Court: Supreme Court of the United States; February 18, 1963; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Mr. Justice Goldberg authored the opinion addressing the constitutionality of Congressional Acts that revoke American citizenship for individuals who leave or remain outside the U.S. during wartime to avoid military service. The case of Mendoza-Martinez is central, where the appellee, born in the U.S. in 1922 and possessing dual nationality due to his Mexican heritage, left for Mexico in 1942 to evade military conscription. After admitting to this intent, he returned to the U.S. in 1946 and was later convicted in 1947 for evading service under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, serving a year in prison.
In 1953, he faced deportation proceedings based on the claim that he lost his citizenship by remaining outside the U.S. after September 27, 1944, when §401(j) became effective. Initial rulings upheld his deportation, asserting that §401(j) was constitutional. However, following the Supreme Court's decision in Trop v. Dulles, the District Court later deemed §401(j) unconstitutional for lacking a rational connection to Congressional powers and being penal in nature, thus violating procedural due process. The court also determined that the government's claim of collateral estoppel based on the earlier criminal conviction did not apply since citizenship was not addressed in that context.
Procedural due process requirements are deemed unmet by the Immigration Service's administrative hearing and the current proceedings. The Attorney General is appealing a decision, with probable jurisdiction noted on February 20, 1961, and the case having been argued and restored for reargument. Cort, a native-born American from Boston, 1927, lacks dual nationality and is married with two American citizen children. After earning his M.D. from Yale in 1951, he moved to England for a research position at Cambridge University and timely registered for the draft, supplementing his registration under the Doctors Draft Act.
In late 1951, the American Embassy in London instructed him to return his passport for validation, which he refused, citing unlawful demands and a desire to avoid political persecution while engaged in important research. Cort had previously been a Communist Party member during his medical studies. In late 1952, he accepted a teaching position at Harvard but was informed that his military obligations precluded his deferment. His draft board subsequently denied his deferment request and ordered him to report for a physical examination; he failed to appear, resulting in an induction order. He was indicted in December 1954 for not reporting, with the indictment still pending.
Cort contends he did not comply due to beliefs regarding the legitimacy of the induction order and concerns about his political past and physical disabilities. After the British Home Office refused to renew his residence permit, he relocated to Prague, Czechoslovakia, in mid-1954. In April 1959, he applied for a new U.S. passport at the American Embassy in Prague, intending to return to the U.S. with his family to fulfill his draft obligations and seek medical treatment for his wife’s condition.
Mrs. Cort traveled to the United States in late 1959 for medical treatment and to assist in her husband's return. Her husband, Cort, had his application for citizenship denied due to his failure to report for military induction in 1953, resulting in automatic loss of citizenship under §349 (a)(10) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. The State Department affirmed this expatriation finding, prompting Cort to file a suit in the District Court for a declaratory judgment to affirm his citizenship, challenge the constitutionality of §349 (a)(10), and seek a passport. A three-judge court determined that Cort had indeed evaded military service but ruled §349 (a)(10) unconstitutional, citing similarities to the Trop case, thus declaring Cort a citizen and preventing the Secretary of State from denying him a passport. The Secretary of State appealed, with jurisdiction questions temporarily set aside, leading to a separate focus on the validity of §349 (a)(10) and §401 (j). In the case of Mendoza-Martinez, a preliminary issue arose regarding whether a three-judge court was necessary for decisions affecting congressional acts. Despite initial claims for injunctive relief, the court found that both the original and amended complaints did not seek such relief, validating the single district judge’s handling of the case without the need for a three-judge panel. The trial framed the issues without contemplating injunctive relief, as confirmed by the court's records.
