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JUD. INQUIRY & REVIEW COM'N OF VA v. Taylor
Citations: 685 S.E.2d 51; 278 Va. 699Docket: 090845
Court: Supreme Court of Virginia; November 4, 2009; Virginia; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
The Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission of Virginia filed a complaint against Judge Ramona D. Taylor, asserting violations of the Canons of Judicial Conduct. The complaint, based on Article VI, § 10 of the Virginia Constitution and Code § 17.1-902, alleges that Judge Taylor engaged in misconduct while serving in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of Virginia Beach. Specifically, the Commission charged her with violating Canons 1, 2, 2A, and 3B(2) during a May 2, 2007 adjudicatory hearing for a 15-year-old defendant, K.M., found guilty after a plea of 'not innocent'. Key allegations include Judge Taylor's actions post-hearing, where she deemed K.M. a risk to the community and remanded him to custody, denying his request for immediate sentencing and bond. K.M.'s counsel submitted a request for reconsideration, arguing that the denial of bond and the order's interlocutory nature hindered K.M.'s right to appeal. Judge Taylor denied this reconsideration, maintaining the order was non-appealable. Following this, K.M. filed a petition for a writ of mandamus against the court clerk, which was granted, requiring the processing of his appeal. Subsequently, after a bond hearing on May 11, 2007, K.M. was released to his parents. Judge Taylor later issued a 'Corrective Order' reiterating that her prior order was interlocutory and non-appealable. In her response to the charges, Judge Taylor claimed she did not recall any request for immediate sentencing from K.M.'s counsel. Judge Taylor confirmed her issuance of the May 3rd order denying K.M.'s motion for bond and release pending sentencing, acknowledging K.M.'s request for reconsideration. She disputed K.M.'s counsel's assertion that they cited clear authority for appeal rights regarding the bail denial, claiming the cited authority was open to varying interpretations, particularly for juvenile defendants post-adjudication. During a mandamus hearing, she clarified that an attorney for the clerk incorrectly represented her role regarding the appealability of the order, stating she acted as the presiding judge rather than the chief judge in that context. Judge Taylor requested dismissal of the formal charges from the Commission's Notice. At the Commission's evidentiary hearing on March 10, 2009, Judge Taylor, represented by counsel, faced a bifurcated process to examine potential violations of the Canons and corresponding sanctions. The parties agreed that when K.M.'s counsel attempted to file an appeal, the deputy clerk informed Judge Taylor, who confirmed the order was non-appealable but did not instruct the clerk to reject the appeal. Judge Taylor recounted her decision to securely detain K.M. to protect the community and her order for a social history. She did not recall a request for a final appealable order. In discussing K.M.'s reconsideration motion, she expressed her intention to ensure the Circuit Court was informed about her reliance on the Juvenile Code. When questioned about the appealability of the May 3rd order, she reiterated her belief that it was not appealable, acknowledging that the deputy clerk was seeking guidance on processing the appeal, while asserting it was the clerk's responsibility to consult appropriately if there was uncertainty. Judge Taylor emphasized that the clerk's office should have consulted the Office of the Executive Secretary (OES) of the Supreme Court of Virginia for guidance, as OES is responsible for providing administrative support to all courts in the Commonwealth. The Department of Judicial Services (DJS) within OES acts as a liaison, offering administrative services such as publications, training, and program support, specifically assisting juvenile and domestic relations matters. Judge Taylor stated that, in her view, K.M. did not have the right to appeal his detention status due to his post-adjudication/pre-disposition status. She expected K.M.'s attorney to appeal her May 3rd order and clarified that her mention of the order being "interlocutory" and "non-appealable" was not a ruling but a concern flagged for the circuit court's consideration regarding the appealability of the case. The Commission found that Judge Taylor violated Canons 1, 2A, and 3B(2) and concluded that her actions intentionally obstructed K.M.'s appeal of the bail denial. Following the hearing, the Commission deemed the charges serious enough to warrant censure and considered prior informal contacts with Judge Taylor, which had previously been dismissed. Judge Taylor's counsel objected to these exhibits, arguing they were irrelevant and prejudicial. Nonetheless, the Commission admitted the exhibits for final disposition. Ultimately, the Commission filed a complaint against Judge Taylor in this Court, leading her to file a post-hearing motion to dismiss based on the argument that the evidence merely pointed to legal errors, not violations of the Canons of Judicial Conduct. Judge Taylor contended that there was no evidence she knowingly violated any statutes or legal rights and asserted