Jon Goble, also known as Jonathon Thomas Goble, appeals his convictions for selling or attempting to sell wild animal parts under Code 29.1-553. He argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction since the sales occurred in Pennsylvania, claiming the Commonwealth had the burden of proving the sales did not fall under a statutory exception. Goble asserts that if the burden was on him to prove an exception as an affirmative defense, he successfully met that burden. Additionally, he contests the evidence supporting the total sales value exceeding $200, which would elevate his charges from misdemeanors to a felony.
The background includes a search warrant executed at Goble's home on September 22, 2008, by Officer Neil T. Kester from the Virginia Department of Game and Inland Fisheries, seeking evidence of violations related to the sale of a mounted black bear. During the search, Goble voluntarily accessed his eBay account for the officers, revealing three listings for mounted deer heads sold for $450, $432.27, and $510, all located in Milford, Pennsylvania, at the time of the listings. It was established that Goble received payment for these sales while in Virginia. He was indicted on six counts related to the illegal sale of wild animal parts. At the trial, evidence was presented that Goble lacked a valid taxidermy permit and did not possess the required legal documentation for the antlers found during the search. The court ultimately affirmed Goble's convictions for two misdemeanors and one felony.
The trial court received testimony from Mike Fies, a wildlife biologist, who defined "fur-bearing animals" as those commonly trapped and referenced the legal definition including species such as beaver and raccoon. Goble, defending himself, revealed he held a taxidermy permit from November 2006 to July 2007, which was revoked after a guilty plea for illegal possession of a "road kill fawn." His attempt to renew the permit in November 2007 was denied, with the Department stating he could reapply only after August 2008. Goble claimed to have had a valid permit when he met with an undercover officer in September 2008, yet he did not provide evidence of this permit.
The court clarified that a "tag" or "game check card" is an official document confirming lawful acquisition of wild game. Goble faced scrutiny over inconsistent statements regarding the origins of deer hides used in taxidermy, initially claiming all were road kills with tags, then stating two were road kills and one was legally harvested, and finally suggesting the hides could have come from various sources. He also testified about acquiring deer antlers from a "Big Game Show" and possibly eBay, admitting to posting the mounted deer heads for sale on eBay while in Virginia, although stored in Pennsylvania.
Goble's motion to strike the evidence was denied by the trial court, which concluded he sold the items from Augusta County despite their shipping origin, asserting no legal authority allowed him to sell deer antlers. The court determined that the sale occurred within its jurisdiction, based on the evidence presented.
Goble was found guilty of selling mounted deer heads without a taxidermy license, resulting in one felony and two misdemeanors due to sales exceeding $200. He claimed he did not sell the antlers in Virginia and argued that the Commonwealth failed to prove their value was over $200, seeking a reconsideration of his conviction. The trial court denied this motion, confirming that Goble lacked a taxidermy license during the sales and that he sold the items in Virginia, as evidenced by listing on eBay and receiving payment there. The court ruled that the sale was complete once the items were listed online. Goble's argument regarding the jurisdiction for the sales was rejected; the court maintained that the sales occurred in Virginia despite Goble’s assertion that title passed in Pennsylvania. Furthermore, the court found Goble's claims about the value of the antlers and the legality of the deer were not adequately raised during the trial, affirming that the overall value of the deer head mounts was appropriate for determining guilt. Goble's appeal followed after some counts were dropped or struck during the trial.
Under Code 29.1-553(A), individuals engaging in the sale or purchase of wild birds, animals, or freshwater fish without legal authorization face a Class 1 misdemeanor. If such transactions aggregate to 200 or more within a 90-day period, the offense escalates to a Class 6 felony. In auction contexts, sales are considered complete when the auctioneer announces it, typically marked by the fall of the hammer. The traditional jurisdictional principle requires that crimes must occur within Virginia for the courts to have jurisdiction. However, in the present case, the Commonwealth could not demonstrate where the auction sale was announced or where the physical delivery of goods took place, preventing a conclusion that the sales occurred within Virginia.
The Commonwealth argues for jurisdiction based on the fact that the defendant, Goble, made eBay postings and received payments in Virginia. Virginia's Supreme Court has recognized an exception, the "immediate result doctrine," allowing for jurisdiction when actions in one state lead to criminal consequences in another state, as seen in Farewell v. Commonwealth and Jaynes v. Commonwealth. In Jaynes, the court upheld jurisdiction for crimes committed via electronic means that had effects within Virginia, despite the defendant being physically located outside the state. Thus, the immediate result doctrine may apply to Goble's actions, warranting further consideration of jurisdiction in this case.
