of 1650 illustrate the early legal framework regarding contempt, including fines for disorderly conduct in court and severe penalties for revealing court secrets or defaming judicial proceedings. These provisions transitioned through to the Constitution's adoption. An 'Act concerning Delinquents' empowered the court to impose suitable punishment for contemptuous behavior, with restrictions on the severity of punishments imposed by individual justices. The first statute limiting the courts' summary punishment powers was identified in 1824, establishing specific maximum fines and imprisonment terms for contempt.
Records from the Particular Court between 1639 and 1663 indicate various summary contempt proceedings. In 1639, Thomas Gridley was punished with whipping and bound to good behavior for contemptuous remarks towards court orders. Enoch Buck received a 10-shilling fine in 1648 for irregular speeches. Will Taylor was imprisoned in 1654 for contemptuous behavior, and in 1655, John Sadler faced one day in prison and a 40-shilling fine for similar offenses. In 1657, both parties in a case were fined 10 shillings for disorderly conduct. Edward Bart-let was imprisoned for ten days and required to post a 10-pound security in 1663 for defaming the court's sentence. Additionally, fines ranging from two shillings, six pence to four pounds were imposed on non-appearing parties and jurors from 1647 to 1654, exemplified by Thomas Sherwood's 40-shilling fine for failing to appear in court. In 1796, Chief Justice Zephaniah Swift noted that while courts possess discretionary power for contempt, it does not extend to capital punishment but includes fines and imprisonment. By 1823, Swift specified that courts must impose definite fines or time-limited imprisonment for in-court contempts, whereas they could imprison indefinitely for common law contempts not witnessed by the court. In Delaware, no specific colonial contempt statutes were found, although early 18th-century laws set maximum fines for jurors’ non-attendance and for derogatory remarks against court judgments. An 1852 Act aligned Delaware's contempt punishment with English judicial standards. In Georgia, no colonial contempt statutes were identified; however, a 1799 law allowed fines for non-appearance, and subsequent statutes detailed contempt powers of justices of the peace with specified fine limits. The earliest contempt case in Georgia involved fines against local officials for disobeying a Superior Court order.
In 1807, the Superior Court established that inferior courts of record could impose punishments for contempt, although no specific penalties were mentioned. In the case of State v. Helvenston, jurors were fined for conversing with non-officials. Colonial Maryland had limited statutory provisions on contempt, primarily affecting the court of chancery. A 1785 Act allowed the chancellor to impose a fine of up to ten pounds and commitment for non-compliance with court orders. Other colonial laws addressed jurors and witnesses failing to appear, with a 1715 statute imposing fines of up to 1,000 pounds of tobacco for defaulting witnesses. Additionally, judges could create rules and impose fines as deemed appropriate. In 1782, fines for failing to appear were revised to a maximum of 35 pounds for the general court and 20 pounds for county courts. The only notable Maryland case before the Constitution's adoption involved fines against justices for disregarding a writ of certiorari. Historical records indicate various contempt citations and penalties from the Provincial and County Courts, including fines for attorneys who failed to comply with court orders or caused delays for clients.
County courts imposed various punishments for misconduct in court, including fines of 500 pounds of tobacco for abusive language, 300 pounds for wearing a hat, 10 pounds for taking God's name in vain, and 300 pounds for insolent language. Between 1671 and 1674, 23 individuals were fined 500 pounds for failing to appear as jurors or witnesses. In Massachusetts, early statutes against contempt included provisions for bail except in capital cases and contempt in open court. Offenders faced fines, imprisonment, or even corporal punishment for various offenses, including profaning the Sabbath and defaming court authority. Plymouth Colony laws allowed similar penalties for disturbing the peace. Specific fines were established for grand jurors and witnesses who did not appear, with escalating penalties over time. Notable contempt cases included Maurice Brett, who faced severe punishment for contemptuous behavior, and Elizabeth Vane, who was committed for abusing a magistrate.
In 1637, John Greene was fined 20 pounds and committed until payment, prohibited from the jurisdiction for contemptuous remarks about magistrates. In 1633, Captain John Stone faced a 100-pound fine and a ban from the Colony without government leave, under threat of death, for assaulting a court officer. Thomas Foxe was whipped in 1630 or 1631 for alleging bribery in court actions. John Lee received a whipping and a 40-pound fine in 1634 for calling a court officer a "false-hearted knave." In 1637 or 1638, Thomas Starr was fined 20 pounds and required to acknowledge his fault for criticizing a court order. Katherine Finch was whipped and held until the General Court in 1638 for speaking against magistrates. William Robbinson received 20 lashes in 1659 for contemptuous speeches against the court and governor.
