Blaustein v. Mitre Corp.

Citations: 550 S.E.2d 336; 36 Va. App. 344; 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 476Docket: 2860004

Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia; August 7, 2001; Virginia; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Barbara T. Blaustein appeals the Workers' Compensation Commission's denial of benefits for an injury sustained on February 5, 1997, while commuting to work. She argues that her injury qualifies for an exception to the "coming and going" rule. Blaustein was employed by Mitre Corporation as a scientist and was assigned to the National Science Foundation (NSF) through an inter-governmental Personnel Assignment Agreement (IPA), which was extended until November 1997. While at NSF, she received reimbursement for parking or Metro fares but was not compensated for mileage or gasoline. On the day of her injury, she parked at the Wheaton Metro station and was struck by a vehicle while crossing to access the subway. 

Initially, a deputy commissioner found that Blaustein fell under the "special errand" exception to the "coming and going" rule, granting her disability and medical benefits. However, Mitre and their insurer, Travelers Indemnity Company, contested this decision, prompting a review of whether Blaustein was an employee at the time of the accident, whether her injury arose out of her employment, and her entitlement to temporary total disability benefits. The Court of Appeals, affirming the commission's decision, upheld the denial of benefits.

On November 15, 2000, the commission determined that Blaustein was an employee of Mitre but denied her workers' compensation benefits, concluding her accident did not meet exceptions to the "coming and going" rule. Blaustein appealed to the Court, focusing solely on whether her accident qualified for an exception. The Court noted that determining if an injury is work-related involves both legal and factual questions, reviewed de novo. Generally, injuries incurred while commuting are not compensable unless they fall under specific exceptions. The "premises" rule allows benefits only on the employer's premises and recognizes three exceptions: 1) employer-provided transportation or compensated travel time; 2) sole means of ingress/egress; and 3) when performing a work-related task. Blaustein claimed her accident fell under the first and third exceptions, but the Court disagreed.

Regarding the transportation exception, Blaustein argued that her injury while traveling to the Metro station was compensable since Mitre reimbursed her subway fare. The Court found this interpretation unpersuasive, noting that past Virginia cases addressed compensation for injuries sustained in employer-provided transport. The Court referenced several precedents where benefits were awarded when employees were injured during employer-mandated transportation. However, it did not conclude on whether injuries occurring at the subway station would be compensable. The discussion also pointed to a prior case that allowed compensation when an employer agreed to cover transportation costs or reimburse travel expenses related to work duties.

In Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the U.S. Supreme Court established that an employer's obligation to provide transportation is significant regardless of the method used—be it their own vehicle, an independent contractor, or reimbursement for employee transportation costs. The case of Scott reinforced this by highlighting that the employment contract specifically provided for free transportation. The Virginia Supreme Court concluded that injuries occurring during transportation are compensable if they arise out of the course of employment. 

The court rejected the employer's narrow interpretation that coverage ceased once the employee left the vehicle, emphasizing a broader perspective consistent with the liberal construction of the act favoring employees. It noted that liability persists until the employee is safely home, exempt from travel-related risks. The court drew parallels to premises liability, asserting that employment encompasses not only work activities but also the reasonable time and space used in commuting. Injuries incurred during this commutation, especially on or near the employer's premises, are treated as arising out of employment, thereby extending the employer's liability to risks under their control.

Employer-provided transportation is treated as an extension of the employer's premises, which extends liability to employees during boarding and alighting from employer-furnished vehicles. Court cases illustrate this principle: in Ferrara v. City of New Orleans, an employee was injured while exiting a truck; in Gibbs v. Pizzolato, an employee was hurt stepping from a vehicle. Liability also applies when injuries occur on pathways used by employees at the employer's direction or with their consent, as seen in Flannagan v. Webster, where an employer's vehicle stopped across the road constituted an invitation for the employee to cross. In Povia Bros. Farms v. Velez and Baldwin v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., similar circumstances established liability due to implied directions from the employer. 

Extended liability arises from special hazards associated with employer transportation, such as in Katz, where an employee was injured due to an unshoveled sidewalk, and in Becker v. Industrial Commission, where a vehicle's position obstructed the employee's view while crossing the street. The case of Devito v. Imbriano highlighted a danger created by the vehicle's egress point into traffic. 

The analogy of treating the employer's vehicle as a part of the premises helps clarify liability issues. For instance, if an employer maintains a parking lot across the street, employees crossing to board the truck would typically be considered within the course of employment. However, this does not apply when employees approach the vehicle from home, as it leads to complications in determining a "reasonable distance" for liability protection. Special hazards, such as the necessity to cross a railroad track after leaving the truck, may warrant liability under specific circumstances.

Cases involving employer-provided transportation should be analyzed using specific exceptions to the "coming and going" rule to ensure clarity and consistency, avoiding ambiguity associated with the "reasonable distance" concept. Liability hinges on the employment contract outlining the scope of transportation benefits. In this case, the contract limited Mitre’s obligations to paying for Blaustein's Metro fare or parking, explicitly excluding reimbursement for time, gas, mileage, or parking at the Metro station. The agreement defined the employment environment's boundaries, indicating that risks arising outside the specified transportation modes were not covered. 

Precedents such as State Highway Commission v. Saylor and Morris v. Hermann Forwarding Co. illustrate similar limitations, where injuries occurring outside the defined transportation parameters were deemed non-compensable. Blaustein’s situation lacked an agreement for comprehensive employer-funded transportation; hence, her injuries sustained en route to the Metro station were not compensable. Additionally, Blaustein's argument for coverage under the "special errand" exception was rejected, as it was found inapplicable to her circumstances.

The "special errand" exception to the "coming and going" rule applies when an employee undertakes a journey related to their employment that would not typically be covered under standard commuting circumstances. This exception is outlined in Kendrick v. Nationwide Homes, Inc., where it was established that if an employee's off-premises travel has significant trouble, urgency, or hazard that is integral to their job duties, it may fall within the course of employment. In Harbin v. Jamestown Village Joint Venture, the claimant was deemed to be on a special errand when traveling to a meeting outside of his regular work site, resulting in an award of benefits after his fatal accident. 

However, the analysis differs when the journey is regular and not burdensome. As per Professor Larson, if a trip is routine and not particularly onerous, there is a presumption that it is a standard commute. In the case of Blaustein, her daily commute to NSF was not considered a special errand, as it was neither onerous nor associated with any specific duty during the travel. Consequently, the commission found that the "special errand" exception did not apply, affirming that Blaustein's injuries were not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act.