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Koffman v. Garnett
Citations: 574 S.E.2d 258; 265 Va. 12; 2003 Va. LEXIS 16Docket: Record 020439
Court: Supreme Court of Virginia; January 10, 2003; Virginia; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
The case involves Andrew W. Koffman, a 13-year-old student who was injured during a football practice led by assistant coach James Garnett. After a disappointing game, Garnett instructed Koffman to hold a football while demonstrating tackling techniques. Without warning, he forcefully tackled Koffman, resulting in a broken arm. The Koffmans filed a second amended motion for judgment claiming gross negligence, assault, and battery against Garnett. Garnett demurred, citing sovereign immunity and arguing that the Koffmans had not sufficiently alleged a lack of consent for the physical demonstration. The trial court agreed, dismissing the case on the grounds that Garnett's actions were part of the inherently dangerous nature of football and that the Koffmans' claims did not meet the threshold for gross negligence, assault, or battery. On appeal, the Koffmans did not contest the sovereign immunity ruling but argued that they had adequately pleaded their claims. The court referenced the definition of gross negligence as a significant disregard for safety, which typically requires factual determination by a jury, unless the circumstances are clear-cut. The size disparity between Garnett and Koffman was noted as a critical factor. Garnett, acting in his capacity as a coach, is alleged to have anticipated that student player Andy would comply with instructions to assume a non-defensive stance. Contrary to this expectation, Garnett tackled Andy aggressively, lifting him over two feet and slamming him into the ground. The Koffmans contend that no previous coach had tackled a player, leaving Andy unaware of the possibility of such an action or the force that would be used. While injury during a tackling demonstration may be typical in football, the circumstances here—Garnett’s greater size, his directive for Andy to remain motionless, the excessive force used, and his history of not tackling players—could indicate negligence and disregard for safety. This ambiguity presents a jury issue, leading to an assertion that the trial court incorrectly ruled the second amended motion for judgment insufficient to claim gross negligence. Furthermore, the trial court found the motion inadequate to establish assault and battery claims. The tort of assault involves an act intended to cause harmful or offensive contact, creating reasonable apprehension in the victim, while battery is defined as unwanted touching. The Koffmans' claims lacked allegations of Andy’s apprehension of an immediate battery, as he received no warning of Garnett's actions. Although the Koffmans suggested that a reasonable inference of apprehension existed due to the rapid nature of the tackle, the court determined that the battery was already occurring at that moment. Thus, the pleadings did not support a claim for civil assault. However, they did sufficiently establish a claim for battery, as the Koffmans asserted that Andy did not consent to aggressive contact from coaches, despite his general consent to play football. Whether Andy consented to being tackled by Garnett is a factual matter open to reasonable disagreement, leading to the conclusion that the trial court erred in deeming the Koffmans' second amended motion for judgment insufficient to establish a battery claim. The ruling is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings, allowing the Koffmans to pursue punitive damages based on sufficiently pled intentional tort claims. Justice Kinser concurs in part but dissents on the consent issue, asserting that the plaintiffs' motion was insufficient to claim battery as consent is generally a defense unless fraud is involved. Participation in a game implies consent to allowed bodily contact, but not to prohibited actions that violate the game's protective rules. The Koffmans allege they only consented to Andy's participation in a contact sport with peers, not aggressive tackling by adult coaches. They argue that the coaches had not previously engaged in such tackling during instruction. The plaintiffs acknowledged the coach's responsibility for supervising and training players, which includes minimizing the risk of significant injuries. A coach should ensure players are prepared for the inherent physical challenges of football and provide proper tackling technique instruction. The alleged battery occurred during this instructional phase. Plaintiffs claimed they were unaware that physical force would be used by Andy's coach for football instruction, as prior practices did not involve such methods. However, they did not assert that the coaches explicitly stated they would refrain from using physical demonstrations or that the tackle itself was against any football rules. The plaintiffs also failed to argue that Andy was incapable of being tackled by a larger, stronger player during games or practices. Participation in football inherently includes consent to tackling and instruction on tackling techniques. Therefore, the allegations did not sufficiently support a claim for battery, which differs from acts that could constitute battery in non-sport contexts. The distinction between gross negligence and battery is emphasized, as battery is an intentional tort. While the plaintiffs provided enough facts to proceed with a gross negligence claim, the judgment sustaining the demurrer regarding the battery claim should be affirmed.