Thomas Dexter was set in bilboes, disfranchised, and fined 40 pounds in 1632 for reproachful speech against the government. In 1636, Thomas Miller was committed for seditious remarks suggesting rebellion against the court. Robert Shorthose faced bilboes in 1638 or 1639 for slighting magistrates. George Hurne was whipped and committed in 1640 for insolent behavior. Most cases involved immediate punishment for contempt, except for a 1686 case against Samuell Shrimpton, who was indicted for denying government authority and causing court disruption. In 1635, John Endecott was imprisoned for contempt after protesting a court proceeding but was released upon acknowledgment. Records from 1680 to 1698 in Suffolk County show imprisonment for contemptuous behavior. The Pynchon Court Record includes instances of fines for contempt. A 1772 Superior Court ruling indicated severe penalties for disruptive behavior in court, reflecting a history of strict enforcement against contempt across various courts and colonies. Eighteenth-century New Hampshire statutes primarily addressed witnesses and jurors.
An Act from 1791 allowed courts to attach witnesses who failed to appear, imposing fines up to 10 pounds without reasonable excuse, while justices of the peace could impose fines of up to 40 shillings. Additionally, grand jurors failing to appear could be fined up to three pounds. The 1792 New Hampshire Constitution granted the house of representatives, senate, governor, and council the power to punish for contempt, limited to 10 days’ imprisonment, with no mention of court contempt powers.
In New Jersey, there was no legislation on contempt until after the Constitution, with the first statute in 1798 addressing witnesses and jurors in small claims courts, allowing fines between $1 and $5 for non-appearance. Subsequent provisions in 1799 established fines for circuit court jurors who failed to appear or left trials. An Act also allowed the Court of Chancery to impose fines up to $50 for contempt and to confine individuals until compliance. A historical case from 1698 involved a contempt fine of 50 pounds imposed by the Court of Common Right of East New Jersey.
In colonial New York, the earliest contempt-related enactment was the Charter of Liberties and Privileges of 1683, which assured jury trials but exempted contempt cases. No further statutory provisions on contempt were found before the Constitution, though an 1801 law permitted summary punishment by stocks for swearing in the presence of certain officials. A significant statute in 1829 defined criminal contempts and set penalties up to a $250 fine and 30 days in jail, with few reported contempt cases prior, except for the notable trial of John Peter Zenger in 1735.
Zenger's attorneys challenged the validity of the judges' commissions, arguing they were improperly appointed “at pleasure” by Governor Cosby instead of “during good behavior” as mandated by law. The judges denied the attorneys the opportunity to present their argument, citing them for contempt and subsequently disbarring them from legal practice, with an order to strike their names from the attorney roll. Historical context is provided, referencing various contempt cases in colonial times, including fines for refusal to answer questions and punishments for affronting justices. Specific examples include fines imposed by the New York Supreme Court in the 1760s and a 1809 case regarding John V. N. Yates, who was jailed for contempt after forging a name in court documents. Additionally, North Carolina's limited contempt statutes before 1868 are noted, detailing fines for swearing in court and the nonappearance of witnesses or jurors. The first general statute addressing summary contempt punishment in North Carolina was enacted in 1868, allowing for a maximum penalty of $250 and 30 days’ imprisonment. Pennsylvania's legislative history regarding contempt punishments prior to the Constitution is also mentioned, starting with the Act of 1713 concerning orphans' courts.
Default by a party allows Justices to enforce compliance with their orders through imprisonment or the sequestration of assets, similar to powers held by equity courts. The 1715 Act established the “Supreme or Provincial Court of Law and Equity,” granting it jurisdiction to correct and punish misconduct among judicial officers and to enforce orders using processes akin to those in British courts of chancery or exchequer. In 1722, legislation reaffirmed these courts' authority to administer justice and exercise powers comparable to those of the King's Bench and other courts in Westminster.
Criminal contempt regulations specific to Pennsylvania emerged in 1809, defining the scope of contempt powers for court officers and participants, limiting punishments to imprisonment for offenses occurring in open court, while other contempts could only result in fines. Notable cases include Feree v. Strome, where a witness was reprimanded but not fined due to a misunderstanding of the summons, and Respublica v. Oswald, where a publisher faced a fine and imprisonment for contemptuous publication, underscoring the court's commitment to uphold the law. In Bayard v. Passmore, a contempt attachment required a publisher to secure his appearance by posting a bond, reflecting the court's serious approach to breaches of conduct.
A contemner was fined $50 and sentenced to 30 days in prison, remaining incarcerated until the fine and costs were paid. Historical records from Bucks County, Pennsylvania, reveal multiple contempt cases, including Thomas Coverdale, who was fined five shillings for appearing drunk in court, and nine jurors fined five shillings each for failing to appear. Richard Thatcher faced multiple commitments for abusing justices, resulting in fines of 50 shillings and custody until he provided sureties for good behavior. In colonial Rhode Island, contempt laws primarily targeted witnesses and jurors, allowing fines up to $20 for non-appearance and up to $5 for jurors. Few contempt cases were documented, with some individuals fined for using contemptuous language. Colonial South Carolina had broader contempt laws than other colonies, where a 1702 Act imposed fines of 10 pounds for non-appearing witnesses, with imprisonment until fines were paid. A 1731 statute allowed judges to impose fines for misbehavior in court and to imprison offenders. An 1811 Act gave judges the authority to address disturbances during court sessions. In Lining v. Bentham (1796), the South Carolina Constitutional Court of Appeals upheld a magistrate's power to imprison for insults or contempt in court.
