Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
Davenport v. Little-Bowser
Citations: 611 S.E.2d 366; 269 Va. 546; 2005 Va. LEXIS 42Docket: Record 041180.
Court: Supreme Court of Virginia; April 22, 2005; Virginia; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Katherine Anne Fisher Davenport and three other children, along with their adoptive parents, appealed the refusal of the Commonwealth to issue new birth certificates that include both adoptive parents for each child. All children were born in Virginia but adopted in other states by same-sex couples, none of whom reside in Virginia. The Registrar of Vital Records and Health Statistics, Deborah Little-Bowser, denied the requests for new birth certificates as per Code § 32.1-261. The petitioners filed a Bill of Complaint and a Petition for Writ of Mandamus against Little-Bowser and State Health Commissioner Robert B. Stroube in the Circuit Court of Richmond, seeking a declaration for the issuance of the new certificates and an injunction to enforce it. The trial court addressed the case through cross-motions for summary judgment, ruling in favor of the Registrar and Commissioner and against the petitioners. The background details include that Katherine was born in Arlington on March 26, 1990, and her biological father's rights were not terminated, yet her adoption by W. Scott Davenport led to a birth certificate listing only him as the father. Similar situations occurred for Cameron, born May 18, 1992, and Hillary, adopted by Mark M. Dalton and Bruce H. Moffit, where requests for new birth certificates reflecting both parents were also denied. The trial court's summary judgment upheld the actions of the Registrar, denying the petitioners' claims. John Doe, born on February 27, 1999, in Falls Church, Virginia, was adopted by Jean Doe and Jane Doe on December 23, 1999, in Dutchess County, New York. Jane Doe's request for a new birth certificate reflecting both adoptive parents was denied. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a bill of complaint and a petition for writ of mandamus against the Registrar and the Commissioner, arguing that the denial violated Virginia Code and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They sought an injunction, a declaration of unlawfulness regarding the Commonwealth's actions, nominal damages, and attorneys' fees. The Commonwealth responded with a demurrer, later denied, and an answer. Following discovery, the petitioners moved for summary judgment, which was countered by the Commonwealth's cross-motion. After oral arguments, the trial court granted the Commonwealth's motion, stating there was no material fact at issue and that the Commonwealth was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The petitioners appealed, raising three assignments of error regarding the trial court's decisions related to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Virginia Code, and the Equal Protection Clause. The court's analysis indicated that the issues presented were legal questions reviewed de novo. The trial court's decision was based on two main points: first, that Virginia law only permits birth certificates to list one mother and one father, not two of the same gender; second, that the request essentially aimed to recognize a status that Virginia law does not support, which should be addressed by the legislature rather than the court. The case at hand focuses solely on the issuance of birth certificates under Virginia law, specifically referencing Code § 32.1-261, and does not address issues related to homosexual marriage, same-sex relationships, or adoption policy. According to this statute, the State Registrar is required to issue a new birth certificate when presented with specific documentation, such as an adoption report or a certified adoption decree. The relevant Administrative Code mandates that the new birth certificate must follow the form in use at the time of birth and must include details about the adoptive or natural parents. The terms "adoptive parents" or "intended parents" are mentioned in the statutory provisions but are not defined. The Commonwealth argues for deference to the Executive Branch's interpretation of these terms, asserting that such interpretations warrant judicial respect unless deemed unreasonable. Citing various legal precedents, the Commonwealth emphasizes that the burden of proof lies with the taxpayer to demonstrate the validity of a challenge to an assessment made by state authorities. The principles established in cases like Department of Taxation v. Westmoreland Coal Co. reinforce the presumption of correctness in agency assessments and interpretations. The document highlights the principle that the construction of a statute by state officials responsible for its administration carries significant weight in judicial interpretation. It emphasizes that courts will generally defer to the interpretations of public officials, particularly when the statutory language is ambiguous or unclear, as established in previous case law. However, this deference does not allow