State v. Bridges

Citations: 963 S.W.2d 487; 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 642; 1997 WL 804620Docket: 02S01-9606-CC-00053

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court; December 31, 1997; Tennessee; State Supreme Court

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In the case before the Supreme Court of Tennessee, the primary legal issue is the constitutionality of the warrantless seizure of cocaine from the defendant, Ray Anthony Bridges, during a detention and frisk, evaluated under the "plain feel" doctrine established in Minnesota v. Dickerson. The trial court originally denied Bridges' motion to suppress evidence obtained during the frisk after he pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to sell, reserving the right to appeal the seizure's constitutionality.

The Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, but upon appeal, the Supreme Court found that while the initial stop and frisk were based on reasonable suspicion, the evidence did not support the trial court's determination that the officer had probable cause to believe the object felt during the frisk was contraband. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment, vacated Bridges' conviction, and dismissed the charge against him.

The background details reveal that Officer D.W. Blackwell acted on information from a reliable confidential informant who indicated that Bridges was selling crack cocaine while carrying cash and drugs. After conducting a patdown, Officer Blackwell felt an object he identified as a pill bottle commonly used for storing crack cocaine, which he seized and confirmed contained crack cocaine. This led to Bridges' arrest and the discovery of additional drugs during a subsequent search.

The trial court's denial of the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence was upheld by the Court of Criminal Appeals. However, this Court found that the seizure of the pill bottle violated the defendant’s constitutional rights, leading to the reversal of the appellate court's judgment. The review standard for suppression motions involves evaluating the trial court's findings of fact and law. The trial judge retains the authority to assess witness credibility and resolve evidentiary conflicts, with findings upheld unless the evidence strongly contradicts them. Legal applications to those facts are reviewed de novo.

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures, requiring warrants to be based on probable cause and specific details. The intent of these provisions is to safeguard individual privacy against arbitrary government actions. Both constitutional frameworks presume warrantless searches or seizures as unreasonable, necessitating the State to prove that such actions fall within narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement for evidence to be admissible.

The defendant asserts that Officer Blackwell had no authority to detain or search him, claiming that no exceptions to the warrant requirement apply. In contrast, the State argues that Officer Blackwell had probable cause for arresting the defendant and that the subsequent search of his person was lawful as a search incident to that arrest. Additionally, the State claims the initial detention and patdown search were valid under the "stop and frisk" principle established in Terry v. Ohio, along with the admissibility of evidence under the plain touch doctrine.

A search incident to a lawful arrest is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Thus, it is necessary to determine if the arrest was lawful. Both the Fourth Amendment and state law require probable cause for warrantless arrests. Probable cause exists when the facts known to officers would lead a prudent individual to believe that an offense has been committed or is being committed. 

In evaluating probable cause based on an informant's tip, the reliability of the informant and the basis for their knowledge must be established. In this case, the informant had a history of reliability with Officer Blackwell but failed to provide details on how they knew of the defendant's alleged drug activity. Despite this deficiency, the State contends that independent police work corroborated the tip. Specifically, Officer Blackwell had received multiple tips about the defendant's similar activities at the same location, was aware of the defendant's prior drug convictions, and found the defendant at the specified location shortly after receiving the informant's tip. This corroboration may support finding probable cause despite the informant's credibility issues.

Corroboration of facts is inadequate for an arrest in this case. A police officer's awareness of a suspect's reputation alone does not meet the probable cause threshold for arrest, as established in *State v. Kimbro*. More substantial evidence beyond mere reputation or rumors is required. In this instance, the only corroborated fact from the informant, aside from the defendant's reputation, was the defendant's presence at a specific location, which does not validate the informant's reliability or establish probable cause.

The State did not demonstrate that Officer Blackwell had enough information for a lawful warrantless arrest, rendering the subsequent search invalid. The analysis then shifts to the validity of the initial detention and frisk under *Terry v. Ohio*. An investigatory stop is permissible if the officer has reasonable suspicion, supported by specific facts, that a crime has occurred or is imminent. *Terry* also allows for a frisk if there are particular facts suggesting the suspect may be armed.

Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause, as noted in *Alabama v. White*, and can arise from less reliable information. Courts assess reasonable suspicion based on the totality of circumstances, including observations, tips from other officers or citizens, and offender behavior patterns. In this case, the decision for an investigatory stop and frisk was based on three factors: reliable past information from a confidential informant, multiple tips about the defendant dealing drugs, and the officer’s own observations shortly after receiving the informant's tip. Although the informant's tip did not fully meet the two-prong reliability test, it, combined with the officer's corroboration, established sufficient reasonable suspicion for the stop.

An investigative stop is permissible based on an informant's tip if it demonstrates sufficient reliability, as established in State v. Pully and Adams v. Williams. Timely reports from informants, particularly those suggesting firsthand knowledge, are generally considered credible. In this case, Officer Blackwell received a tip that the defendant, Bridges, was selling crack cocaine at "Preacher's" and carrying drugs on him. Shortly after, Officer Blackwell located Bridges at the described location. Previous tips indicated Bridges regularly sold crack cocaine in the area, providing corroboration and establishing the informant's credibility, thus fulfilling the reliability requirements for reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio.

Once a valid stop occurs, police may conduct a limited pat-down if there is reasonable suspicion the suspect is armed. Given Bridges' status as a convicted felon and drug dealer recently charged with a violent offense, coupled with his history of fleeing armed from police, Officer Blackwell had sufficient grounds to suspect Bridges was armed. Therefore, the officer was justified in conducting a limited search for weapons.

The summary then transitions to the legality of seizing contraband found during the search, referencing the "plain feel" doctrine from Minnesota v. Dickerson. The Supreme Court ruled that if an officer detects contraband through touch during a lawful Terry frisk, they may seize it. In Dickerson's case, the officer felt a lump in his pocket, which was later identified as crack cocaine. The conviction for possession was initially upheld but ultimately overturned by the Minnesota Supreme Court, which ruled the cocaine should have been suppressed.

The United States Supreme Court established the "plain feel" doctrine, allowing contraband detected by touch during a lawful patdown to be admitted as evidence. This doctrine parallels the "plain view" doctrine. In *Dickerson*, the Court ruled that if a police officer lawfully performs a patdown and feels an object whose identity is immediately apparent, it does not violate the suspect's privacy beyond the initial search for weapons. The warrantless seizure of contraband is justified under similar practical considerations as in the plain view context.

The Court dismissed the argument that the sense of touch is less reliable than sight, emphasizing that the premise of Terry v. Ohio is based on officers detecting weapons through touch. Even if touch is less reliable, the Fourth Amendment still requires probable cause to justify any seizure of contraband, regardless of whether it is detected by sight or touch.

In *Dickerson*, the key issue was whether the officer was acting within the lawful bounds established by Terry when he had probable cause to believe the object felt was contraband. The Court found that the officer exceeded the permissible scope of the search; his exploration of the respondent’s pocket after determining it contained no weapon was not justified under Terry’s rationale, which is to protect officer safety.

To apply the "plain feel" doctrine, three criteria must be satisfied: 1) a valid reason for the initial patdown under Terry, 2) that the contraband is detected during the ongoing search for weapons, and 3) the incriminating nature of the object must be immediately apparent to the officer. In this case, the first two criteria were met, with the patdown deemed permissible under Terry. The legality of the seizure hinges on the third criterion, specifically whether Officer Blackwell had probable cause to believe the bottle he felt was contraband prior to its seizure.

Probable cause arises when the facts within an officer's knowledge are sufficiently compelling for a reasonable person to believe that an item may be contraband. It does not require that the belief be correct or more likely true than false. When assessing probable cause, courts consider the totality of circumstances, including the officer’s testimony and prior experience. The subjective belief of an officer regarding an object's nature must also be objectively reasonable based on the known circumstances at the time of the search. 

In this case, the court found that Officer Blackwell lacked probable cause to believe that the object he felt during a patdown was contraband. Despite his assertion of recognizing a pill bottle commonly used by crack dealers, the officer could not have determined its contents merely by touch. The officer’s testimony did not provide an objective basis for identifying the bottle or determining its contents as contraband, nor was there sufficient evidence of his experience with drug cases. The court concluded that it was not immediately apparent to Officer Blackwell that the bottle contained contraband until it was removed from the defendant's pocket, which constituted an impermissible further manipulation.

