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Jaccard v. Commonwealth
Citations: 597 S.E.2d 30; 268 Va. 56; 2004 Va. LEXIS 87Docket: Record 031507.
Court: Supreme Court of Virginia; June 10, 2004; Virginia; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Evidence of a prior probation revocation's admissibility during the penalty phase of a bifurcated criminal jury trial was considered in the appeal of Douglas Albert Jaccard, indicted for malicious wounding. Prior to trial, the Commonwealth notified Jaccard of its intent to introduce evidence of his prior convictions, which included five criminal convictions and a probation revocation. Jaccard's counsel objected to the probation revocation's admissibility, arguing it is not a conviction. The trial court overruled the objection, citing that a probation violation is an offense. The jury ultimately sentenced Jaccard to ten years in prison and a $30,000 fine. Jaccard's appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied, referencing the Merritt v. Commonwealth decision, which held that a probation violation is not a criminal conviction but is admissible as part of the sentencing process. However, subsequent decisions, Green v. Commonwealth and Commonwealth v. Jackson, clarified that while probation revocation hearings are not part of criminal prosecutions, they are still criminal proceedings. This indicated a shift in interpretation, suggesting that probation revocation could be considered in the context of the sentencing process for prior convictions. A trial judge who previously served as Commonwealth's Attorney was not required to recuse himself in a probation revocation proceeding after imposing a suspended sentence and probation. The court determined that these were separate proceedings, allowing the trial judge discretion in the matter. The court clarified that a probation revocation is not a criminal conviction and does not constitute part of the "record of conviction" referenced in Code 19.2-295.1. Consequently, Jaccard's probation revocation record was deemed inadmissible during the penalty phase of his criminal trial. The court explicitly overruled the holding in Merritt, reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment, set aside Jaccard's sentence, and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing.