Jennifer and Steven Norman divorced in 1994, with Jennifer awarded custody of their son and Steven required to pay $300 monthly in child support. Their marital dissolution agreement mandated annual adjustments to child support based on Steven's income and required him to provide his tax returns to Jennifer's attorney. After Jennifer and their son moved to Nashville, the case was transferred to Davidson County. In November 1999, Jennifer sought an increase in child support and held Steven in contempt for not providing his tax returns. Following a bench trial, the court increased child support and awarded Jennifer $19,026 in retroactive child support dating back to 1996, based on a motion she filed that year that was never addressed. Steven appealed, arguing the retroactive support was improperly granted, but the court affirmed the trial court's decision, indicating no error in awarding retroactive support due to the unaddressed 1996 motion.
Dr. Norman filed a petition for contempt, custody modification, and changes to the marital dissolution agreement. A hearing occurred on December 7, 2000, leading to a January 8, 2001 order that increased his child support payments to $1,600 and awarded Ms. Norman a $2,900 judgment for past due support. The court postponed Ms. Norman’s retroactive support request and other issues for later consideration. After a subsequent hearing on April 5, 2001, the court issued a May 9, 2001 order granting Ms. Norman a $19,026 retroactive child support judgment dating back to September 18, 1996, and $7,500 for legal expenses. Dr. Norman appealed the retroactive support ruling.
Dr. Norman raised a procedural concern regarding the April 5 hearing, contesting the trial court’s reliance on a salary and child support tabulation prepared by Ms. Norman’s attorney. He argued that without his testimony, there was insufficient evidence of his income from 1995 to 1999. This argument was dismissed for two reasons: he did not object to the tabulation during the hearing, and the trial court acted within its discretion by considering an accurate tabulation of previously filed information. Tax returns for 1995-1999 had been submitted prior to the hearing, and Ms. Norman's attorney provided relevant documents and the tabulation at the hearing, which Dr. Norman's attorney did not challenge. Generally, appellate courts do not entertain arguments not raised during trial, particularly regarding evidence admissibility when no objection was made. Thus, Dr. Norman's failure to object to the exhibits during the hearing precludes him from contesting their admission on appeal.
Litigants are permitted to use exhibits that summarize admitted evidence, as per Tenn. R. Evid. 1006, which allows for charts and summaries derived from voluminous materials. This practice aids in expert testimony based on accurate document tabulations. The admissibility of such summaries is recognized for their efficiency in presenting relevant information. In this case, the disputed exhibits included accurate photocopies of documents already filed, and Dr. Norman did not challenge the authenticity of his tax returns, which were used for calculating his child support obligations from 1995 to 2000. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering these exhibits.
Dr. Norman raises two main objections to the retroactive child support award of $19,026. He argues that Ms. Norman is not entitled to the funds due to her delay in seeking a judicial decision and that Tenn. Code Ann. 36-5-101 does not allow for retroactive child support. However, these arguments lack merit. The delay in resolution resulted from Dr. Norman’s unilateral decision to ignore his obligations in the marital dissolution agreement, and he has not diligently pursued his claims. Additionally, the child support is for the benefit of their son, not Ms. Norman. Regarding the statutory interpretation, the prohibition against retroactive modifications only applies to changes prior to the filing of a motion for modification. Any modifications after such filing are permissible. The Tennessee Supreme Court has consistently upheld this interpretation, confirming that the court's decision aligns with established legal precedent.
No application for Tenn. R. App. P. 11 was filed in the case Siefker v. Siefker. The primary issue is the timing of the petition or motion for modification of child support. Modifications for periods before the filing must be vacated under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(5), while those for periods after the filing are not subject to this provision. To evaluate the trial court's interpretation of Ms. Norman’s September 18, 1996, cross petition, three questions must be answered: whether it constituted an action for modification under the statute, whether notice was properly sent to Dr. Norman's last known address, and whether the cross petition has remained viable since its filing.
Ms. Norman's cross petition, albeit unconventional, includes claims about Dr. Norman's increased income and requests for his tax returns to assess potential adjustments in child support. Although it lacks a specific request for modification, it seeks unspecified relief that could include an increase in support, which courts interpret based on the substance rather than the title of the filing. Previous cases establish that the nature of the relief sought is crucial in categorizing court documents.
The court ultimately determined that Ms. Norman's cross petition rightly requested a modification of child support. Regarding notice, a proper certificate of service would typically establish that the document was sent, but none were included in the filings from August and September 1996. However, since Dr. Norman has not contested receipt of the cross petition, it is concluded that he did receive it, fulfilling the notice requirement under the statute.
In Nash v. Waynick, the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed the validity of a child support modification request filed by Ms. Norman on September 18, 1996. The court noted that the absence of a certificate of service in the answer did not affect the case, as the opposing party did not dispute receipt. The trial court concluded that Ms. Norman's petition for modification had not been acted upon, allowing for the application of Tenn. Code Ann. 36-5-101(a)(5), which permits retroactive modifications of child support obligations. Consequently, the court affirmed a judgment requiring Dr. Norman to pay $19,026 for child support owed from September 1996 to October 2000. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, with costs taxed to Steven Ennis Norman.