In Davis v. State, the court addressed the limitations of the "plain view" and "plain feel" doctrines in the context of warrantless searches. The United States Supreme Court previously warned against using the plain view doctrine to extend exploratory searches, a caution that similarly applies to the plain feel doctrine. The majority found that the initial stop and frisk was justified by reasonable suspicion but concluded that the officer lacked probable cause to believe the object felt during the frisk was contraband. As a result, the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to deny the defendant's motion to suppress was reversed, the defendant’s conviction vacated, and the charge dismissed.

A concurring/dissenting opinion supported the majority's position on the constitutionality of the stop and frisk but argued that the seizure of contraband was permissible under the plain feel doctrine. This opinion emphasized that probable cause exists when facts and circumstances are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that an item may be contraband. The opinion referenced previous legal standards for evaluating probable cause, noting that it does not require certainty but rather a practical probability based on the totality of circumstances and the officer’s experience.

Under the plain feel doctrine, there is a division among courts regarding the seizure of objects typically used to contain drugs. Some courts assert that only contraband or recognizable evidence can be seized, while others allow seizure if an officer has probable cause to believe the object contains contraband. The majority opinion in this case follows the latter view but concludes that Officer Blackwell lacked probable cause regarding the item detected during a patdown. In dissent, it is argued that Officer Blackwell indeed had probable cause based on a reliable tip that the defendant was selling crack cocaine and carrying it on his person. During a lawful Terry frisk, Officer Blackwell identified an object resembling a pill bottle, commonly used by crack dealers, and his recognition was informed by prior drug case experience. The dissent emphasizes that without the informant's tip, the seizure might be constitutionally questionable, but given the circumstances, Officer Blackwell had sufficient grounds to believe the item contained contraband. The dissent concludes that the seizure was constitutionally permissible, advocating for affirmation of the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress and the defendant's subsequent conviction.

The case involves Ray Anthony Bridges, the defendant, who appealed a judgment from the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the trial court's decision to overrule his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a stop and frisk. Bridges pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to sell. The court reserved the issue of the legality of the warrantless search for appeal, determining it to be significant to the case. The Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the conviction, concluding that the seizure of evidence was permissible under the "plain feel" doctrine established in Minnesota v. Dickerson.

At a suppression hearing, Officer D.W. Blackwell of the Paris Police Department testified regarding a confidential informant, who provided credible information about Bridges selling crack cocaine at a club. Prior to stopping Bridges, Blackwell had received multiple tips about his drug dealing and was aware of Bridges' prior felony assault conviction and recent altercations with the police. 

Thirty minutes after receiving the informant's tip, Officer Blackwell found Bridges at a table in the club, identified himself, and conducted a stop and frisk. During the pat-down, Blackwell felt a small object in Bridges' jacket pocket, which he recognized as commonly used by crack dealers to store drugs. Upon seizing the object, it was confirmed to contain crack cocaine, along with a knife found in the search.

The defendant was arrested following a search that revealed a plastic bag of cocaine in his pocket, although the initial record did not describe the pill bottle or its characteristics. The case involves the appellate review of a trial court’s findings regarding a motion to suppress evidence. The appellate standard, as established in State v. Odom, involves assessing the credibility of witnesses and the weight of evidence, with the trial judge serving as the trier of fact. The party prevailing in the trial court is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence, and the trial court's findings will be upheld unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. The application of law to the trial court's factual findings is reviewed de novo. The decision concurs with the conclusion that there was no probable cause for the defendant's arrest. The primary focus of the ruling relates to the legality of Officer Blackwell's initial detention and the doctrine of plain feel, which extends from the plain view doctrine, as discussed in the U.S. Supreme Court case Minnesota v. Dickerson. Before seizing evidence under the plain feel doctrine, initial intrusion must be justified.

