White v. Com.

Citations: 636 S.E.2d 353; 272 Va. 619; 2006 Va. LEXIS 104Docket: Record 051737.

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia; November 3, 2006; Virginia; State Supreme Court

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The case involves William White, Jr., who was charged with first-degree murder and assault and battery of a police officer. White intended to present an insanity defense during his jury trial, but the trial court granted the Commonwealth's motion to exclude this evidence. Consequently, White entered a conditional nolo contendere plea, preserving his right to appeal the ruling.

The events leading to the charges began on March 29, 2002, when White's car broke down in North Carolina, prompting him to arrange transportation with Elton Giliken to New York. While in Virginia, White exhibited erratic behavior, including asking for an unknown individual, ingesting what appeared to be cocaine, and making statements about committing violence. After leaving Giliken's car, White was later found to have murdered a victim at a motel, inflicting 27 stab wounds.

Following the murder, White was identified by police while walking on Interstate 95, dressed unusually, and displaying further erratic behavior. He was arrested after a physical altercation with officers. Prior to his trial, White complied with legal procedures to assert an insanity defense, including a psychiatric evaluation by Dr. William D. Brock, which was ordered by the court.

The Commonwealth moved to prevent White from introducing evidence about his mental state during the offense, arguing that Dr. Brock’s report did not support an insanity defense and that expert testimony is essential for such a defense, citing Massie v. Firmstone. In opposition, the defense contended that Dr. Brock’s report could assist in demonstrating a mental disease or defect and proposed additional lay witness testimony. The trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion, ruling that the proposed testimony did not meet the admissibility standards for an insanity defense, thus barring any evidence supporting it. Following this ruling, White changed his plea to nolo contendere while reserving the right to appeal. He was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison, along with five years for assaulting a police officer. Although a Court of Appeals panel initially reversed his conviction, it was later affirmed upon en banc rehearing. White appealed, claiming the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence concerning his mental state.

Dr. Brock’s report, intended to support White's insanity plea, detailed his medical history, including two psychiatric hospitalizations and treatment with Haldol. Dr. Brock noted that during one hospitalization, White likely suffered from drug-induced psychosis due to heavy narcotics use. White reported significant cocaine use prior to his arrest and shared beliefs that he was on a divine mission, experiencing auditory hallucinations. Dr. Brock indicated that White exhibited symptoms of psychosis at the time of the offenses, supported by his psychiatric history, drug abuse, and erratic behavior. However, Dr. Brock also suggested that White's symptoms were likely exacerbated by his voluntary drug use, questioning the viability of his insanity defense.

White exhibited efforts to evade detection, suggesting awareness of right and wrong. Dr. Brock submitted a letter asserting that White suffered from drug-induced psychosis during his hospitalization in Louisiana, stemming from cocaine, antihistamines, and marijuana abuse, and concluded that White's psychotic symptoms were likely due to substance abuse rather than another mental condition. White also presented testimony from Joseph W. Skinner, a licensed clinical social worker, as a lay witness, who noted that White reported hearing the voice of God both before and after the incident, even when not using drugs. 

Further testimony was proffered from White's roommate, Troy Whidbee, who claimed White expressed fears of being killed and believed he was a 'soldier' for God. White's mother would have testified about his auditory hallucinations prior to arriving in Virginia, including claims of seeing God and hearing voices urging him to harm himself or others. She described his behavior, including drawing red circles around perceived threats in his jail cell, symbolizing protection. Additionally, two correctional officers would have corroborated that White mentioned hearing voices after his arrest.

Regarding the legal framework for an insanity defense in Virginia, it is based on the M’Naghten test, which allows a defendant to prove they were suffering from a mental disease at the time of the act, preventing them from knowing the nature of their actions or understanding that they were wrong. White contended that he presented adequate evidence for a prima facie case of insanity and argued that the trial court erred by not allowing this evidence to be considered by the jury.

