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Schilling v. Rogers
Citations: 4 L. Ed. 2d 1478; 80 S. Ct. 1288; 363 U.S. 666; 1960 U.S. LEXIS 1869Docket: 319
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; June 20, 1960; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court regarding the Trading with the Enemy Act, specifically Section 32(a). This section allows for the return of property vested by the U.S. during World War II under certain conditions, including the claimant being the prior owner or legal representative, not belonging to excluded classes, the absence of concealment of ineligible ownership, no associated liability risks for the Custodian, and that the return serves U.S. interests. The case centers on paragraph 2(D) of Section 32(a), which excludes certain citizens of enemy countries present in those countries after hostilities began, with a proviso exempting persecution victims. The legal question was whether the District Court had jurisdiction to review a determination by the Director of the Office of Alien Property, supported by the Attorney General, that the proviso did not apply to the petitioner, a German national claiming $68,500 from vested property. The petitioner argued he was an anti-Nazi and faced discrimination that deprived him of full citizenship rights. A Hearing Examiner recommended approval of his claim, but the Director rejected it, and the Attorney General declined to review the decision. The District Court initially denied the Government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeals reversed, asserting that judicial review was barred by Section 7(c) of the Trading with the Enemy Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, explaining that Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act permits judicial review unless explicitly precluded by statute or where agency action is committed to discretion. Here, both limitations applied, as Section 7(c) specifies that claimants' remedies are confined to what the Act provides, and thus, it applies to Section 32, which was enacted later. The section in question is deemed 'all-inclusive' and pertains to both past and future claims regarding property vested during World War II under the Trading with the Enemy Act. Specifically, §9(a) allows court recourse for claimants seeking the return of property, but only for individuals who are not classified as enemies or allies of enemies, excluding the current petitioner, an enemy national. While §9(c) permits certain enemy classes from World War I to sue for the return of their vested property, it does not apply to World War II cases. Furthermore, while §32(a) expanded eligibility for the return of property for additional enemy categories during World War II, it lacks any express provision for judicial relief for these claims, unlike §9(c). Legislative history suggests that judicial relief was intentionally omitted from §32, as previous drafts included such provisions but were removed before enactment. Testimonies from committee hearings affirm that it was understood that enemy nationals would not have the right to compel property return through court actions. The absence of judicial relief provisions for §32 claims, contrasted with the detailed judicial remedies provided in other sections of the Act, indicates a deliberate choice by Congress to exclude enemy nationals from seeking court recourse regarding administrative denials of property return claims. Congress intended to exclude judicial participation in the administration of the §32 return provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act, indicating a clear legislative purpose. The Act’s language suggests that the Executive branch has complete discretionary authority without court intervention. The petitioner argues for judicial review of his eligibility under a specific proviso, referencing McGrath v. Kristensen, but the court finds this case inapplicable due to fundamental differences in statutory structure. The petitioner’s proposed partial reviewability lacks clarity and would improperly involve judicial review of matters within the Executive’s exclusive purview. The court interprets specific paragraphs of the Act not as conferring rights to claimants but as guidelines for the Executive’s decision-making, aimed at reducing administrative burdens. The court concludes that the Trading with the Enemy Act does not provide for judicial remedies in this situation, rendering the Administrative Procedure Act irrelevant to the petitioner’s claims. The petitioner’s assertion that the administrative action was arbitrary and capricious is dismissed, as such claims do not demonstrate a refusal to exercise discretion or actions beyond statutory authority. Finally, reliance on the Declaratory Judgment Act does not support the petitioner’s position, as it does not create an independent source of jurisdiction and requires a judicially remediable right, which the court finds does not exist in this case. The Court of Appeals is affirmed in its ruling that the District Court lacked jurisdiction.