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Herndon v. ST. MARY'S HOSP. INC.
Citations: 587 S.E.2d 567; 266 Va. 472Docket: 030070
Court: Supreme Court of Virginia; October 30, 2003; Virginia; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
The case involves an appeal by Debbie Thompson Herndon and Larry McNeil Herndon, parents of Matthew McNeil Herndon, against St. Mary's Hospital regarding a medical malpractice claim filed on behalf of their minor child, Matthew. The Herndons allege that Matthew was injured due to the hospital's negligence during his birth. The hospital moved to dismiss the case, arguing it was improperly filed as it was not brought in Matthew's name by his "next friend" in accordance with Code § 8.01-8. This statute allows a minor to sue through a next friend, and following a 1998 amendment, it states that either or both parents may sue on behalf of their minor child. The circuit court sided with the hospital, concluding that the Herndons could not initiate the lawsuit in their own names. The Herndons appeal this decision, arguing that the 1998 amendment permits parents to sue in their own names as next friends for their child. They contend that the amendment intended to overturn the previous ruling in Kirby v. Gilliam, which stated that parents could not bring an action in their own names on behalf of their child. The Herndons assert that the amendment's language supports their position and is not merely intended to allow both parents to act simultaneously as next friends. The court will examine whether the language of Code § 8.01-8 is ambiguous, which would affect the interpretation of the statute and the validity of the Herndons' claims. Ambiguity in statutory language arises when it is unclear, imprecise, or difficult to understand, as noted in cases such as Supinger and Lee-Warren. The language of Code 8.01-8 is deemed ambiguous as it states that a minor child must bring an action through a next friend while also allowing either or both parents to sue on behalf of the child as next friend. This necessitates an interpretation that reflects the General Assembly's intent, which requires considering the entire statute rather than isolated terms. Established principles dictate that a statutory change to common law must be clearly indicated in the statute's language. Historically, common law required that actions on behalf of a minor be brought in the child's name, not that of a next friend. The statute prior to the 1998 amendment reflected this rule, emphasizing that the minor is the real party in interest. The court finds that the 1998 amendment to Code 8.01-8 does not express a legislative intent to alter the common law requirement. The first sentence permits a minor to act through a next friend, while the second merely clarifies that parents can serve in this capacity. The amendment does not suggest that parents can initiate actions in their own names or that minors do not need to bring actions in their own names. Thus, the circuit court's dismissal of the Herndons' action is upheld, affirming that the amendment did not change the common law rule as articulated in prior cases. The judgment is affirmed.