that she did not commit any legal errors intentionally. She requested the Commission to reconsider the admission of documents regarding her prior contacts with the Commission, arguing these documents lacked a legal basis for use, had minimal probative value compared to their prejudicial effect, violated her confidentiality rights, and denied her equal protection and due process under the U.S. and Virginia Constitutions. Additionally, Judge Taylor claimed that an email from Commission Chairman Judge Larry D. Willis, Jr. influenced one of her prior informal contacts with the Commission, warranting Judge Willis's recusal. She argued that the Canons of Judicial Conduct, as applied to her case, were unconstitutionally vague and lacked clear standards, leading to an arbitrary process. The Commission denied her motion on April 14, 2009, stating that under Code § 17.1-913, any record filed with the court becomes public, and certain exhibits would remain unsealed as they had already been made public. Judge Taylor subsequently abandoned her equal protection argument in court. On April 28, 2009, the Commission filed a formal complaint, to which Judge Taylor responded by asserting the evidence was insufficient to prove she knowingly violated any laws or Canons, claiming no factual basis for findings against her, and arguing her motion to dismiss was well-founded with no basis for censure. The relevant Canons addressed included: Canon 1, which emphasizes upholding the integrity and independence of the judiciary; Canon 2, which mandates avoidance of impropriety; and Canon 3, which requires judges to perform their duties impartially and diligently. The Commission's complaint triggered a court hearing to determine if Judge Taylor engaged in misconduct or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The court is required to assess evidence de novo, with the Commission needing to prove its charges by clear and convincing evidence, defined as a strong conviction regarding the allegations. The standard of proof in this context is "clear and convincing," which is higher than a mere preponderance but less than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in criminal cases. The findings and opinions of the Commission are not given special weight or deference. Upon conducting a de novo review, if clear and convincing evidence of judicial misconduct or prejudicial conduct is found, the judge may be censured or removed from office. Judge Taylor presents four main issues for consideration: (1) whether there is sufficient evidence of misconduct; (2) whether the Canons applied to her are sufficiently definite for due process; (3) the legality of considering her prior contacts with the Commission; and (4) her entitlement to relief based on conflict or recusal issues. The Commission argues that the record demonstrates Judge Taylor's misconduct and emphasizes that K.M. had the right to appeal the denial of bail, as all decisions denying bail are appealable under Virginia criminal procedure. The Commission cites relevant statutes to support the claim that K.M. retained the status of being held in custody, allowing for an appeal of Judge Taylor's bail denial. K.M. is classified as a 'person' under Code § 19.2-119, encompassing any accused or juveniles in custody per § 16.1-246. The Commission argues that Judge Taylor improperly created an exception for juveniles held 'post-adjudication/pre-disposition,' claiming Virginia law does not support her assertion of a 'no appeal zone' in juvenile court after an adjudicatory hearing when bail is denied. Even if Judge Taylor's actions are deemed a 'mere legal error,' the Commission insists that her decision to label her ruling as immune from appellate review should not be excused. The Commission highlights a distinction between mistakenly deeming an order nonappealable and explicitly ruling it as such, which obstructed the appeal process. Judge Taylor is accused of failing to withdraw her position despite opportunities to do so, violating judicial Canons and engaging in conduct detrimental to justice administration as per Virginia Constitution, art. VI, § 10. The Commission disputes Judge Taylor's claim that she did not rule on the appealability of her order and emphasizes that her statements to other judges and her failure to deny the ruling in her response to formal charges support their position. The clerk of court acted under the belief that K.M.'s appeal was invalid based on Judge Taylor's May 3rd order labeling it as 'interlocutory, nonappealable.' The Commission asserts that Judge Taylor's guidance to the deputy clerk effectively obstructed the appeal process. In contrast, Judge Taylor maintains that there is no evidence indicating she violated any Canons. Judge Taylor maintains that she applied the law correctly and argues that the Commission failed to provide a credible theory supporting its claim of judicial misconduct. She asserts that post-adjudication, pre-disposition detention under Code § 16.1-248.1(G) does not affect bail appeal rights as outlined in Code § 19.2-124, which differentiates 'bail' from 'detention' and only addresses the right to appeal bail decisions. Judge Taylor emphasizes that her interpretation of the statutes is at least plausible, supported by the language used by the General Assembly. She