The court declared the 1944 Amendment unconstitutional, affirming that the plaintiff has been a national and citizen of the United States since birth. The proceedings were characterized as not requiring injunctive relief, thus negating the necessity for a three-judge District Court under §2282. The legislative intent behind §2282 and its counterpart §2281 was to prevent a single federal judge from undermining entire regulatory frameworks through broad injunctions. The current case, being solely for declaratory relief without injunctive sanctions, did not pose the risks that Congress aimed to mitigate. As a result, the government was permitted to continue applying the statute during the appeal process, aligning with congressional objectives. Additionally, the court addressed Mendoza-Martinez's claim of collateral estoppel, asserting that the government’s previous acknowledgment of his citizenship in a 1947 indictment did not prevent it from contesting this status now, a position the District Court upheld and which this court also rejected. The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 is noted to apply exclusively to citizens and resident aliens.
The indictment and judgment indicate that Mendoza-Martinez remained in Mexico from November 15, 1942, until November 1, 1946. From September 27, 1944, when §401 (j) became effective, he could not violate draft laws unless he retained U.S. citizenship, as these laws do not apply to nonresident aliens. The Government's charge of draft evasion for that period implies an acknowledgment of his citizenship status. However, citizenship was not contested during his trial for draft evasion, and his guilty plea suggests that this status was not litigated, potentially undermining any claim of estoppel. The charge against him specifically pertained to knowingly leaving the U.S. on November 15, 1942, to evade military service, with the mention of his continued presence in Mexico being ancillary and not integral to the charge. The conviction did not necessitate a determination of his citizenship status after September 27, 1944, allowing the Government to deny his citizenship in subsequent proceedings. The excerpt also touches on constitutional issues, emphasizing the importance of citizenship as a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, while noting the Constitution does not address involuntary forfeiture of citizenship rights.
Citizenship rights come with significant obligations, particularly the duty to serve during war and national emergencies, which Congress can constitutionally enforce. Congress possesses extensive authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to legislate on foreign affairs, a power deemed essential for effective governance. The Government defends provisions §401 (j) and §349 (a)(10) as valid exercises of congressional authority related to foreign affairs and war powers, while the appellees argue these provisions are unconstitutional and constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
The deprivation of American citizenship results in severe consequences, notably rendering an individual stateless, devoid of rights and protections from any government. Stateless individuals lack recourse or protection under international law, as no state is obligated to assist them, leading to potential mistreatment and a loss of community support for rights.
The discussion references two significant cases, Perez v. Brownell and Trop v. Dulles, which examined similar issues regarding Congress's power to revoke citizenship under the Nationality Act of 1940. In Perez, the Supreme Court upheld §401 (e), which revokes citizenship for voting in foreign elections, as a constitutional exercise of Congress's authority to manage foreign relations. The Court found this withdrawal of citizenship justifiable to prevent diplomatic embarrassment. However, it did not address the constitutionality of §401 (j). Dissenting opinions acknowledged that citizenship can be lost not just through voluntary renunciation but also through actions undermining allegiance to the United States.
In Trop, §401 (g), the forfeiture of citizenship for Americans guilty of military desertion during wartime was deemed unconstitutional, as it imposed cruel and unusual punishment contrary to the Eighth Amendment. The Chief Justice's opinion, supported by four Justices, echoed concerns raised in a previous dissent regarding the statute's validity. Justice Brennan highlighted the inconsistency in constitutional interpretations, noting that expatriation for voting in foreign elections was permitted while military desertion faced harsher scrutiny. He concurred that the lack of a rational relationship to war powers rendered the statute invalid. Justice Frankfurter and three other Justices dissented, arguing that §401 (g) did not constitute punishment and fell within Congress's war powers.
The document also addresses the constitutionality of §401 (j), added in 1944, and its counterpart §349 (a)(10) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which automatically forfeits citizenship without prior legal proceedings. The central question is whether these statutes are punitive and thus violate due process protections under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Unlike §401 (g), which required a court-martial conviction, these sections impose citizenship loss without procedural safeguards. The Chief Justice remarked on the absence of due process in determining the guilt of draft evaders. The text asserts that Congress's extensive war powers are still bound by constitutional due process requirements, emphasizing the importance of safeguarding rights during crises to prevent governmental overreach. The Constitution protects all individuals at all times, reinforcing that due process rights must be upheld even amid emergencies.