Evidence must be in plain view to be considered constitutionally valid, as established in Coolidge v. New Hampshire. Determining the validity of the defendant's detention and the pat-down is necessary before addressing the issue of seizure under the plain feel doctrine. Officer Blackwell conducted a warrantless search, which the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibit unless they fall within narrowly defined exceptions. The defendant argues that no exceptions apply in his case, asserting that Officer Blackwell lacked the right to detain or search him. Conversely, the State claims Officer Blackwell had probable cause to arrest the defendant, making the search permissible. The Fourth Amendment secures individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures and requires warrants to be issued based on probable cause with specific descriptions. The Fourteenth Amendment extends the Fourth Amendment's protections to the states. Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution similarly protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures and prohibits general warrants lacking evidence of specific offenses. The doctrine of search incident to arrest is noted as an exception to warrant requirements.

The detention and search of the defendant were deemed valid as a stop and frisk under Terry v. Ohio, reinforcing the Court of Criminal Appeals' agreement with the State's second argument. The first argument regarding the lawfulness of the arrest must be considered, as a finding of lawful arrest would independently justify the search and seizure. The Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 7 require probable cause for warrantless arrests. The trial court found sufficient articulable facts supporting the arrest and frisk, although it did not address the plain feel doctrine. Officers are permitted to search a person being arrested to remove weapons and to seize evidence to prevent concealment or destruction, provided there is probable cause based on trustworthy information at the time of arrest. The warrantless arrest was based on information from an informant.

Probable cause for making an arrest and for issuing a search warrant is assessed using the same criteria. An officer must establish that an informant is credible or that their information is reliable, as well as that the informant has a basis for their knowledge regarding the defendant's criminal activity. In this case, Officer Blackwell testified that the informant had previously provided reliable information in a drug case and had been known to him for several years as honest and straightforward. While these factors may satisfy the first prong of the reliability test, they are insufficient for the second prong, as the informant did not disclose how they knew about the defendant's alleged drug selling activities.

The informant's general reliability does not necessarily indicate the reliability of specific information provided. Without personal knowledge of the facts, the informant's information may stem from unreliable sources. Therefore, the quality of the informant’s information must be evaluated to avoid violating privacy and liberty rights based solely on an informant's credibility. Nonetheless, even if an informant's tip fails under the necessary prongs, probable cause can still be established through independent police investigation that corroborates the tip, supporting the inference of the informant's reliability and the basis of their claims.

The State argues that three independent pieces of information corroborated a tip regarding the defendant's illegal activities, which should overcome any deficiencies in establishing probable cause for an arrest. First, the State notes that Officer Blackwell received multiple prior tips indicating the defendant's involvement in similar illegal activities at the same location. Second, it asserts that Blackwell was aware the defendant had a prior drug-dealing conviction. Third, Blackwell encountered the defendant shortly after receiving the tip. However, these facts were deemed insufficient to justify the arrest because mere reputation or innocent activities cannot establish probable cause. Previous cases reinforce that more substantial evidence than casual rumors or general reputation is required. The only corroborated fact from the informant was the defendant's presence at a specific location, which does not indicate illegal activity or support the suspicion of a crime being committed. Consequently, the information available to Officer Blackwell was insufficient for a warrantless arrest, invalidating the subsequent search of the defendant. The dissenting opinion argues that probable cause is not the only basis for detaining a person without a warrant, suggesting that other justifications may exist for investigative stops.

Circumstances must exist to warrant a reasonable belief that a crime is occurring or about to occur; otherwise, there is no probable cause for arrest. The distinction between arrest and investigative stops has been previously discussed by the Court, highlighting that while the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause for an arrest, the reasonableness of less intrusive seizures is evaluated based on the public concern's gravity, the extent of the seizure, and the intrusion into individual privacy. Under exigent circumstances, officers may conduct an investigative stop if they have reasonable suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts suggesting a criminal offense is imminent. This recognition does not relax constitutional protections against state intrusions but acknowledges that limited intrusions can be constitutionally reasonable under specific situations. Valid investigative stops are characterized by exigent circumstances and limited intrusion. The Court has referenced other jurisdictions where investigative stops were justified, noting that the perceived harm's gravity is crucial in assessing the reasonableness of such stops. Ultimately, the reasonableness of a stop relies on the facts and circumstances unique to each case.