highlights that her order was labeled 'interlocutory, nonappealable' to prompt the circuit court to consider the appealability issue, arguing that previous court opinions support the dismissal of the complaint against her. Judge Taylor distinguishes her case from Lewis, noting there is no evidence of her defying a higher court's order, and claims that legal ambiguities exist within the statutes. She acknowledges the possibility of her interpretations being wrong but likens her situation to Peatross, suggesting that any errors were merely legal misjudgments, not grounds for discipline. The excerpt critiques her argument about a 'no appeal zone' for juveniles, pointing out that allowing indefinite detention without circuit court review undermines the right to a de novo trial and the ability to challenge bail denials. Ultimately, the core issue is whether Judge Taylor obstructed K.M.'s right to appeal, and if such obstruction constitutes a violation of judicial conduct standards. The Commission established that Judge Taylor violated the Canons of judicial conduct as evidenced by clear and convincing information. Although she misinterpreted the law, her actions exceeded mere legal error when she obstructed K.M.'s appeal to the circuit court. Judge Taylor declared her May 3rd order as interlocutory and nonappealable, directly influencing the deputy clerk's decision on whether to process K.M.'s notice of appeal. K.M.'s attorney requested reconsideration of this ruling, citing legal provisions that supported K.M.'s right to appeal the denial of bond. The attorney indicated that the circuit court acknowledged the appealability of Judge Taylor's order. Despite this, Judge Taylor did not respond to the attorney's request and reiterated her stance by issuing a corrective order reinforcing her original determination. During the Commission hearing, Judge Taylor acknowledged her awareness of the deputy clerk's inquiry regarding the order's appealability but distanced herself from the appeal process, insisting that it was not her role to intervene. She placed the responsibility on the clerk's office to seek guidance from higher authorities, never directing them to do so. Judge Taylor admitted her chief judge status and her authority to guide the clerk's actions, yet denied accountability for the situation following her May 3rd ruling. Judge Taylor acknowledged that her instructions led the clerk’s office to refuse K.M.’s appeal, but did not attempt to rectify the clerk's belief that she was compelled to do so. Four days after the order was issued, Judge Taylor received a letter from the clerk stating that they felt 'compelled' to declare the order nonappealable based on her ruling. During oral arguments, her counsel admitted that it could be interpreted that Judge Taylor implicitly directed the clerk regarding the appeal process. Despite being aware of K.M.'s counsel's attempts to appeal the denial of bond and the nonappealability of the order, Judge Taylor did not clarify her stance that she had not ruled the order as nonappealable or directed the clerk to refuse the appeal. Furthermore, she had knowledge of a writ of mandamus filed against the clerk but only communicated her ruling to fellow judges without taking further action. Judge Taylor's claim that her decision was not a ruling on appealability is contradicted by her own correspondence where she described her actions as a 'ruling.' The argument that her designation of the order as nonappealable served merely as a 'red flag' for the circuit court lacks credibility, especially since her actions prevented the appeal from reaching the circuit court. Historical precedent establishes that a court cannot obstruct the review of its decisions on appeal, and thus, Judge Taylor's ruling effectively barred K.M.'s appeal. The conclusion is that a judge cannot declare their own ruling nonappealable and simultaneously claim not to interfere with the appeal process. Judge Taylor's claim of lacking supervisory authority over a clerk when responding to an inquiry about processing an appeal is deemed disingenuous. She failed to clearly communicate her presiding role and that she was not acting as the chief judge with supervisory power, leading to the deputy clerk's misunderstanding regarding the appeal's processing. Judge Taylor was aware that her directive had influenced the clerk of court's refusal to process the appeal. Her assertion that the clerk's office should seek guidance from the OES lacked prior communication to the deputy clerk and did not assist K.M., who sought appellate review to secure his release. Furthermore, Judge Taylor's subsequent entry of a corrective order amidst a potential writ of mandamus contradicts her claim of disengagement from the appeal process. Her actions obstructed K.M.'s right to appeal, undermining public confidence in the judiciary and violating Canons 1, 2A, and 3B(2), which constituted prejudicial conduct. In response to claims of constitutional vagueness regarding the Judicial Canons, Judge Taylor argues that these standards lack clarity. She contends that Canon 1’s requirement for judges to maintain high conduct standards, Canon 2’s promotion of public confidence, and Canon 3’s fidelity to the law are vague and aspirational rather than definitive. The Commission counters