The provisions §401 (j) and §349 (a)(10) are deemed invalid due to their imposition of citizenship deprivation as punishment for evading military service without the procedural protections guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The framers of the Constitution intended to prevent punishment without proper trial procedures, which include a fair jury, legal representation, and clear charges against the accused. The government acknowledges that these sections automatically revoke citizenship upon leaving or remaining outside the country to avoid military obligations, independent of any criminal conviction for draft evasion. The argument that post-facto judicial and administrative remedies provide due process is rejected, as historical legislative intent clearly indicates that citizenship forfeiture is a penalty necessitating prior criminal trial safeguards. The punitive nature of the sanctions is evident, aligning with traditional tests that assess whether an act is penal or regulatory in nature. Although a detailed analysis of these tests is not required, the congressional purpose and historical context suggest that the primary function of these statutes is to serve as an additional penalty for draft evasion.
The legal discussion centers on the origins and implications of a section from the Civil War Act of March 3, 1865, specifically addressing the treatment of deserters and draft evaders. Section 21 of the Act imposes punitive measures, stating that individuals guilty of desertion or evading the draft by leaving the country for that purpose would lose their citizenship rights. The Congressional debates reveal that the punitive nature of this section was intentional; initially targeting only deserters, an amendment proposed by Senator Morrill sought to include those who flee to avoid the draft. Concerns arose about the ex post facto nature of the penalties—punishing past actions without prior law. Senator Johnson clarified that penalties would apply only to deserters who failed to return within sixty days, which assuaged some concerns. However, objections remained regarding the severity and fairness of the penalties, particularly the loss of citizenship for draft evaders, with Senator Hendricks arguing against the section on the grounds of its ex post facto implications and the excessive nature of the punishment, given existing penalties for desertion.
Representative Townsend of New York criticized a proposed section of a bill as a “despotic measure,” claiming it would unjustly strip rights from up to one hundred thousand individuals. In response, Representative Schenck of Ohio defended the section as a lawful and necessary penalty for deserters. An amendment proposed by Representative Wilson of Iowa, which expanded the draft-evasion clause to include individuals leaving their enrollment district, prompted Representative J. C. Allen of Illinois to raise an ex post facto objection. Schenck countered that the law was not retroactive, asserting it applied solely to deserters who did not return within sixty days, thus allowing them a chance for redemption. Allen argued that the penalties constituted an additional punishment for their prior actions, suggesting a retroactive effect. Schenck maintained that the law addressed current deserters, likening their ongoing status to a continual act of larceny. The debates revealed consensus among lawmakers that leaving the country to evade the draft constituted a penalty and a violation of the law. Post-Civil War state court decisions, particularly Huber v. Reily, supported the interpretation of the predecessor statutes as criminal laws imposing additional penalties for desertion and draft evasion, specifically highlighting issues of disenfranchisement for deserters.
The statute in question is identified as an ex post facto law that Congress attempted to implement to regulate state suffrage, which exceeds its constitutional authority. The law imposes severe penalties, including loss of citizenship, for crimes such as desertion from military service. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a ruling by Justice Strong, engaged with claims of unconstitutionality, characterizing the law as highly penal and asserting that it adds to existing penalties for desertion.
The court addressed the ex post facto concern by stating that the offense could extend to continued refusal to serve rather than just initial desertion. It clarified that the law punishes individuals for violating federal law, but states retain the authority to decide on voting eligibility for those individuals. A significant objection raised was whether the law imposed penalties without a conviction, violating due process. The court emphasized the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, arguing it is incompatible with these rights for election officials to determine guilt or innocence of federal law violations.
Ultimately, the court concluded that the additional penalties must be imposed through the same legal process as established penalties for desertion, specifically through a court-martial with proper conviction. Since the plaintiff had not been convicted in such a manner, he was not disenfranchised. Subsequent state court decisions reaffirmed this reasoning. Notably, in Kurtz v. Moffitt, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged the nature of the sanctions imposed and the necessary procedural safeguards, citing earlier decisions in support. The provisions from 1996 and 1998 reaffirm the original act from 1865.
