Ricky Harris v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: E1999-02771-SC-R11-PC

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court; April 16, 2003; Tennessee; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Tennessee addressed the appeal of Ricky Harris, who sought to reopen his post-conviction petition based on the claim that the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, violating Brady v. Maryland. The trial court denied this motion, ruling it did not present a valid basis for reopening under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-217(a). The Court of Criminal Appeals concurred but, sua sponte, reclassified the motion as a petition for writ of error coram nobis, asserting that due process warranted tolling the one-year statute of limitations for such petitions. The State appealed this decision, arguing that the intermediate court erred in its reclassification. The Supreme Court agreed that while the lower courts correctly found the motion insufficient to reopen under the post-conviction statute, they erred in treating it as a coram nobis petition. Consequently, the Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal of the motion. The opinion noted the appointment of Kenneth F. Irvine, Jr. as counsel for Harris and acknowledged the representation provided. The background included Harris’s original conviction in 1988 for first-degree murder, subsequent appeals, and his earlier post-conviction claims regarding ineffective counsel and suppressed evidence.

Harris alleged that the State failed to disclose the identity of a witness, Ms. Corrine Hampton, who had reportedly spoken to a law enforcement officer about his case. Attached to Harris's motion were unsigned notes of the alleged interview, which lacked details about the interviewing officer. The notes claimed that on September 8, 1987, Ms. Hampton experienced car trouble, during which Harris assisted her. She stated that she had seen inside his car and trunk but did not observe anyone else or a dead body. Ms. Hampton followed Harris to his workplace, Sherwood Chevrolet, for minor vehicle repairs. Harris argued that the notes were critical because the State alleged he committed a crime between 8:00 a.m. and 9:30 a.m., while he maintained he drove directly to Sherwood Chevrolet. Had the State provided this evidence, he could have used Ms. Hampton as an alibi witness.

Harris claimed he discovered the notes in 1998 after placing an advertisement seeking information about his case. An anonymous letter, related to the sheriff involved in his case, indicated that the writer had seen the interview notes and felt compelled to share this information due to a personal connection to Harris’s family. The trial court denied Harris's motion, stating it failed to present a valid basis for reopening under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-217(a) and lacked supporting sworn affidavits. The trial court noted that the motion relied solely on Harris's affidavit, while the anonymous notes and letter were unverified. After receiving a subsequent affidavit from Ms. Hampton, which only confirmed her car trouble without a specific date, the trial court upheld its decision. Harris's appeal was met with agreement from the Court of Criminal Appeals regarding the lack of a Brady violation basis for reopening. However, the majority of the appellate court treated the motion as a writ of error coram nobis, ruling that due process concerns invalidated the one-year statute of limitations for such petitions.

The intermediate court remanded the case to the trial court to evaluate whether the State suppressed exculpatory evidence, whether the petitioner was diligent in raising the issue, and if such evidence could have changed the trial outcome. Following this, the State sought permission to appeal, which was granted, leading to the reversal of the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment and the reinstatement of the trial court's judgment.

The review commenced with whether the lower courts appropriately ruled that the petitioner’s claim of suppressed exculpatory evidence was not a valid reason to reopen a post-conviction petition. The State contended that such suppression is not listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-217(a) as a ground for reopening. Conversely, the petitioner argued that even if the motion did not cite a valid ground, it should be treated as a petition for writ of error coram nobis.

Under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, a petitioner must file for post-conviction relief within one year of the final action from the highest state appellate court. Only one post-conviction petition is permitted, and reopening is restricted to specific circumstances: (1) claims based on a final appellate ruling recognizing a new constitutional right; (2) new scientific evidence proving actual innocence; (3) claims regarding an invalid previous conviction affecting sentencing; and (4) claims where facts, if true, would clearly establish the petitioner’s entitlement to relief.

The statute explicitly outlines three grounds for reopening, excluding claims of suppressed exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland. Thus, the trial court and Court of Criminal Appeals correctly determined that the petitioner’s claim regarding the State's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence was not a valid basis for reopening the post-conviction proceeding. 

