A personal injury lawsuit was filed by Richard M. Gilleland against William L. Cason, Vincent D. Cason, and Antonio Teran Seay, alleging that on January 7, 1999, he was assaulted and shot by the defendants while working as an undercover narcotics agent. Gilleland sought $5,000,000 in compensatory damages and requested a jury trial. Vincent D. Cason, representing himself, filed a pro se answer denying the allegations but did not pursue further defense actions. The trial was scheduled for April 4, 2002, and all defendants were notified. Gilleland filed for a default judgment against William L. Cason and Antonio Seay, which was granted. During the trial, Vincent D. Cason failed to appear, leading the court to enter a default judgment against him as well. The court ultimately awarded Gilleland $5,000,000 in damages, holding all three defendants jointly and severally liable. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Tennessee.
Vincent D. Cason, the defendant, appealed pro se, claiming the trial court erred by denying him the right to a jury trial and entering a default judgment against him. Cason, believing that filing his answer would ensure his transportation to court, did not take further action, such as requesting a jury trial or moving to postpone the proceedings. On the trial date, the court allowed the plaintiff to waive the jury trial and, after the plaintiff's testimony, awarded a judgment of $5 million against Cason.
The court indicated that while a prisoner has a constitutional right to access the courts, this does not guarantee personal attendance at all proceedings. It cited the case Stone v. Morris, establishing that adequate opportunities for an inmate to confer with counsel and petition the court are sufficient to satisfy this right. Cason's inaction, including failing to file requests or motions, contributed to the outcome.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-304 restricts the removal of convicts from prison for civil court appearances, allowing testimony via deposition instead. The court noted that the law does not grant party defendants an absolute right to be present at civil hearings. While a defendant may vigorously defend themselves without appearing in person, it is inappropriate to delay proceedings until their release. The court concluded that if the defendant is given a meaningful opportunity to present their defense, the case can proceed without their physical presence.
The trial court holds the discretion to decide if a defendant-prisoner can appear personally in a civil trial, with the prisoner's unavailability stemming from their conviction. There are no compelling reasons to bypass the self-imposed restrictions of prisoners. The appellant argues that a jury trial was demanded in the Complaint, suggesting that the Plaintiff cannot waive this right without the appellant's consent, as per T.R.C.P. Rule 38.05. However, Tennessee law, as established in Russell v. Hackett and reaffirmed in subsequent cases, allows for an implied waiver of the right to a jury trial due to failure to appear. Despite the appellant's pro se status, the court emphasizes that he cannot remain inactive for two years and expect the court to favor him. The trial court's judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings, with costs assigned to the appellant.