Key points include the parameters for justifying a limited intrusion by law enforcement based on reasonable suspicion, which is established through three main factors: the public interest served by the seizure, the nature and scope of the intrusion, and the objective facts relied upon by the officer based on their knowledge and experience. Reasonable suspicion is defined as a less demanding standard than probable cause, allowing it to be established with less reliable information. An informant's tip can be sufficient for reasonable suspicion if it is immediately verifiable at the scene and indicates a potential threat, even if it does not meet the higher threshold for probable cause. The case of State v. Pully illustrates that an informant’s report, particularly if timely and specific, may provide enough grounds for further investigation. In this case, Officer Blackwell received information from an informant about the defendant selling crack cocaine, establishing a basis for the officer's immediate action.

Officer Blackwell located the defendant at a preacher's location based on an informant’s tip regarding serious threats of harm. The informant indicated that immediate police action was warranted, which typically justifies an investigative stop. However, the informant did not report that the defendant was armed or posed an immediate danger, despite the officer's suspicions about potential illegal drug possession and past violent conduct. At the time of the officer's entry into the club, the defendant exhibited no suspicious behavior or actions that would necessitate immediate detention. The evidence presented does not support that Officer Blackwell had specific, articulable facts to conclude that a crime had been committed or was about to occur. The suspected criminal activity, specifically possession of illegal drugs, did not constitute an immediate threat to the officer or others, negating the need for immediate police intervention. Consequently, the initial detention of the defendant was deemed unjustified. The officer's knowledge of the defendant's criminal history, including prior violent offenses and drug dealing, did not provide sufficient grounds for the stop as defined by relevant case law. The purpose of a limited search in such contexts is to allow officers to pursue their investigation without fear of violence, rather than to seek evidence of a crime.

The defendant attempted to flee from police, with the officers holding a reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous, although he was not actually armed. For a valid investigatory stop, an objective basis for suspicion of criminal activity is required, which must be clearly related to the circumstances justifying police interference. The state bears the burden of proof in demonstrating that a search was conducted under a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. In this case, the state failed to meet that burden, leading to the conclusion that Officer Blackwell's initial detention of the defendant lacked validity. Consequently, any evidence obtained from an unlawful search should have been suppressed. The court erred by not suppressing the evidence. 

Even if the initial detention was deemed lawful under Terry v. Ohio, the evidence would still be inadmissible under the plain feel doctrine, as established in Minnesota v. Dickerson. Since the detention was not a valid Terry stop, the issue of plain feel becomes moot, but it was still discussed for clarification.

In a case involving Dickerson, officers conducted a pat-down search after observing suspicious behavior linked to a known crack house. During the search, an officer felt a small lump in Dickerson's jacket pocket, which he suspected to be crack cocaine. Upon retrieving a plastic bag containing approximately one-fifth of a gram of crack cocaine, Dickerson was arrested and charged with possession. He moved to suppress the evidence before trial, but the trial court denied his motion, leading to his conviction. The Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the cocaine should have been suppressed. The State appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower courts' decision but clarified that evidence seized through a lawful pat-down search, based on the "plain feel" doctrine, can be admitted. This doctrine allows for the seizure of contraband that is felt during a lawful search without violating Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches. Justice Scalia expressed uncertainty regarding the constitutional compliance of the physical search that led to the evidence.

Resorting to a neutral magistrate may often be impractical and fail to support the objectives of the Fourth Amendment. The excerpt references the case Arizona v. Hicks, highlighting that tactile discoveries of contraband do not constitute an invasion of privacy beyond what is already authorized by law during a lawful search for weapons. If an officer lawfully pats down a suspect and identifies an object as contraband, warrantless seizure is justified based on practical considerations similar to the plain view doctrine.

The United States Supreme Court in Dickerson rejected two arguments against the plain feel doctrine. The first argument, that touching is more intrusive than sight, was deemed inappropriate since the intrusion had already been authorized by a lawful search for weapons. The second argument, asserting that the sense of touch is inherently less reliable than sight, was countered by the Court stating the reliability of touch is sufficient to support a seizure. The premise of Terry v. Ohio underscores that officers can detect weapons through touch, and thus the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause before seizing items believed to be contraband, ensuring protection against speculative actions.