Contempts committed outside the presence of the court should be prosecuted by indictment, as noted in earlier cases. In *State v. Johnson* (1802), a justice of the peace imprisoned a woman for contempt, but the Charleston Constitutional Court determined the 1731 Act imposing fines for contempt did not apply to justices, who possess the necessary power to commit for contempt. In *State v. Applegate* (1822), a justice imprisoned a constable for failing to perform his duties; however, the court ruled the constable must be released, asserting that only higher courts have the authority to imprison for out-of-court contempt.
In colonial Virginia, contempt statutes primarily imposed fines for the nonappearance of jurors and witnesses, with a 1788 Act setting a maximum fine of 10 pounds sterling for jurors guilty of contempt. This limit was later updated to $30 in 1792, which also introduced procedures for contempt processes. The first comprehensive contempt statute in 1831 outlined four categories of contempt punishable by judges, with specific limits only for misbehavior in court.
Arthur P. Scott, in his work on early Virginia contempt cases, notes that contempt was strictly penalized, often requiring an apology, fines, or imprisonment until good behavior was ensured. He emphasizes the potential for abuse of contempt power, highlighting the importance of the character of those entrusted with this authority.
In a contemporary context, following the expiration of Governor Barnett’s term in 1964, charges of criminal contempt were filed against two individuals for allegedly disobeying a temporary restraining order requested by the United States as amicus curiae. These charges, which also constituted a federal offense under congressional legislation, raise the question of whether the accused are entitled to a jury trial for the contempt charges.
A United States court has the authority to impose fines or imprisonment for contempt of its authority, specifically for: 1) Misbehavior in the court's presence that obstructs justice; 2) Misconduct by court officers in official matters; and 3) Disobedience to lawful court orders or processes. In *Busby v. Electric Utilities Employees Union*, the Court clarified that it will not address questions outside the current controversy unless an unresolved issue is presented in a specific manner. The right to a jury trial was clearly raised in the Court of Appeals, which had previously rejected claims of lack of jurisdiction. Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari to review the jurisdictional order, it retains the ability to address the issue if appropriately presented after trial. The Court emphasized that only certified questions from lower courts can be considered, and any suggestions of procedural irregularities are premature and not within the Court's current purview. Furthermore, a legislative bill aimed to limit contempt proceedings to circuit courts, where juries are present, in response to prior criticisms regarding contempt abuses occurring in district and circuit courts. The Court's resolution of the certified question negates the need to determine whether the violated orders were part of a suit on behalf of the United States or related constitutional amendments.
An Appendix accompanying the opinion compiles statutes and case law regarding limitations on summary contempt powers from the original 13 States. It includes references to numerous significant cases from 1812 through 1964, highlighting the evolution of legal standards related to contempt and the associated rights of defendants. Notably, the analysis indicates that the severity of the penalty may necessitate a jury trial, as established in District of Columbia v. Clawans (1937). Justice Stone emphasized that perceptions of punishment severity can change over time, warranting jury trials for penalties previously considered minor. Furthermore, some justices believe that summary trials without a jury should be constitutionally restricted to penalties for petty offenses. The Mississippi Constitution mirrors the federal provision, guaranteeing the right to a trial by an impartial jury in criminal cases.
The right to trial by jury is preserved under Mississippi Constitution Article III, Section 26, but its application is limited in contempt cases. In the context of civil contempt, the reasoning from the case Watson is relevant, as it has been cited in Mississippi criminal contempt rulings, notably in Young v. State, where the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed that there is no jury trial right in criminal contempt cases. Historical perspectives on punishment reveal that early colonial practices differed significantly from modern approaches, typically favoring swift, short-term penalties over long imprisonment, as noted by Professor Zechariah Chafee. Records indicate that colonial statutes often penalized non-appearance in court, though the classification of such offenses varied by jurisdiction. The General Court of Massachusetts, as the primary civil authority from 1634 to 1672, engaged in significant legislative functions, including the imposition of penalties for contempt. The term "lawfully convict" has been debated regarding its implications for the necessity of formal indictment processes. The Court of Assistants, which included key magistrates and functioned as a precursor to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, had broad judicial authority, including handling serious criminal matters. Historical records also indicate that English courts were not restricted to minor penalties for contempt.
Witnesses who failed to attend the General Court faced fines of five pounds (sterling) or 1,000 pounds of tobacco, along with costs, as outlined in Virginia Public Acts from 1777 and reiterated in 1788 for District Court witnesses. By 1792, grand jurors could be fined up to $8. Misbehavior in the presence of the court, which obstructs justice, constitutes a first class offense, while other categories of offenses are not restricted by this section. Historical cases exemplifying contempt of court include: William Hatton in 1662, who criticized the justices; Robert Smith in 1684, who petitioned against the court's actions; Humphrey Chamberlain in 1685, fined for carrying a drawn sword; Mary Russell in 1703, jailed for her remarks about justice; Colonel Bolling in 1720, punished for cursing the justices; and Richard Dunning in 1748, jailed for claiming judges never did good.