that Judge Taylor provides no authority supporting her due process argument, noting that other jurisdictions have rejected similar vagueness challenges. Ultimately, the court finds that the Canons are sufficiently clear and definite to withstand Judge Taylor's due process claims. Procedural due process under the Constitution of Virginia necessitates a balance between the integrity of the judiciary and the rights of individual judges. Courts in various jurisdictions have consistently rejected claims that judicial conduct canons are unconstitutionally vague. Notably, Canon 2A has been upheld as sufficiently clear, with courts stating that judicial disciplinary rules can allow for more flexibility compared to criminal statutes. The determination of vagueness hinges on whether the Canons provide judges with a definite warning about prohibited conduct based on common understanding. In this case, the Canons violated by Judge Taylor require compliance with the law to maintain public confidence in the judiciary's integrity and impartiality. The Virginia Canons of Judicial Conduct consist of broad principles, specific rules, and advisory commentary intended to guide judges' ethical conduct. Canon 1 emphasizes that judges, while independent, must adhere to the law, as violations erode public trust. Canon 2A further mandates that judges comply with the law to uphold judicial integrity, while Canon 3B(2) requires fidelity to the law. The Commission asserts that Judge Taylor's actions in obstructing K.M.’s appeal constituted a legal violation that diminished public confidence in the judiciary, a claim supported by clear and convincing evidence. The relevant Canons unequivocally prohibit a judge from failing to follow the law, leaving no room for vagueness in their application. Additionally, Judge Taylor contends that the Commission improperly considered her prior contacts, citing Code 17.1-913 as the basis for her argument against this evidence's admissibility. The statute mandates that all prior contacts not associated with a formal complaint filed with the Supreme Court must remain confidential within the Commission's files (Code § 17.1-913(A)). Judge Taylor argues that Rule 16 of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission supports the confidentiality of records from proceedings that concluded without adverse findings against a judge (15 VAC 10-10-10). She claims that neither the statute nor Rule 16 allows for the release of records from complaints deemed "not well founded," which includes her previous contacts from 2002 and 2006. Judge Taylor asserts these contacts are irrelevant to current proceedings, as the 2002 contact was an in camera interview and the 2006 complaint about court delays was resolved in her favor. In contrast, the Commission argues that Judge Taylor's prior contacts are relevant based on the precedent set in Shull, where prior contacts influenced the court's decision regarding a judge's conduct. The Commission cites Rule 13(B), which allows for the admission of "material and relevant" evidence, asserting that past contacts with the Commission could indicate whether a judge is amenable to discipline. They contend that the confidentiality provisions do not restrict the admissibility of evidence at the hearing. Ultimately, the court holds that the evidence of Judge Taylor's prior contacts was appropriately admitted and is valid for review. Both parties agreed to the admission of the exhibits prior to the hearing, which included correspondence related to Judge Taylor's informal contact with the Commission from 2001-02. The document includes a redacted agenda from a JIRC meeting on April 19, 2002, a transcript of a judge's informal meeting with JIRC on May 21, 2002, and correspondence about a judge's informal contact with JIRC in 2006. Judge Taylor argues that her case is undermined by her agreement to the admission of exhibits used by the Commission, referencing Rule 5:25. She contends that Judge Willis, the Commission chairman, should have recused himself due to his prior involvement as a complainant. Under Canon 3E, disqualification is warranted if a judge's impartiality could reasonably be questioned, particularly if they possess personal knowledge of disputed facts or are a party to the proceedings. The Commission counters that Judge Taylor was likely aware of Judge Willis' prior involvement as early as 2006 and did not object to his participation in the 2009 hearings. An email from Judge Willis to Chief Judge Deborah M. Paxson regarding delays affecting the Chesapeake court, without naming any judges, suggests Judge Taylor may have been informed of this complaint through judicial channels. The Commission argues that Judge Taylor's failure to raise a timely objection constitutes a waiver of her right to challenge Judge Willis' role. The conclusion notes letters from attorneys praising Judge Taylor's professionalism, which were considered in determining the outcome of the case. Judge Taylor requests a dismissal of her complaint based on comparisons to four published opinions and asserts that her prior contacts with the Commission should not imply uncooperativeness but indicate the Commission's lack of courtesy. The Commission also refers to previous disciplinary cases for comparison, particularly Judicial Inquiry