The Court applied the principles of the plain view doctrine to the facts of Dickerson, specifically examining whether the officer had lawful grounds to believe that the lump in the respondent's jacket was contraband. It concluded that the officer exceeded the boundaries set by Terry when he continued searching for items beyond the original justification of a weapon search. The Court expressed concern over the potential for officers to misuse specific authorizations, such as warrants or exigencies, to conduct broad searches akin to general warrants. It was noted that once the officer determined that there was no weapon in the respondent's pocket, further exploration was unjustified under Terry. For a lawful seizure of contraband discovered during a protective pat-down, two prerequisites must be met: the scope of the search must be limited to assessing whether the suspect is armed, and the incriminating nature of any detected contraband must be immediately apparent. In this case, assuming the initial search was justified, the first prerequisite was satisfied.

An officer exceeded the limits of a Terry search when he continued to pat down the defendant after determining that the pocket did not contain a weapon, ultimately seizing a bottle. To justify the seizure of the bottle as contraband, its identity must have been immediately apparent. The term "immediately apparent" is synonymous with "probable cause." The Supreme Court in Dickerson noted that if police lack probable cause to believe an object in plain view is contraband without conducting further inspection, the plain view doctrine cannot justify its seizure. The question arises whether Officer Blackwell's perception of the pill bottle provided him with probable cause to believe it contained contraband without further searching. An affidavit from Officer Blackwell states that during a frisk for weapons, he identified a pill bottle in the defendant's pocket, recognized it as commonly used to hold crack cocaine, and subsequently found crack cocaine in the same pocket. At a suppression hearing, Officer Blackwell confirmed the discovery of the bottle and the amount of crack cocaine seized.

During the Terry stop, Officer Blackwell discovered an object in the defendant's jacket pocket, which was identified as a pill bottle and part of it was contained in a plastic bag. The officer immediately recognized the pill bottle as a common container for illegal substances, specifically crack cocaine. The court must critically evaluate seizures based on the plain feel doctrine, as established by the U.S. Supreme Court. While the officer's subjective belief that an object is contraband is a factor, it must also be objectively reasonable given the circumstances at the time of the search. The application of the plain feel doctrine requires caution, as it could potentially allow officers to seize items based solely on a touch, potentially leading to abuse of power. The doctrine encourages officers to investigate items that arouse their curiosity, but if the item is later found to be contraband, its seizure may be justified retrospectively.

If a situation arises that diverges from the initial premise, the case concludes without further proceedings. Meanwhile, a citizen may experience an unwarranted intrusion into their personal privacy beyond what is allowed in a weapons pat-down search. The United States Supreme Court has cautioned against the misuse of the plain view doctrine, which should not facilitate broad exploratory searches from one object to another without evidence of incrimination emerging. The plain feel doctrine, intended to limit searches, could be improperly expanded if applied too loosely, potentially allowing extensive searches under the guise of Terry stops for contraband.

In a specific case, the defendant did not argue that the Tennessee Constitution offers more protection against searches than the federal Constitution regarding the plain feel doctrine. The doctrine, as defined by the Supreme Court, maintains that its limitations will be applied in relevant cases. However, in the present case, it is essential to determine whether Officer Blackwell had probable cause to believe an object was contraband. His suspicion alone was deemed insufficient for seizure under the plain view doctrine, as reasonable suspicion does not meet the criteria required for lawful seizure. The officer's recognition of the item as a pill bottle does not imply clarity regarding its contents, which cannot be determined solely by touching.

The officer's testimony lacks an objective basis for identifying a container as potentially holding contraband. No evidence indicates that touching the container revealed its contents, nor was there a warrant requirement simply due to the presence of a container. Officer Blackwell's identification of contraband was not supported by sufficient evidence of his experience in drug cases, particularly regarding the connection of the container to cocaine possession. Case law indicates that a valid search cannot be substantiated solely on the assumption of contraband based on proximity or appearance. The officer did not recognize the bottle as holding contraband until it was removed from the defendant, which constitutes the type of manipulation prohibited by precedent. Consequently, the initial detention of the defendant was deemed invalid under the Terry stop doctrine, and the subsequent search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and relevant state provisions.