Desertion from U.S. military service incurs severe penalties, including loss of citizenship rights and disqualification from holding public office, which only take effect following a court martial conviction. This principle was established in cases such as Huber v. Reily and has been consistently upheld by civil and military courts. The relevant statute remained unchanged until 1912 when Congress amended it to exclude peacetime violations and granted the President the authority to lessen penalties for such violations. Legislative discussions in 1912 highlighted concerns about the harshness of losing citizenship rights for deserters, emphasizing that many individuals faced dire circumstances due to this penalty. Critics, including Representative Roberts and Senator Bristow, characterized the loss of citizenship as excessively punitive, particularly during peacetime, arguing that it was an unjust consequence for offenses like desertion. A similar amendment in 1908 aimed at addressing this issue was vetoed by the President.
Representative Roberts, in 1908 and again in 1912, criticized the severe punishment of loss of citizenship for desertion, characterizing it as a "monstrosity" of the law. The discussions focused on whether this penalty was too harsh for peacetime offenses. Roberts asserted that loss of citizenship constituted punishment, a point affirmed by Representative Hull. The Nationality Act of 1940 repealed aspects of the 1865 statute related to draft evasion but retained the punitive nature of citizenship loss for desertion, as established in Section 401(g), which required a court-martial conviction. The President's committee acknowledged the penal character of the 1865 provisions, urging strict construction, which contrasted with Section 401(j) enacted in 1944 that lacked similar procedural safeguards. Justice Brennan noted that the punitive nature of 401(g) initiated a critical inquiry, leading to findings that 401(j) and 349(a)(10) were also unconstitutional. Legislative history of 401(j) indicated its punitive intent, drawing on precedents from earlier statutes and focusing on penal measures for citizens avoiding military service without addressing potential societal benefits or improvements in military conduct. The House Committee highlighted the prevalence of draft evasion in specific regions as justification for the bill.
Congress's motivation for enacting the bill primarily focused on imposing retribution against draft evaders and similar individuals. Representative Dickstein articulated that the bill aimed to address those who left the U.S. knowing they could be drafted, emphasizing a need to counter their intent to evade military service and reintegrate into society post-war. Senator Russell echoed this sentiment, asserting that those unwilling to serve should face penalties. The legislation stipulated that American citizens convicted of violating the Selective Service Act would lose their citizenship, and the bill sought to impose a comparable penalty on non-citizens, indicating a punitive intent aligned with its predecessor statute.
Legislative debates and the Attorney General's correspondence revealed no alternative purposes for the new statute, reinforcing its retributive nature. Consequently, it was determined that Congress intended to impose additional punishment for draft avoidance in cases where individuals left the country. Such punitive measures necessitate the safeguards associated with criminal prosecutions.
Concerns were raised that the ruling might effectively shield draft evaders abroad from sanctions, as they must return to the U.S. to face prosecution. However, the argument asserted that the protections of the Bill of Rights should not be compromised, even if it results in a guilty party evading prosecution. Additionally, individuals living abroad cannot fully exercise their rights as American citizens without returning to the U.S., at which point they would expose themselves to legal consequences.
The United States has the discretion to withhold diplomatic protection for individuals evading prosecution, particularly draft evaders abroad. To exercise their citizenship rights, these individuals must return to face prosecution, which Congress can define within constitutional limits. The court ruled that sections 401(j) and 349(a)(10) of the Nationality Act and Immigration and Nationality Act, respectively, are punitive and unconstitutional due to the lack of necessary procedural safeguards. While acknowledging the seriousness of draft evasion, especially during wartime, the court emphasized that punishment must adhere to due process principles, a core tenet of civil liberties since Magna Carta. The judgments of the District Courts were affirmed. Justices Douglas and Black concurred with the majority but maintained their dissenting opinions from Perez v. Brownell, asserting that Congress cannot revoke citizenship granted at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment. The challenged provisions stipulate that U.S. nationals lose their nationality by leaving the country to evade military service during wartime or declared national emergencies, with a presumption of intent to evade based on non-compliance with service laws.