Finally, the analysis addressed whether it was erroneous for the Court of Criminal Appeals to treat the motion to reopen as a petition for writ of error coram nobis, with the State arguing that the motion lacked allegations of subsequently or newly discovered evidence that the petitioner could not have presented at trial.

An alleged violation of Brady is not recognized in a writ of error coram nobis proceeding, as noted by the State. The petitioner, through appointed counsel, contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals acted correctly in recognizing a coram nobis claim based on the motion's allegations. In his pro se application, Harris argued that the writ does not apply and criticized the trial court for citing Mixon v. State regarding coram nobis petitions. The Court of Criminal Appeals observed that the General Assembly's intent to exclude Brady claims from reopening procedures is evident in other statutes that provide exceptions for such violations. The Court concluded that it erred by treating the motion to reopen as a coram nobis petition, as these two proceedings have distinct procedural rules and grounds for relief. Motions to reopen can only be filed after unsuccessful post-conviction relief and are adjudicated through a summary process confirming one of three narrow grounds: 1) a new constitutional right retroactively applicable, 2) new scientific evidence of actual innocence, or 3) evidence of an improperly enhanced sentence. These grounds are typically proven through documentary evidence, minimizing factual disputes. Upon denial of a motion to reopen, the petitioner has ten days to apply for permission to appeal, with the State also given ten days to respond, resulting in a limited record on appeal. Writ of error coram nobis claims are governed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-105, which allows for relief based on newly discovered evidence and requires the defendant to show lack of fault in presenting this evidence. This writ is considered an extraordinary remedy, primarily denied rather than granted, and while it was initially limited to civil cases, it was extended to criminal proceedings by the General Assembly in 1955. The rules for criminal coram nobis proceedings align with those for civil cases, despite the latter's abolition since 1971 under Rule 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

A petition for writ of error coram nobis is not confined to specific categories like post-conviction petitions; it can be based on any newly discovered evidence relevant to trial matters, provided the petitioner shows they were not at fault for not presenting this evidence earlier. Coram nobis claims are fact-intensive and typically require a hearing, as opposed to motions to reopen, which can often be resolved based on the petition alone. Additionally, while both claim types are subject to a one-year statute of limitations, the burden to raise this limitation as a defense lies with the State in coram nobis cases. This distinction underscores why an appellate court should not treat a motion to reopen as a coram nobis petition without a proper state response, as it risks undermining the trial court's ability to resolve factual disputes. The Court of Criminal Appeals erred in this case by treating the motion to reopen as a coram nobis petition, misapplying the precedent from Norton v. Everhart, which does not support appellate courts independently assessing motions for potentially different relief avenues. The conclusion reached negates the need to consider issues regarding the coram nobis statute of limitations.

The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the trial court's dismissal of the motion is reinstated. The costs of the appeal are assigned to the appellee, Ricky Harris, which may involve execution if necessary. The document notes that trial courts are likely to assess all potential alternative claims to avoid remand, even in cases where the petitioner does not actively pursue them. The State may also contest these claims, potentially leading to extensive litigation. A petitioner must actively pursue both motions to reopen and petitions for writ of error coram nobis; failure to do so precludes them from complaining about the trial court's evaluation of alternative claims on appeal.

The excerpt further highlights that the key issue in the Burford due process analysis is whether a petitioner has presented a "later-arising" prima facie claim that would be barred by the statute of limitations. In Harris's case, the evidence he relies on does not appear to be newly discovered, nor does he seem free of fault for not presenting it earlier. Specifically, it is noted that Harris was aware of a stranded motorist he assisted on the morning of the victim's disappearance, contradicting his previous statements to police. Therefore, even if the Burford analysis applies, Harris would not qualify for relief from the one-year statute of limitations, as the evidence does not establish a prima facie claim under the writ of error coram nobis statute.