The case involves Larry and Sondra Massie, who are appealing a circuit court decision that dismissed their action against Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Virginia due to a contractual limitation period. The central issue is whether the tolling provision of Virginia Code § 8.01-229(E)(3), which allows plaintiffs to recommence a cause of action within six months after a nonsuit order, applies to limitation periods set by contract. The court concluded that the tolling provision only applies to statutory limitations, affirming the circuit court's judgment.
Key facts include that the Massies, employees of the Russell County School System, filed suit against Blue Cross for unpaid medical bills following Sondra's surgery in 1989. After a nonsuit was granted on February 21, 1992, they attempted to recommence their action on August 14, 1992. Blue Cross argued that the twelve-month limitation period in their insurance contract barred the action. The circuit court agreed, stating that applying the statutory tolling provision would undermine the clear terms of the contract.
The court emphasized that parties can establish shorter contractual limitation periods than statutory ones, provided they are reasonable and adhere to the minimum requirements. The Massies did not dispute the validity of the twelve-month limitation nor claim they filed within that timeframe, but rather argued their action was timely based on the nonsuit tolling provision. The court, however, maintained that the contractual period stood firm, leading to the dismissal of their action with prejudice.
The Massies contend that their twelve-month contractual limitation period is subject to tolling under Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) due to the filing of an initial suit in general district court, which they argue allows them six months to refile following a nonsuit. They assert that if the Contract lacked a limitation period, the five-year statute for written contracts would apply. Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) specifies that a voluntary nonsuit tolls the statute of limitations, allowing the plaintiff to recommence action within six months or the original limitation period, whichever is longer. The Massies interpret this tolling provision as applicable to all actions, including theirs.
However, Blue Cross argues that the previous version of the code applies, as the Massies' cause of action arose before the 1991 amendment that added the broader applicability phrase. The court finds it unnecessary to determine which version of the statute applies since the essential tolling language remains unchanged: the statute of limitations, not a contractual limitation, is tolled after a voluntary nonsuit. The court concludes that the language indicates Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) does not apply to contractual limitation periods, rendering the Massies' action time-barred.
Prior cases cited by the Massies do not influence this decision as they did not address contractual limitation periods. Additionally, the Contract does not include any provisions for tolling the twelve-month limitation or reference the six-month tolling from the Code. The court emphasizes that the parties' intentions, expressed in the contract's language, must be upheld, which indicates a choice to exclude statutory tolling provisions. Consequently, the circuit court's judgment is affirmed. The court refrains from discussing the general tolling provision in Code § 8.01-229(E)(1) as it was not argued by either party.
