The Court addresses the appeal involving the Town of Blackstone and Southside Electric Cooperative regarding the Town's attempt to acquire Southside's electric distribution facilities through condemnation. The key issue is whether the Town must obtain approval from the State Corporation Commission (Commission) before proceeding with such condemnation under Virginia law.
The Town of Blackstone, which operates an electric utility system, annexed a 2.5 square mile area of Nottoway County in 1992. Southside Electric Cooperative serves portions of this area, while Virginia Electric and Power Company serves additional customers outside the annexed area. Following unsuccessful negotiations to acquire Southside's facilities, the Town Council authorized a condemnation proceeding and filed an application with the Commission, claiming public necessity for the acquisition.
The Town argued that the condemnation would eliminate fragmented service, reduce rates, improve reliability, expedite service connections, increase customer input, and would not adversely affect Southside's remaining customers. Southside contested these claims, leading to a hearing where the Commission's hearing examiner ultimately rejected the Town's assertions regarding the necessity of Commission approval and the adequacy of its justifications for public necessity or essential public convenience. The examiner found that the Town's arguments did not sufficiently support its application for condemnation.
The Town filed exceptions to the hearing examiner's report, which the Commission reviewed and accepted in an order dated November 24, 1997, denying the Town's application. The Town appeals, claiming the Commission incorrectly determined that it needed permission under Code 25-233 before exercising its right to condemn Southside’s facilities under Code 56-265.4:2. The Town argues that the Commission applied an erroneous legal standard by requiring it to demonstrate "public necessity" or "essential public convenience" according to traditional criteria, rather than a less stringent standard.
The relevant provisions state that a city or town can acquire utility facilities after annexation using the procedures outlined in Title 25. Code 25-233 stipulates that no corporation can condemn property owned by another corporation with eminent domain powers without the Commission's certification of necessity. The Town asserts that a proper interpretation of Code 56-265.4:2 would allow it to bypass this requirement, arguing that the statute was intended to enable condemnation actions prohibited by Code 25-233. While the Town implies that Code 56-265.4:2 is ambiguous, it does not explicitly state this, instead relying on external construction aids. The Town claims that Code 56-265.4:2 should grant broader condemnation powers; however, it acknowledges that the statute was enacted following a court decision to clarify the right of condemnation in annexed areas, indicating that it does not provide powers beyond those in other statutes.
A court's interpretation of a legislative act relies solely on the statute's language when its meaning is clear, without recourse to external construction aids or legislative history. In this case, the phrase “in the manner provided by Title 25” does not imply a limited interpretation; rather, it indicates that cities and towns must comply with all relevant Title 25 provisions when acquiring electric utility distribution facilities through condemnation. Specifically, a city or town must obtain permission from the Commission as mandated by Code § 25-233, demonstrating a public necessity or essential public convenience for the condemnation.
The Town argues that without a "less stringent" standard, it would be nearly impossible to show that a public utility is failing to provide adequate service, thus rendering Code § 56-265.4:2 ineffective. However, this argument is based on a flawed assumption, as the Commission's review of the Town’s application was not limited to service adequacy and rate reasonableness. Instead, the Commission assessed the overall public benefits of the proposed condemnation, concluding that the evidence did not support the Town's claims. Furthermore, the court rejects the assertion that municipalities cannot effectively compete with public utilities regarding service provision or costs.
Ultimately, the court affirms that all provisions of Code § 25-233 apply to the condemnation of electric utility distribution facilities under Code § 56-265.4:2. The Commission's decision, presumed to be reasonable and correct unless clearly unsupported by the record, is upheld, as the record adequately supports the Commission's ruling. The order of the Commission is affirmed.
