Adcock v. COM., DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES

Citations: 693 S.E.2d 757; 56 Va. App. 334; 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 227Docket: 1681094

Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia; June 8, 2010; Virginia; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Edward W. Adcock appeals a July 8, 2009, order from the Circuit Court of Alexandria, which denied his defense based on the statute of limitations regarding past due child support payments and awarded Mildred A. Houchens $73,629.10 in principal and interest. The court found that the enforcement of the child support order from 1966 was not barred by the twenty-year statute of limitations. Adcock's child support obligation, established during his divorce on October 20, 1966, ended on June 24, 1982, when his youngest child reached adulthood. Houchens sought enforcement through the Division of Child Support Enforcement (DCSE) on June 14, 2006. Adcock's motion for summary judgment, citing the statute of limitations, was denied after a hearing, leading to this appeal. The court ruled that the twenty-year limitation applies only to liquidated judgments, not ongoing support obligations, and referenced Code 16.1-278.15(c), which states that unpaid support obligations create a judgment by operation of law.

The appellant asserts that the twenty-year statute of limitations under Code 8.01-251(A) bars enforcement of a 1966 child support order, claiming the limitation period began on June 24, 1982, when his youngest child reached adulthood and his support obligation ended. The court reviews the trial court’s statutory interpretations de novo to determine the applicability of this statute to an ongoing, unliquidated child support order versus a liquidated money judgment. The appellee references Bennett v. Commonwealth, which established that the limitations under Code 8.01-252 do not apply to unliquidated support obligations. The Bennett ruling clarified the distinction between ongoing, unliquidated support orders and liquidated judgments, concluding that no time limitation exists for an obligee spouse to seek judgments for accumulated arrears under Virginia law. The appellant argues this distinction in Bennett is dicta, but the court maintains it is essential for determining the statute's applicability. The appellant further critiques Bennett's reliance on Taylor v. Taylor, arguing misapplication regarding liquidated support orders; however, the court distinguishes that the analysis in Taylor does not undermine the Bennett decision. Thus, the court reaffirms that the statute of limitations in Code 8.01-251 applies only to liquidated support judgments.

Appellant's attempts to differentiate Bennett based on its reliance on New Jersey law regarding support payments, which do not vest and can be retroactively modified, are ineffective. The distinction between New Jersey and Virginia law does not impact the Bennett analysis regarding the nature of support orders. The argument that Bennett is confined to the enforcement of foreign judgments is also flawed; Bennett's scope is broader. Although it addressed the statute of limitations for enforcing a New Jersey support order in Virginia, its discussion of liquidated versus unliquidated judgments pertains to Virginia spousal support orders generally. An initial spousal support order establishes an ongoing monetary obligation but is not a judgment for a specific liquidated amount, as the total payment will depend on future circumstances. While appellant claims that unliquidated support orders can be enforced without a specified amount, this does not contradict Bennett's principles related to the statute of limitations. Although the Department of Child Support Enforcement (DCSE) can enforce orders without a liquidated amount, this does not modify the Bennett ruling. The decision in Bennett is binding under the doctrine of stare decisis, which prevents it from being overruled except by higher courts. The analysis in Bennett regarding spousal support logically extends to child support, as Virginia law makes no distinction between the two in terms of support order enforcement.

Code 16.1-278.15 combines the enforcement of child and spousal support, indicating that judgments for unpaid support do not differentiate between the two. The DCSE is empowered to enforce these support orders under Codes 63.2-1900 to 63.2-1960, while the UIFSA (Codes 20-88.32 to 20-88.82) addresses foreign support orders. The Workers’ Compensation Act (Code 65.2-531) also allows for claims against compensation benefits for support. The legislative intent and court interpretations equate child support with spousal support for enforcement purposes.

The dissent acknowledges the precedent set by Bennett but argues that it does not apply universally to the current case, attempting to distinguish between ongoing spousal support and terminated child support. It claims that child support and spousal support are subject to different statute of limitations due to the nature of their termination, with child support ending upon the child's majority age. However, spousal support ceases upon death or remarriage (Code 20-109), and child support may continue under certain conditions (e.g., disability or full-time education).

The dissent further posits that upon emancipation, child support arrears become a fixed amount, triggering the statute of limitations. However, the majority opinion rejects this view, arguing that the terms "ascertainable" and "liquidated" are distinct. While an amount may be calculated, it remains unliquidated until a court order specifies the obligation. The majority emphasizes that without a court's intervention to liquidate the obligation, an arrearage is not considered a sum certain despite potential computability. The Bennett case specifically addresses the distinction between ongoing unliquidated support and liquidated amounts due.

