William Brownlee filed a medical malpractice suit against Dr. David T. Schwartz and his corporation, Metropolitan Medical Care, Inc. (MMC), after undergoing prostate surgery that resulted in total incontinence. Brownlee claimed this incontinence stemmed from Dr. Schwartz's post-operative negligence rather than the surgery itself, despite acknowledging that some patients may experience such complications without negligence. The trial court found Dr. Schwartz to be acting as an agent of MMC during the relevant times and the jury awarded Brownlee $1,850,000, later reduced to $1 million against Dr. Schwartz due to the medical malpractice cap in Virginia law. However, the full amount was upheld against MMC.
The defendants appealed, initially citing three errors, including the argument that Brownlee did not sufficiently prove causation. However, they abandoned this point in their rehearing petition, focusing instead on two remaining errors: (1) the denial of MMC's motion to dismiss based on the claim that Dr. Schwartz was acting as an agent of MMC and (2) the allowance of a judgment against MMC exceeding the malpractice cap, arguing that MMC’s liability should not surpass that of Dr. Schwartz, as it was based solely on the principle of respondeat superior. The defendants contended that Virginia law limits damages for a single injury to the malpractice cap, regardless of multiple defendants.
The trial court's refusal to remit the verdict against MMC violates Va. Code § 8.01-581.15. The defendants contended that a conflict existed regarding the agency relationship between Dr. Schwartz and MMC, arguing that this issue should have been decided by a jury. They asserted that Dr. Schwartz was not acting as MMC's agent while providing services to Brownlee, despite significant evidence supporting the contrary view. Although there was a dispute in the parties' positions, the facts surrounding the agency question were undisputed. The court emphasized that when there is no substantial conflict in the evidence, the determination of agency is a legal question for the court. Key facts included Dr. Schwartz being MMC's president and sole shareholder, MMC managing his medical practice, billing patients, collecting fees, and covering all expenses related to his practice, which it deducted on its tax returns. The defendants cited a case asserting that control determines agency, claiming Dr. Schwartz controlled MMC. The court disagreed, highlighting that Dr. Schwartz granted MMC extensive control over his financial affairs, confirming the existence of an agency relationship during the treatment of Brownlee. The court concluded that it did not err in its ruling. Additionally, the defendants argued that the court should have ordered a remittitur of the verdict against MMC to the $1 million cap specified in Code § 8.01-581.15 for medical malpractice cases.
Definitions in § 8.01-581.1 apply to this section, defining 'health care provider' as any licensed individual or entity providing health care services. The defendants acknowledge that MMC does not qualify as a health care provider under this definition at the time of Brownlee's injury. They argue that because MMC is jointly liable with Dr. Schwartz, a licensed health care provider, Brownlee's total recovery is limited to the amount recoverable from Dr. Schwartz. A 1994 amendment expanded the definition of 'health care provider' but is not applicable since it took effect after Brownlee's injury. The defendants reference Bulala v. Boyd, asserting a single limit for indivisible injuries caused by multiple defendants; however, Bulala involved only health care providers, making it not directly relevant. They also cite Fairfax Hospital System v. Nevitt, which dealt with joint tortfeasors and the application of the medical malpractice cap, but the context differs from the current case. The most relevant case is Taylor v. Mobil Corp., which established that an unlicensed individual cannot claim protection under the medical malpractice cap. Since MMC was unlicensed, it is not entitled to the cap's protection.
Defendants contend that MMC's liability for Brownlee's injuries is solely based on the respondeat superior doctrine, asserting that a principal's judgment cannot exceed that of the agent tortfeasor. They argue the trial court erred by not reducing the verdict against MMC to $1 million, claiming that under common law, the liabilities of principals and agents are aligned, as recognized in Virginia case law. Specifically, they reference Monumental Motor Tours v. Eaton, which states that if a master's liability is solely based on the servant's negligence, a verdict against the master without a corresponding finding against the servant reflects a misunderstanding of the law.
Virginia's common law remains intact unless explicitly altered by the General Assembly, which must clearly express its intent to abrogate common law principles. The excerpt cites various precedents emphasizing strict construction of statutes that modify common law. It concludes that Code § 8.01-581.15 reflects the General Assembly's clear intent to abrogate common law by applying the medical malpractice cap exclusively to licensed health care providers, thereby creating an exception to the general rule of coterminous liability for principals and agents. This legislative intent aims to support affordable medical malpractice insurance for licensed providers, intentionally excluding non-health care providers from this protection. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
