Downer v. CSX Transportation, Inc.

Citations: 256 Va. 590; 507 S.E.2d 612; 1998 Va. LEXIS 151Docket: 972637

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia; November 6, 1998; Virginia; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Michael J. Downer filed a Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) claim against Amoco Oil Company and his employer, CSX Transportation, Inc., alleging he was injured due to their negligence in exposing him to harmful chemicals at Amoco's Yorktown Refinery. Downer settled with Amoco for $5,000, which included a covenant not to sue and dismissal of Amoco from the case, but this release did not affect his claim against CSX. According to Virginia Code § 8.01-35.1(A)(1), a release to one tortfeasor does not discharge others from liability, though any recovery against others is reduced by the amount paid in the release.

A jury awarded Downer $5,000 against CSX. CSX sought to reduce this amount by the $5,000 settlement with Amoco, and the trial court granted this motion, leading to a judgment against CSX for costs only. Downer appealed, and CSX assigned cross-error. 

Evidence indicated that on July 9, 1991, during hot and windy conditions, Downer was near sodium hydroxide drip pans while conducting switching operations at the refinery. He inhaled fumes, resulting in respiratory issues that required hospitalization and treatment. After returning to work, he was again exposed to sodium hydroxide fumes on September 10, 1991, leading to a recurrence of symptoms. Upon his return, CSX informed Downer he could not work at the refinery due to Amoco's request for him to be denied access.

An adversarial relationship has developed between Amoco Oil Company and Mr. Downer, who is seeking damages for alleged harmful exposure to toxic substances on Amoco's property. Amoco disputes Downer's claims of adverse reactions but wishes to avoid contributing to any health issues he may experience due to his hypersensitivity. Due to CSX's agreement with Amoco to restrict Downer's access to the Yorktown refinery, CSX reassigned him to a route starting and ending in Richmond, which Downer opposed as it imposed a daily commute and resulted in humiliation, particularly as less experienced employees filled the position he desired.

Downer contends that CSX's acquiescence to Amoco's decision exacerbated his damages. He acknowledges that the court allowed an instruction concerning his inconvenience and humiliation but argues that he should have been permitted to present claims for damages related to these issues. Although the court previously instructed him not to include these claims in final arguments, Downer briefly mentioned them, and the court overruled CSX's objection, suggesting he was not prejudiced by the earlier ruling.

Downer also asserts that the court erred in not setting aside a $5,000 jury verdict as inadequate, claiming that reasonable people could view this amount as insufficient given his undisputed lost wages of $1,400, two hospitalizations, emergency room visits, pain and suffering, and a month of home confinement, along with 17 weeks out of work. The court emphasized that a jury's damage award cannot be overturned unless it is shockingly inadequate, indicating that the jury's decision must be respected unless it clearly indicates bias or misunderstanding. Factors supporting the jury's award include the absence of claims for permanent injury or disability and the characterization of some of Downer’s complaints as psychological rather than physical. The jury was also informed that they could adjust Downer’s recovery based on the relative negligence of both parties.

Reasonable persons could conclude that the awarded verdict was adequate. Under Code 8.01-383, trial courts have discretion to decide on motions to set aside verdicts for being excessive or inadequate, and the appellate review focuses on whether this discretion was abused. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Downer's motion to set aside the verdict as inadequate. 

Downer argued that the court's offset of Amoco's settlement against the $5,000 verdict against CSX violated 45 U.S.C. 55, which nullifies any contract or rule that allows a common carrier to exempt itself from liability. However, it allows for set-offs of payments made to injured employees. Downer claimed CSX's use of Code 8.01-35.1(A)(1) constituted a prohibited "device" to evade liability, but CSX contended that counterclaims in FELA actions are not considered such devices. The court agreed, finding no significant difference between asserting counterclaims, obtaining releases, and motions to reduce verdicts, thus rejecting Downer's argument.

Downer also contended that 45 U.S.C. 55 indicated a congressional intent to preempt state law, but the court found no clear intent to do so. The application of the Act was limited to actions taken by railroads to exempt themselves from liability, and in this case, CSX’s right to offset arose from Downer's settlement with Amoco, not from any action by CSX.

Ultimately, the court found no error in denying Downer's motion for a new trial and also considered CSX's cross-errors, finding no merit in them. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.