The dissent argues that an ongoing support order cannot be considered liquidated because future payments remain due. However, courts typically assess the amount of arrears for ongoing support payments, allowing for a judgment to be entered with a specific sum. The dissent concludes that the twenty-year statute of limitations in Code 8.01-251 applies only to liquidated money judgments, indicating that the ongoing nature of the child support order does not trigger this statute and thus does not prevent enforcement of past due payments. The trial court's ruling that the statute of limitations does not bar recovery of overdue child support and interest is affirmed.

The dissent references Bennett v. Commonwealth to emphasize that ongoing support obligations remain unliquidated until arrears are established, thus aligning with the majority’s reasoning. However, the dissent highlights a key difference in that child support obligations can become fixed by law due to circumstances such as the youngest child's emancipation. It contends that this distinction should lead to different legal outcomes, asserting that fixed obligations should be treated differently from ongoing support orders. The dissent acknowledges that while child support is determined by a child's needs, the purpose of statutes of limitations is to protect defendants from stale claims and ensure fairness in legal proceedings.

Defendants are protected against stale claims through statutes of limitation, which are essential to prevent plaintiffs from manipulating evidence and prolonging disputes. Such statutes should only be lifted by clear legislative intent, with any ambiguities resolved in favor of maintaining their application. Courts are required to enforce these statutes strictly, interpreting exceptions narrowly. 

In child support cases, jurisdictions differ in how they apply statutes of limitation, with some allowing the statute to run for each installment due, while others start the limitation period when the child reaches adulthood or when a judgment for arrears is issued. Some jurisdictions view enforcement of alimony and child support orders as equitable, thus not subject to statute limitations.

In this case, the majority opinion follows Bennett, stating that the statute of limitations for spousal support begins when a liquidated money judgment for arrears is issued. However, the author believes that the statute of limitations should also begin upon the child’s emancipation. The Bennett decision primarily addressed spousal support without considering scenarios where child support obligations cease automatically. Child support is only required during a child's minority, and no new statute of limitations is created for each payment. The ongoing nature of spousal support does not impose a time limit on obtaining judgments for arrears, whereas limitations can apply to support payments in certain situations.

Entry of judgment for accrued arrearages is an established method for enforcing payment obligations, as noted in Taylor v. Taylor. In this case, the wife's URESA petition was filed within ten years of her remarriage, making it inappropriate to enforce a judgment for spousal support arrearages since the spousal support obligation had already terminated by law. Courts do not provide advisory opinions on speculative matters, per City of Fairfax v. Shanklin.

Jurisdiction for child support and maintenance ends when a child reaches the age of majority, according to Eaton v. Eaton. Once a child is emancipated, the support obligation ceases to be ongoing, and no further payments accrue. The statute of limitations on support obligations only begins when the amount owed is liquidated, which can occur through a court judgment for arrearages or a defined sum in support orders. The majority's interpretation of Bennett incorrectly suggests that a liquidated amount can only arise from a court-rendered judgment.

An ongoing support order remains unliquidated due to the potential for future modifications, as demonstrated in Cofer v. Cofer. However, once a child reaches the age of majority, the total amount payable under the support order becomes a sum certain, capable of being computed based on the terms of the agreement. Support orders cannot be retroactively modified, and payments vest upon becoming due. Thus, upon a child's emancipation, the support obligation becomes a fixed amount, leading to the conclusion that the statute of limitations would only begin to apply when the arrearage is reduced to a lump sum or upon the child’s emancipation, as illustrated in Harvey v. McGuire.

The characterization of the appellant’s obligation under the 1966 child support order as an unliquidated, ongoing obligation is deemed incorrect. The obligation became a liquidated amount when the youngest child was emancipated on June 24, 1982, at which point the appellant was no longer required to make payments under the decree. All previous payments were fixed and not modifiable, thus constituting a sum certain. The statute of limitations for claiming arrearages began on June 24, 1982, and since the petition to enforce the support order was filed on July 7, 2008, the twenty-year limitation under Code 8.01-251 bars recovery of arrearages that accrued by that date. Additionally, the ruling suggests that child and spousal support obligations terminate automatically under similar circumstances, such as the death of a party or remarriage, reinforcing that a spouse unable to collect spousal support arrearages for over twenty years should be treated similarly. The majority's interpretation diverges from this understanding, as it would allow collection of arrears beyond the statute of limitations under certain conditions.