Prima facie evidence refers to evidence that supports a fact or judgment unless contradicted by opposing evidence. The focus of this appeal is on White's evidence of a mental disease or defect. The legal framework allows for an insanity defense in cases where chronic substance abuse leads to a mental condition. Historically, a distinction has been made between temporary intoxication and permanent insanity, with the latter being excusable in criminal acts if produced by habitual drunkenness. This condition, termed "settled insanity," requires a prolonged period of substance abuse.

White claims to have settled insanity at the time of his offenses, a recognized defense that necessitates significant duration of the condition. Numerous cases affirm that long-term intoxication resulting in permanent mental disease can absolve a defendant of criminal responsibility. White, at 28 years old, reported extensive substance abuse, including heavy cocaine, alcohol, and marijuana use, particularly in the months leading up to his arrest. Dr. Brock's evaluation indicated a substantial history of substance abuse and a prior psychiatric hospitalization, suggesting that White experienced drug-induced psychosis. Records from the hospitalization, treated with Haldol for psychotic symptoms, were not available during the evaluation, but his history indicates a possible link between his substance abuse and mental health issues.

Mr. White stopped taking Haldol after his hospitalization and quickly resumed abusing cocaine, marijuana, alcohol, and ecstasy. Dr. Brock reviewed White's psychiatric treatment records from Louisiana and concluded that White was experiencing drug-induced psychosis due to his substance abuse. He determined that this psychosis was not indicative of a separate mental illness but rather a consequence of White's drug use. Dr. Brock noted that while drug-induced psychosis could be a mitigating factor, it did not satisfy the criteria for an insanity defense. He emphasized the need for evidence of long-term, chronic substance abuse to establish a mental disease caused by drugs or alcohol, referencing the standard set in Wessels v. Commonwealth regarding the difficulty of proving feigned insanity. White's evidence was deemed insufficient to establish a prima facie insanity defense, especially since Dr. Skinner's testimony did not address the duration of White's drug use and was presented only during sentencing, not at the trial phase. Consequently, the trial court's exclusion of White's insanity defense evidence was upheld, affirming the Court of Appeals' judgment.

Justice Koontz dissented, arguing that the presence of conflicting evidence regarding White's sanity should have been resolved by a jury rather than the trial court. He contended that the trial court's ruling to exclude the insanity defense effectively denied White a fair trial with a jury, leading to a conditional plea of nolo contendere and an uncontested summary of evidence. The dissent highlighted that while proving insanity is the defendant's responsibility in Virginia, the appeal focused on whether White's evidence was sufficient to show a prima facie case of insanity.

The appellate review principles dictate that evidence supporting a motion in limine must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, White. The Commonwealth's motion argued that Dr. William Brock was the only expert to examine White, asserting he was not legally insane during the crimes, attributing his condition to drug-induced psychosis while acknowledging he knew right from wrong. The absence of additional expert evidence to substantiate White's insanity defense was emphasized. However, expert testimony is not infallible and should be treated like any other testimony, considering the witness's knowledge and demeanor. While lay witnesses can establish facts, they cannot opine on mental states, making expert testimony preferable for complex issues like insanity. Dr. Brock's assessment indicated White was psychotic at the time of the crimes, suggesting a severe mental disorder, but noted that his defense might be undermined by his post-crime actions and the voluntary nature of his drug use. Despite being a known drug abuser, White presented testimony from various lay witnesses indicating he exhibited psychotic symptoms independently of drug use before and after the offenses.

Evidence presented by lay witnesses suggested that White believed he heard God's voice directing his actions, creating a conflict regarding whether his psychotic state stemmed from drug abuse or an underlying mental disorder. The application of the M’Naghten test for insanity does not require an expert diagnosis of any underlying mental disorder to satisfy its first portion. The M’Naghten test distinguishes between those who are severely psychotic and those who, while aware of their actions, do not understand that those actions are wrong due to mental illness. If the jury accepts the lay witness testimony and White’s assertion that he believed he was following a divine command, this provides a valid basis for his insanity defense. This evidence contradicts claims that White's psychosis was solely due to drug use, a conclusion accepted by the trial judge and appellate courts. Ultimately, White's evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of insanity, warranting the reversal of the appellate court's decision and a remand for a new trial to allow the jury to determine White's legal sanity at the time of the crimes.