Court: Supreme Court of the United States; June 19, 1961; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Roy R. Torcaso, the appellant, challenged the constitutionality of a Maryland requirement that he declare a belief in God to obtain a commission as Notary Public, arguing that this requirement violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Maryland Circuit Court rejected his claims, and the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that the state constitutional provision mandating a declaration of belief in God was self-executing and did not require additional legislation. The Supreme Court case, decided on June 19, 1961, highlighted that the Maryland Declaration of Rights effectively established a religious test that barred individuals who do not declare belief in God from holding public office. The opinion noted historical precedents for such laws, emphasizing that many early colonists fled religious test oaths in Europe only to impose similar tests in the New Colonies when they gained power. The decision underscored the philosophical opposition to test oaths, citing figures like George Calvert, who had personally resisted such requirements due to his Catholic faith.
Calvert aimed to create a colonial government in Maryland free from religious persecution, leading to the inclusion of a provision in Article VI of the U.S. Constitution that prohibits religious test oaths for public office. This reflects a broader commitment to religious freedom, as highlighted in Girouard v. United States, which deemed test oaths contrary to American tradition. The First Congress, seeking to enhance these protections, proposed the Bill of Rights, which included the First Amendment, significantly advancing the safeguarding of religious freedom, speech, press, petition, and assembly. Prior court cases have established the First Amendment's dual concepts of freedom to believe and freedom to act, noting that while belief is absolute, actions may have limitations. In landmark cases like Cantwell v. Connecticut and Everson v. Board of Education, the Court clarified that the First Amendment prohibits government establishment of religion, including laws that favor one religion over another or compel religious observance. The principle of separation of church and state was emphasized by Jefferson, and despite dissenting opinions in Everson, there was consensus on the interpretation of the First Amendment's scope. The Court later reaffirmed this interpretation in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, rejecting calls to undermine the Everson precedent.
A concurring opinion in McCollum, authored by Justice Frankfurter, emphasizes that the First and Fourteenth Amendments extend beyond merely prohibiting an established church, advocating for a complete separation of state and religion as essential for both. The Maryland Court of Appeals misinterpreted the Court's earlier decision in Zorach v. Clauson, which reaffirmed McCollum's principles. The Zorach ruling explicitly indicated adherence to McCollum, rejecting any notion that it permitted government interference in religious beliefs through test oaths or restrictions on public office based on religious affiliation. The Court reiterated that neither state nor federal authorities can compel an individual to profess any religious belief or limit public office eligibility based on religious criteria. The Maryland court's justification, which stated that a candidate was not coerced into belief but barred from office based on a declaration of belief, was deemed unconstitutional. The Court referenced Wieman v. Updegraff, asserting that a law could not penalize a federal employee for religious practices. Ultimately, the Maryland religious test was found to violate the appellant's religious freedom, leading to a reversal of the Maryland Court of Appeals' judgment and a remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Justice Frankfurter and Justice Harlan concurred with the outcome. The Court deemed it unnecessary to address the appellant's claim regarding the federal prohibition on religious tests for state offices, as the reversal was based on other grounds. The appellant's contention regarding the Maryland Constitution was similarly dismissed by the state courts.
His Lordship expressed willingness to take an oath, noting the rigid adherence required to the prescribed form, as mandated by the late King James. The document highlights the gratitude for the freedom of religion in the absence of papists in their midst. It references historical legal developments, including Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance and the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, as foundational to the understanding of religious freedom in American jurisprudence, particularly as articulated in Everson v. Board of Education. Additionally, it cites the First Amendment's prohibition against the establishment of religion and the protection of free exercise. Various landmark cases are mentioned, illustrating the evolving interpretation of these principles. Oliver Ellsworth's writings critique religious test oaths as ineffective, suggesting that they lead to exclusion of principled individuals rather than the intended outcome. James Iredell's commentary during the North Carolina Convention emphasizes the inherent validity of religion independent of government authority. The excerpt concludes by acknowledging the diversity of belief systems in the U.S., which may not align with traditional conceptions of God, thus reinforcing the principle of religious liberty.