The Universal Military Training and Service Act has been in effect since 1951. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2281, a three-judge court is necessary to issue an injunction against state statutes on constitutional grounds. Frank Martinez Mendoza was convicted for evading military service by leaving the U.S. for Mexico on November 15, 1942, and remaining there until November 1, 1946. The conviction was based on his actions as a registrant under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. It is acknowledged that the Act applied to both citizens and resident aliens, and it is not disputed that Mendoza was an American citizen at the time of his departure. The Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment establishes that all individuals born or naturalized in the U.S. are citizens. Citizenship can be relinquished voluntarily, either explicitly or through conduct, as demonstrated in several legal precedents.
The excerpt discusses the legal implications of statelessness and the protection of nationality under international law, particularly as affirmed in Article 15 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which states that everyone has the right to a nationality. Various legal documents and scholarly works emphasize that denationalization without consideration of dual nationality is widely disapproved. Significant court cases illustrate the balance between war powers and individual rights, notably in relation to due process and the rights of individuals facing legal proceedings. The case of Mendoza-Martinez highlights that his conviction for draft evasion does not relate to the statutory provisions concerning denationalization, indicating that he did not receive essential procedural protections. Historical references are made to support the argument against involuntary expatriation and to underline the importance of legal protections for individuals within the context of nationality and citizenship rights.
Forfeiture of citizenship, along with banishment and exile, has historically served as a form of punishment. In ancient Rome, loss of freedom often resulted in the loss of citizenship, with individuals facing slavery or forced labor as penalties. Banishment was similarly utilized in English law, recognized as a severe punishment even by those accustomed to harsh judicial practices. Historical cases and legal reviews highlight that the imposition of citizenship loss has often been linked to penal intent, particularly in contemporary statutes. The statutes referenced in recent cases signify a clear punitive purpose, distinguishing them from earlier cases where citizenship loss was tied to noncriminal behavior. This distinction underscores that the current legal framework aligns with historical practices of using citizenship forfeiture as punishment, without addressing the broader constitutional authority of Congress in unrelated statutory contexts.
The refusal of the President to approve a measure was based on concerns regarding the delegation of authority to the Secretary of the Navy for remitting loss of citizenship rights, which the President believed should solely rest with him to avoid potential discrimination against military personnel. Additionally, the President felt that maintaining the current law would deter crimes against the nation, as indicated by his advisers. The Secretary of War noted that loss of citizenship serves as a significant deterrent to desertion, and the Secretary of the Navy echoed this sentiment, with the Attorney General agreeing. The advisers referenced case law to emphasize the necessity of an underlying conviction for constitutional validity.
The document also proposes legislation for expatriating U.S. citizens who evade military service during war or national emergencies, as well as excluding aliens who do the same. Existing laws outline various actions that can lead to expatriation, including obtaining foreign citizenship, taking an oath of allegiance to another country, serving in foreign armed forces, and committing treason. Individuals denied citizenship due to expatriation can seek judicial review of their status, with provisions for those outside the U.S. to enter temporarily until their status is resolved. Currently, many U.S. citizens are reported to have left the country to escape military service, and the document suggests that these individuals should also face loss of citizenship, alongside potential prosecution under the Selective Service Act.
Legislation is recommended to expatriate U.S. citizens who evade military service during wartime or national emergencies by leaving the country, as well as to exclude aliens who do the same. Individuals deemed expatriated under this law would have their status adjudicated by the courts according to the Nationality Act of 1940. Historical precedent for such measures exists from World War I, where a statute mandated expatriation for those who left to avoid the draft. The proposed legislation aligns with the President's program as confirmed by the Bureau of the Budget. The Attorney General clarifies that a senator's claim regarding loss of citizenship for violating the Selective Service Act should be understood in a specific context, referencing amendments that suggest a presumption of intent to avoid service for those who leave the country. Although the issue of denationalization under these provisions has been minimal—approximately 1,750 individuals denationalized from 1954 to 1961, despite millions serving in the armed forces—the punitive nature of such denationalization raises questions about Congress's authority and the need for appropriate legal safeguards if this measure were to be pursued as a criminal sanction.