Review Commission v. Lewis. Judge Taylor's previous experience with the Commission is cited as evidence of her unwillingness to accept informal discipline. Her case is compared to that of Judge Lewis, who was censured for violating judicial conduct canons in a similar manner by disregarding a circuit court’s stay order. Judge Taylor also violated Canons 1, 2A, and 3B(2) by preventing appellate review of her secure detention order, resulting in K.M. being held for nine days without proper legal recourse. The censure of Judge Taylor is deemed necessary to maintain public confidence in the judiciary, emphasizing that judges must adhere to the law for citizens to respect the legal system. Despite dissent from Justice Koontz, who argues that the evidence does not support censure, the majority concludes that Judge Taylor's actions impair public trust and warrant disciplinary action for conduct prejudicial to justice. K.M.'s parents filed a CHINS petition, leading to Judge Taylor ordering K.M. to maintain good behavior and avoid substance abuse. Following an adjudicatory hearing for an assault charge, Judge Taylor mandated a comprehensive social history to be prepared and scheduled a final disposition for May 24, 2007. She determined K.M. posed a substantial risk of harm to the community due to the serious nature of the assault and remanded him to secure custody until the hearing. K.M.'s counsel requested either a final disposition or bond release pending the hearing. On May 3, 2007, and amended on May 8, 2007, Judge Taylor denied the bond request, citing Virginia Code § 19.2-120, which governs bond considerations for individuals in custody. It was noted that K.M. was held post-trial and pre-disposition, and the right to appeal a bond determination in this context did not apply. Judge Taylor’s order was classified as interlocutory and nonappealable. The Commission recognized that Judge Taylor acted within her authority regarding both the assault charge and the bond denial, but contested her alleged intent to obstruct K.M.'s appeal of the bond denial. However, it was concluded that there was no evidence supporting the claim of intentional obstruction, as Judge Taylor’s colleagues concurred that the order was nonappealable. Virginia Code § 16.1-248.1(G) permits the detention of juveniles after a delinquency petition has been filed, prior to and after adjudication, pending final disposition. A thirty-day time limitation is established for completing dispositional hearings for juveniles in secure detention, as per the relevant Code sections. Code 19.2-119 defines “Person” to include any accused individual or juvenile taken into custody under Code 16.1-246, while Code 19.2-120(A) pertains to individuals held in custody pending trial or hearing. Judge Taylor and her colleagues concluded that a juvenile, like K.M., held in secure detention after an adjudicatory hearing was not entitled to appeal the denial of bail under these provisions. However, a previous ruling indicated that mistakes of law do not necessarily warrant disciplinary action. The core issue revolves around whether Judge Taylor's actions constituted more than a legal mistake, particularly in her response to the deputy clerk regarding K.M.'s appeal notice. Judge Taylor confirmed the order was non-appealable but did not instruct the deputy clerk to reject the appeal, leading to the clerk's refusal to process it. Consequently, K.M.'s counsel obtained a writ of mandamus, resulting in her release on bond. The evidence suggests Judge Taylor sincerely believed her bail ruling was interlocutory and nonappealable, supported by her oral and written explanations at the time. The Commission argues that if Judge Taylor's actions are deemed mere legal error, she improperly asserted that her decision was immune from appellate review. However, the interpretation of the evidence does not convincingly demonstrate that Judge Taylor acted improperly or in a manner prejudicial to justice as defined by the Virginia Constitution. The argument against Judge Taylor is deemed unpersuasive as evidence shows she was following the law as understood by her and her colleagues, despite being legally incorrect. The court, referencing Peatross, asserts that legal errors do not warrant censure or disciplinary action, as they do not equate to violations of judicial conduct Canons. The court supported this stance with examples from Illinois and California, emphasizing that not disciplining judges for legal errors is crucial for judicial independence. The lack of evidence indicating bias or intentional misconduct by Judge Taylor further reinforces this position. The court notes the time gap between Judge Taylor's actions in May 2007 and the Commission's proceedings in March 2009, which may explain any inconsistencies in her testimony but do not meet the clear and convincing standard for proving a violation. Unlike previous cases where judges engaged in misconduct, Judge Taylor did not defy superior court orders or disrespect litigants. Without evidence of intentional wrongdoing, her legal error cannot be classified as misconduct. The potential consequences of censure underscore the necessity of maintaining a high standard for judicial discipline. Consequently, the complaint against Judge Taylor is recommended for dismissal.