Bramblett v. Commonwealth

Citations: 513 S.E.2d 400; 257 Va. 263; 1999 Va. LEXIS 47Docket: Record 981394 and 981395

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia; February 26, 1999; Virginia; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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At approximately 4:30 a.m. on August 29, 1994, Dorothy Ross McGee observed a white pickup truck operated by a lone male driver speeding past her as she drove through Vinton, Virginia. Meanwhile, Robert Scott Arney noticed smoke coming from a nearby residence at 232 East Virginia Avenue and reported it to authorities. Firefighters discovered four bodies within the burning home: Teresa Lynn Fulcher Hodges, who died from ligature strangulation and was found burning on a couch; William Blaine Hodges, shot in the head and found in an upstairs bedroom; and two children, Winter Ashley Hodges, 11, and Anah Michelle Hodges, 3, both shot in the head, with Anah's body sustaining mild burns. The victims died prior to the fire, with Blaine likely dying hours earlier on August 28.

Earl Conrad Bramblett was indicted on July 30, 1996, for capital murder of Winter as part of the same transaction as Anah's murder, three counts of first-degree murder, arson, and firearm offenses. He was apprehended in Spartanburg, South Carolina, and extradited to Virginia. Following a 14-day jury trial in late 1997, where 98 witnesses testified, Bramblett was found guilty on all counts. The jury sentenced him to death for capital murder based on the vileness and future dangerousness criteria. The trial court subsequently imposed life sentences and fines for the noncapital murder and arson convictions. The death sentence is undergoing automatic review, along with an appeal concerning the noncapital convictions.

Certification transfers jurisdiction over noncapital appeals to this Court and consolidates them with the capital murder appeal. The Court will examine the trial errors cited by the defendant and assess if the death sentence was influenced by passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors, and whether it is excessive compared to similar cases. 

Two appellate issues are disposed of without extensive discussion. First, the defendant's claim that Virginia's death penalty statute is unconstitutional is rejected, consistent with prior rulings. Second, the defendant's allegation of prosecutorial misconduct is procedurally defaulted as it was not raised in the trial court. 

A summary of the facts reveals that during the trial's guilt phase, the defendant, Bramblett, presented four witnesses but did not testify. Evidence included handwritten notes found at the crime scene, the presence of accelerants, and a cut telephone line. Blaine and Teresa Hodges had attended an Amway conference before the incident, and various testimonies indicate their activities leading up to the discovery of the fire. Witnesses observed Bramblett with Teresa and the children on the day of the fire, and multiple friends noted the lack of response from the Hodges' home later that evening.

A witness, McGee, reported seeing a pickup truck with a "dark" tailgate leave the Hodges' home around 4:30 a.m. on a Monday, describing its color as "sort of pinkish red," which was later identified in a video reenactment as actually being white. Bramblett, a long-time acquaintance of the Hodges family, drove a 1972 white pickup with a black tailgate. He arrived at work at 5:08 a.m., approximately 12 minutes after leaving the Hodges' area, and while he claimed to have slept in his truck, his appearance was notably clean and well-groomed. Later, he expressed concern to his ex-wife that police would blame him for the fire. 

Prior to the incident, Bramblett mailed packages containing photos and audiotapes expressing sexual interest in Winter Hodges, suggesting a belief that her parents were attempting to entrap him. Forensic evidence linked Bramblett to the crime scene, with a firearms expert confirming that bullets found on the victims matched those found in Bramblett's truck and a storage unit he rented. A handgun, with its barrel removed, was found in the Hodges' bedroom, complicating ballistic comparisons. 

Additionally, a pubic hair matching Bramblett's DNA was found between the children, and conversations recorded by a fellow inmate, Tracy Turner, revealed Bramblett admitted to being involved with the young girl and described choking her. He also mentioned setting fire to the house to destroy forensic evidence, referencing knowledge from a forensic science book.

Bramblett's defense strategy posited that the murders of the Hodges family were a "drug hit," citing evidence from the late 1980s that Blaine and Teresa Hodges used cocaine supplied by Michael Fulcher, Teresa's half-brother, who was an undercover DEA witness at the time. Blaine Hodges was facing a six-month jail sentence for embezzlement when he and his family were murdered in a fire, initially suspected to be a murder/suicide, but later determined to be a set fire after autopsy findings indicated Blaine died hours before the others. Bramblett, a friend of the Hodges, was questioned by police and exhibited a range of emotions during the interrogation, eventually expressing a desire to be arrested for murder and indicating suicidal thoughts.

On appeal, Bramblett argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a change of venue, citing extensive media coverage influencing public opinion. The trial court, after careful consideration during jury selection, found that only a few potential jurors were excused for bias, and the majority were either unaware of the media coverage or capable of impartiality. Therefore, the court determined Bramblett had not demonstrated that he could not receive a fair trial in Roanoke County, affirming the court's discretion in denying the venue change.

Additionally, Bramblett contested the trial court's ruling on his mental competency to stand trial. However, the court's conclusion was supported by the appointment of Dr. Evan S. Nelson as a mental health expert for Bramblett's sentencing in November 1996.

Dr. Nelson expressed concerns about Bramblett's competency after interviewing him in jail, prompting the filing of a pretrial motion in January 1997 for a competency evaluation under Code 19.2-169.1, which allows such evaluations if there is probable cause to believe the defendant lacks substantial capacity to understand the proceedings or assist in their defense. The court appointed Dr. Joseph I. Leizer and subsequently Dr. Leigh D. Hagan to evaluate Bramblett's competency. 