Jaynes argued that his actions did not produce an immediate result in Virginia, claiming the Commonwealth lacked jurisdiction over his prosecution. The Supreme Court refuted this, stating that evidence showed AOL's servers were located in Virginia, which was publicly accessible information. The court determined that sending over 50,000 emails to addresses ending in "@aol.com" resulted in the email transmission occurring in Virginia. Citing previous rulings, the court affirmed that a state can assert jurisdiction over crimes committed outside its borders if those acts intend to produce harm within the state. The court clarified that it is not necessary for a crime to start with extraterritorial acts for the immediate result theory of jurisdiction to apply; rather, extraterritorial acts must be immediate causes of harm within the state. The discussion referenced the case of Gregory, where the defendant, while operating outside Virginia, unlawfully sold a tractor pledged as collateral to a Virginia bank. The court upheld jurisdiction, stating that the statute defining larceny did not require the intent or act of disposal to occur within Virginia's borders.
The court established that the lien in question was created within the Commonwealth, and the failure to secure the bank's consent for collateral disposal also occurred there. Although the intent to deprive the bank and the actual disposal of the tractor happened outside the Commonwealth, the court recognized that the statute aimed to prevent both economic harm to the secured party and infringement of the lien established in Virginia. The decision referenced the Supreme Court's ruling in Travelers Health, affirming that harm caused by criminal acts partially executed within the Commonwealth can be prosecuted there, applying the immediate result doctrine.
In Goble's case, the basis for Virginia's jurisdiction was even stronger since he initiated the illegal sales while located in the Commonwealth, including formulating the intent to sell and posting the items for sale on eBay. He also received payment through an online account within the Commonwealth. The court noted that while Virginia's loss of control over its natural resources was less tangible than the bank's financial harm in Gregory, it was still immediate and direct. The Commonwealth has a legitimate interest in regulating the sale of deer and deer parts in accordance with its statutes and regulations.
Regarding Goble's argument about statutory exceptions, he claimed the Commonwealth needed to prove that his sales did not meet legal exceptions outlined in Code 29.1-553. However, the court sided with the Commonwealth, asserting that this phrase constitutes a statutory defense which Goble failed to substantiate. The court emphasized that when evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, it considers the totality of the evidence rather than isolated pieces, and it presumes the trial court's judgment is correct unless proven otherwise.
The appellate review focuses on whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt when evidence is viewed favorably for the prosecution, according to Jackson v. Virginia. Penal statutes are strictly construed against the Commonwealth and favor the liberty of citizens, as established in Martin v. Commonwealth. When interpreting statutes, the goal is to further the statute’s intended purpose if reasonably possible, as per Mayhew v. Commonwealth.
In cases involving penal statutes with qualifications, exceptions, or exemptions, the limiting language may be treated as a negative element that the prosecution must disprove, or as a statutory defense available to the accused. Courts should evaluate the statute's intent and the parties’ ability to prove or disprove the relevant facts. Four key factors are used to determine if limiting language is a negative element or a statutory defense: the wording and relationship of the exception within the statute, the necessity of the exception in completing the prohibition, whether the exception provides an excuse for conduct that would otherwise be criminal, and whether the facts are uniquely known to the defendant.
Applying these factors, it is concluded that the phrase “except as provided by law” in Code § 29.1-553 establishes a statutory defense rather than a negative element. The exception does not define the prohibited conduct, which involves the sale or purchase of wild birds, animals, or freshwater fish. The exception follows the crime's definitional elements and is not essential to the general prohibition. While the exception does not provide an excuse for criminal conduct, it allows for legal sales under specific circumstances, such as for licensed auctioneers or non-profit organizations, indicating potential lawful avenues for selling wild animal parts.
American Indians are referenced under Code 29.1-521(B), establishing that the facts necessary to prove statutory exceptions are primarily within the defendant's knowledge, making the exception in Code 29.1-553 a statutory defense rather than a crime element. Goble asserts that his actions align with statutory exceptions due to his licensed taxidermy status, the classification of deer as "fur-bearing" animals, the legality of the deer hides he sold, and the nature of the mounts as made from legally harvested parts. However, the court disagrees.
1. **Sale of Unclaimed Mounted Animals**: Under 4 VAC 15-40-270, licensed taxidermists can sell unclaimed mounted animals if taken lawfully. The trial court determined Goble lacked a valid 2008 permit for sales; he only presented an expired permit from 2007, and the Department had denied his renewal request. Goble's testimony confirmed that the deer used were not unclaimed but were either road kills or legally harvested, negating this exception.
2. **Sale of Fur-Bearing Animal Parts**: Code 29.1-536 permits the sale of hides and parts of legally taken fur-bearing animals, contingent on compliance with Codes 29.1-400 through 29.1-407. Code 29.1-400 requires a permit for the sale of such items, while Code 29.1-401(A) exempts hunters or trappers from needing a permit for their own legally obtained hides. Assuming deer qualify as fur-bearing, Goble failed to demonstrate his actions fell within these exceptions, as he did not produce evidence of possessing a valid fur permit. Therefore, Goble's arguments do not substantiate legal immunity for his actions.
A. Goble was permitted to sell mounted deer heads without a permit if he legally harvested the deer, but he failed to substantiate his claims regarding the legality of the deer acquisition. At trial, his inconsistent testimony about the source of the deer—stating they were from road kills or a butcher—was not credible. The trial court may disregard self-serving statements, and thus Goble did not prove he legally shot or caught the deer.
Regarding the sale of hides, 4 VAC 15-90-280 allows the sale of hides from legally taken deer, but Goble did not present the necessary tags to demonstrate the legality of the deer used for the mounted heads. His admission that he could not match tags to the mounts further undermined his claims. Consequently, Goble failed to establish that the deer were legally obtained.
As for selling antlers, Goble cited Code 29.1-521(10) as a defense, which permits the sale of items made from legally harvested deer parts. However, he was charged under Code 29.1-553, making that exception irrelevant. Goble argued that the evidence did not establish the value of the antlers alone, which could affect the felony charge based on aggregate sales exceeding $200 within 90 days. However, the court found that the evidence supported his lack of authority to sell the hides and antlers, affirming his felony convictions despite the absence of detailed value evidence for the antlers alone.
The court upheld Goble's convictions. Judge Powell dissented, asserting that Virginia courts had jurisdiction over Goble's actions related to the sale of mounted deer heads stored in Pennsylvania under the "immediate result doctrine,” allowing jurisdiction for crimes intended to cause harm within the state, even if committed elsewhere.
The immediate result doctrine allows Virginia to assert jurisdiction over offenses that cause immediate harm within the Commonwealth, even if the offense is not fully executed in Virginia. This is illustrated in Foster-Zahid v. Commonwealth and Gregory v. Commonwealth, where harm resulting from partially committed criminal acts can be prosecuted in Virginia. Essential to this doctrine is that the harm must directly stem from the extraterritorial act or its consequential chain of events, as established in Travelers Health Ass’n v. Commonwealth. Historical precedent supports that individuals can be charged in the jurisdiction where harm occurs, regardless of their location when initiating the criminal conduct (Strassheim v. Daily).
The doctrine's application hinges on a sequence where a criminal act precedes the resulting harm in Virginia, exemplified by cases involving actions taken in one state that immediately cause harm in another, such as firing a shot across state lines. However, if the harm has already occurred before the criminal act, as in the present case involving the sale of mounted deer heads, Virginia lacks jurisdiction since the immediate harm must result from the criminal act rather than serve as a basis for prosecuting it. The majority opinion incorrectly identifies the harm as Virginia's loss of control over its natural resources without evidence of legitimate possession.
The majority's conclusion overlooks that the "loss" occurred upon the removal of mounted deer heads from the state, preceding any extraterritorial act. The Commonwealth failed to prove any immediate harm in Virginia resulting from Goble's sales of deer heads stored in Pennsylvania, as the Code does not criminalize the transfer of wild animal parts to another state. The harm the Commonwealth seeks to prevent is primarily related to illegal poaching, not sales. While Goble was tried under the premise of selling wild animal parts in violation of Code 29.1-553, the appellate court may affirm a trial court's judgment based on different reasoning, provided the correct reason was raised at trial. Goble acknowledged that he offered the deer heads for sale while in Virginia, establishing jurisdiction. He contends, however, that he cannot be convicted for offers where the sales were not completed in Virginia. The court disagrees, citing Lynch v. Commonwealth, which states that an offer to sell is complete once made, irrespective of future sale completion. Thus, sufficient evidence supports Goble’s misdemeanor convictions for offering the deer heads for sale. However, the felony conviction's sentence enhancement under Code 29.1-553(A) applies only to actual sales, not offers. Consequently, the maximum punishment for offering wild animals for sale is a Class 1 misdemeanor, warranting the vacation of Goble’s felony conviction and remanding for re-sentencing as a Class 1 misdemeanor.
