Sierra v. Commonwealth

Citations: 722 S.E.2d 656; 59 Va. App. 770; 2012 WL 911547; 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 74Docket: 0032111

Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia; March 20, 2012; Virginia; State Appellate Court

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Robert Alexander Sierra was convicted in a bench trial for possession of a controlled substance, specifically methylphenidate, violating Code § 18.2-250. On appeal, he contested the sufficiency of evidence for his conviction, asserting he was unaware of the substance's character and presence, claiming he thought the pills were Tylenol or aspirin. The appellate court reviewed the evidence favorably towards the Commonwealth, noting that during a traffic stop for a defective headlight, Officer B. Person found eight prescription pills on Sierra after arresting him for DUI. Analysis confirmed two of the pills contained methylphenidate, a Schedule II substance.

Sierra argued that the Commonwealth needed to prove he knowingly possessed Concerta, the brand name for methylphenidate. However, the trial court deemed Sierra's explanation implausible, concluding that it was evident the pills were prescription medication rather than over-the-counter drugs. Consequently, the trial court found Sierra guilty, and the appeal court affirmed the conviction, stating that the evidence supported the trial court's determination that Sierra was aware he possessed a controlled substance.

Sierra contends that the evidence was inadequate to demonstrate his knowledge of possessing methylphenidate (Concerta). The analysis centers on two questions: (1) whether Virginia Code § 18.2-250 necessitates that a defendant must know the specific substance they possess, and (2) whether the evidence met the requisite mens rea standard under the same code. The conclusion reached is that the statute requires a defendant to be aware that they possess a controlled substance, but not necessarily to identify which specific controlled substance it is. The trial court's determination that Sierra was aware of possessing a controlled substance was upheld, as the judgment in a bench trial carries the same weight as a jury verdict and can only be overturned if clearly erroneous or unsupported by evidence.

The appellate court reviews factual findings with high deference while interpreting legal conclusions and statutory interpretations de novo. The court emphasizes the importance of adhering to the plain language of statutes, unless ambiguity exists, and must respect legislative intent unless an interpretation would lead to absurdity. Virginia Code § 18.2-250 stipulates that it is unlawful to knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled substance without a valid prescription or authorization.

Violation of the Drug Control Act regarding controlled substances varies by classification. Possession of Schedule I or II substances constitutes a Class 5 felony. For Schedule III substances, the offense is a Class 1 misdemeanor, while Schedule IV results in a Class 2 misdemeanor, Schedule V a Class 3 misdemeanor, and Schedule VI a Class 4 misdemeanor. The statute requires that offenders “knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled substance,” but does not impose a mens rea requirement for the specific type of substance possessed; that is established as an actus reus element the Commonwealth must prove. The legislative intent, evident from the plain language of Code 18.2-250, indicates that the knowing and intentional possession of any controlled substance is criminalized, with varying penalties based on the substance's classification. Appellate courts are bound to interpret the statute as written, without adding or altering its language. The clear policy behind the statute is to hold individuals accountable for knowingly possessing a controlled substance, regardless of any misconceptions about the exact identity of the substance.

A defendant who intentionally possesses a controlled substance, with awareness of its nature, accepts the penalties set by the General Assembly for that specific substance. The legislature, not the judiciary, defines public policy and balances competing interests. Courts focus on interpreting the legislature's intent within statutes. Similar principles apply under federal law, specifically 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), which prohibits intentional possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, and § 844, which criminalizes simple possession. Federal courts have ruled that a defendant can be punished for the substance they possess, even if they intended to distribute another drug. It is established that knowledge of the specific drug is not necessary for conviction for possession with intent to distribute; awareness of dealing with a controlled substance suffices.

In the context of drug importation offenses, the base offense level for sentencing can be determined by the quantity of the imported drug, regardless of the defendant’s knowledge of its volume or specific nature, as long as the defendant is aware they are importing a controlled substance (United States v. Salazar). The mens rea requirement for possession of a controlled substance aligns with due process, emphasizing that Congress intended for narcotics violators to risk sentencing enhancements based on circumstances surrounding the crime. It is sufficient for a defendant to know they are trafficking in a controlled substance, without needing to know the exact type (United States v. Obi; Barbosa). This reasoning also applies to Code 18.2-250, as changing this interpretation would require significant statutory revisions that are beyond judicial authority. The Eighth Circuit affirmed that knowledge of the substance as a controlled substance suffices (United States v. Martin).

Sierra argues that Young v. Commonwealth supports the necessity of intentional and conscious possession with knowledge of a substance's nature. However, the Supreme Court in Young did not clarify whether precise knowledge of the substance is required, rejecting the notion that mere possession infers knowledge of its character (Young v. Commonwealth). Previous cases such as Josephs v. Commonwealth had established an inference of knowledge based on possession, but this was not upheld in Young. Other precedents reiterate that to convict for possession of a narcotic, a defendant must be aware of the substance's presence and its character (Ritter v. Commonwealth; Gillis v. Commonwealth).

The legal interpretation of "awareness of the presence and character of the particular substance" is not definitive regarding whether it requires knowledge that a substance is both present and a controlled substance or knowledge of its exact identity. This language originates from an A.L.R. article, referenced in Ritter, which discussed older statutes that lacked a mens rea requirement. The article differentiates between cases where knowledge of a substance's narcotic character is necessary and those where mere possession suffices for a conviction. The Supreme Court's adoption of this language does not imply a requirement for precise knowledge of the controlled substance; rather, it suggests that a defendant must recognize the substance as a controlled one. 

The mens rea requirement is clearly articulated in Code 18.2-250. The Supreme Court overruled interpretations suggesting that mere possession could indicate guilty knowledge. In the case of Young, the evidence was insufficient for conviction because the pill bottle did not reveal the character of its contents. The current case addresses whether Code 18.2-250 necessitates knowledge of possession of a controlled substance, regardless of whether a defendant accurately identifies it. The conclusion is that a defendant is guilty under Code 18.2-250 if they know they possess a controlled substance, even if they are unaware of its specific identity. The General Assembly could have included such a defense in the statute if intended. In contrast to Young, Officer Person testified that the pills in this case were identifiable as prescription pills, and the trial court found sufficient evidence that Sierra was aware of their nature, supporting the conviction. The analysis will now determine if the evidence met the mens rea requirement, which it did, as Sierra possessed eight prescription pills, with Officer Person’s testimony confirming their character.

Sierra claimed he believed the pills were over-the-counter medications (aspirin and Tylenol), but the trial court rejected his testimony, determining that it was clear the pills were prescription medications. The court concluded that Sierra was aware he possessed a controlled substance, a finding supported by evidence and not plainly erroneous. The court exercised its discretion in deeming Sierra's testimony not credible and viewed his statements as attempts to conceal guilt, which constituted affirmative evidence of guilt. Consequently, the court found sufficient evidence to convict Sierra of knowingly and intentionally possessing a controlled substance, violating Code § 18.2-250, leading to the affirmation of his conviction.