In May 1997, after hearing testimony from the psychologists, the trial court concluded that Bramblett was competent, stating he had the capacity to understand the proceedings and assist his attorneys. Dr. Leizer diagnosed Bramblett with a delusional disorder, persecutory type, noting he held paranoid beliefs regarding police actions and the involvement of the Hodges family in a supposed sting operation. Despite this diagnosis, Dr. Leizer disagreed with Dr. Nelson's assessment of incompetency, asserting that Bramblett was articulate and capable of engaging with his attorneys. 

Dr. Hagan concurred with the diagnosis of delusional disorder but affirmed that Bramblett met the criteria for competence, emphasizing his motivation to collaborate with his attorneys despite some disagreements about defense strategies. 

Additionally, Bramblett challenged the trial court's decision to deny his motion to suppress audiotapes seized in Indiana and to admit those tapes into evidence. In 1993, Bramblett's sister received two packages from him, which he instructed her to keep in case of future events. When he visited her in September 1994, he expressed concerns about being questioned by police and shared details about his whereabouts related to a fire incident, indicating he had stayed at the Hodges' home that night. He also mentioned advice from a lawyer to leave town to avoid police attention.

Bramblett abruptly left his Indiana home after his sister thought she saw a policeman outside. Following his departure, the sister became concerned about some boxes that Bramblett had not mentioned and felt afraid to keep them. She sought to place the boxes in trusted hands and subsequently called the local sheriff. The sister and her husband consented to the search of the boxes, which the sheriff then inventoried and photographed. Bramblett later moved to suppress the items obtained from these boxes, arguing that his sister lacked the authority to deliver them to the police and that a warrant was required for their examination. The trial court denied the motion, finding no basis for an unlawful search or seizure since the boxes were addressed to the sister and under her exclusive control without restrictions from Bramblett, meaning he had no remaining expectation of privacy. The Fourth Amendment does not prevent police from accepting evidence voluntarily provided by private citizens.

Bramblett also contended that evidence obtained from the Apple Valley Motel should be suppressed. After he failed to attend a scheduled appointment with police, officers expressed concern for his safety due to his previous suicidal statements. They went to the motel, knocked on his door, and when there was no response, instructed the owner to open it. One officer briefly stepped into the doorway while the other remained outside. When Bramblett arrived shortly thereafter, officers spoke with him. Later, two brothers of Blaine Hodges visited Bramblett at the motel, one wearing a wire at the police's suggestion, during which a bullet was observed in the room. The room was subsequently searched under a warrant the following day. The trial court found that no search occurred during the officers’ brief presence at the doorway, and thus the warrantless entry did not justify suppressing evidence seized later under a valid warrant. The items seized, including writings, a revolver, and cartridges, were properly admitted into evidence.

Bramblett also argued that the trial court erred by allowing Tracy Turner to testify. However, it was determined that the prosecutor had learned of Bramblett's statements to Turner in January 1997 and planned to use Turner as a rebuttal witness, with Bramblett becoming aware of this in October 1997.

Prosecutors determined that Turner's effectiveness as a rebuttal witness had decreased and decided to include him in the Commonwealth's case-in-chief shortly before his testimony. They disclosed his name and criminal record to the defendant, who subsequently moved to bar Turner's testimony due to the late disclosure of the criminal record. The trial court denied this motion, allowing for delayed cross-examination to enable the defendant's investigator to gather information on Turner. After Turner testified, the defendant sought a mistrial or jury instruction to disregard his testimony, claiming the prosecutor's late disclosure violated discovery orders and due process. The trial court upheld the prosecutor's interpretation that only case-in-chief witnesses' criminal histories needed to be disclosed and found that the prosecution acted timely in providing this information. The court also stated that the defendant had sufficient time to investigate Turner and did not demonstrate specific prejudice from the timing of the disclosure. Citing Brady v. Maryland and related cases, the court affirmed that as long as exculpatory evidence is disclosed in time for effective use without prejudice to the defendant, there is no due process violation.

The court also addressed the admissibility of evidence related to pubic hair, ruling it relevant to establish the defendant's presence at the crime scene, with its probative value outweighing any prejudicial effect. The defendant's argument regarding insufficient evidence for conviction was rejected, as overwhelming evidence, including the defendant's admissions to a jail inmate and his statements showing knowledge of the murders, supported the convictions. The court found no necessity to further detail the evidence pointing to the defendant's guilt, noting significant circumstantial evidence, including the observation of a truck resembling the defendant's near the crime scene.

Bullets, shell casings, and cartridges in Bramblett's possession matched those found at the crime scene. Evidence, including audiotapes and writings, indicated Bramblett's motive for killing the Hodges family. His clothing, stained with accelerants, was found at his workplace, and a pubic hair matching his was discovered with the children's bodies. This evidence justified the jury's conclusion that Bramblett was the killer and responsible for the arson.

Bramblett's additional claims of error were rejected. He argued that the trial court should have directed a life sentence during the penalty phase because the jury was misled about his prior criminal record. He also contended that the evidence was insufficient to prove vileness or future dangerousness and that the death sentence was arbitrary. The court found these arguments meritless, specifically addressing Bramblett's objection to the use of testimony from women regarding his past sexual misconduct, which occurred decades earlier. The court determined that while the time gap affected the weight of the evidence, it did not impact its admissibility.

The court noted substantial evidence of Bramblett's future dangerousness, including his recent conduct with an 11-year-old victim and his meticulous planning of the murders. Regarding the proportionality of the death sentence, the court examined past capital murder cases and found that the sentence was consistent with penalties imposed for similar crimes, particularly when young children are senselessly murdered. The trial court was found to have committed no reversible error, and the death sentence was deemed properly assessed. The judgments for both the capital murder and noncapital cases were affirmed.