administrative interpretations to alter the statute's plain meaning. The discussion also points out that in the case at hand, neither the statute nor its accompanying regulations define "adoptive parents," nor do they exclude the recognition of same-sex couples as adoptive parents. The Commonwealth's arguments against the issuance of new birth certificates listing adoptive parents rely on administrative regulations to interpret Code § 32.1-261, which the court is scrutinizing in light of the ambiguity surrounding the statutory definitions. The Commonwealth's argument centers on the interpretation of 12 VAC § 5-550-100 and 12 VAC § 5-550-330 regarding the issuance of a new certificate of live birth following adoption. The Commonwealth asserts that a live birth certificate must list both a mother and a father, and that any new birth certificate must be on the form in use at the time of the child's birth. It contends that Code § 32.1-261(B) mandates that a new certificate be a 'substitute' for the original, which it interprets restrictively to exclude listing two same-sex adoptive parents. However, this interpretation conflicts with the regulation 12 VAC § 5-550-330, which requires that the new certificate include the names of the adoptive parents or natural parents as appropriate, suggesting no restrictions on the listing of adoptive parents. The Commonwealth's insistence on a specific form contradicts both the plain language of Code § 32.1-261 and its own regulations. The Commonwealth further argues that its interpretation aligns with Code § 63.2-1201, which pertains to Virginia adoptions, but this case involves out-of-state adoptions and new certificates for children born in the Commonwealth. The court concludes that the Registrar must issue new birth certificates listing both adoptive parents, affirming the General Assembly's directive. The trial court's summary judgment for the Registrar was deemed erroneous and is to be reversed, with the case remanded for appropriate action to provide relief to the Petitioners. The dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Hassell, joined by Senior Justice Compton, argues against the majority's view regarding the issuance of birth certificates for children adopted by same-gender couples in Virginia. The dissent emphasizes that Virginia law does not obligate the Registrar of Vital Records and Health Statistics to issue a birth certificate identifying two individuals of the same gender as parents. Under Code § 32.1-261, the Registrar is authorized to issue a new birth certificate under certain conditions, including adoption, and must comply with Regulation 12 VAC § 5-550-330. This regulation stipulates that the new birth certificate must reflect the format in use at the time of the child's birth, including specific details such as the child's name, birth date, and the names of the adoptive or natural parents. The dissent points out that the existing form does not allow for the identification of two mothers or two fathers as parents. It asserts that the General Assembly did not intend for the law to permit such designations. While the petitioners argue that the regulation does not explicitly prevent the inclusion of a second parent of the same gender, the dissent clarifies that the key issue is whether the regulation mandates the issuance of such certificates, not whether it prohibits them. The petitioners did not contest the regulation's validity or the Registrar's authority to issue it. Therefore, the dissent concludes that the Registrar's interpretation of the regulation, which does not require the issuance of birth certificates for same-gender couples who adopted outside Virginia, should be given significant deference, consistent with established legal principles regarding administrative agency decisions. Trial courts may only reverse an administrative agency's interpretation of law if it is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or not aligned with the agency's purpose as defined by its governing statutes. The Registrar's interpretation of Code § 32.1-261 should be afforded the deference it deserves, leading to an affirmation of the circuit court's judgment. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy used to compel a public official, like the Registrar, to perform a legally mandated, ministerial duty. However, it is not granted as a matter of right but rather at the discretion of the court, considering factors such as urgency, public interest, and the clarity of the right and duty involved. In this case, the circuit court's implicit ruling indicated that a writ of mandamus to compel the Registrar to issue a birth certificate listing two same-gender parents is inappropriate. The petitioners lack a clear entitlement to such certificates, as neither Code § 32.1-261 nor relevant regulations require it, and such issuance contradicts Virginia's public policy, which does not recognize same-sex relationships or authorize same-gender adoptions. Therefore, the petitioners' constitutional arguments are deemed meritless, and the circuit court's judgment should be upheld.