Montague v. Com.

Citations: 684 S.E.2d 583; 278 Va. 532Docket: 090337

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia; November 5, 2009; Virginia; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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In the case of Chauncey Lamont Montague v. Commonwealth of Virginia, the Supreme Court weighed whether the circuit court correctly denied Montague's motion to suppress evidence obtained during an encounter with police officers, which he claimed was an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Montague was convicted of multiple offenses, including possession of cocaine and assault on a law enforcement officer. 

Prior to trial, Montague argued that evidence of the cocaine and firearm was obtained unlawfully. The circuit court denied the suppression motion, leading to a bench trial where Montague received a sentence totaling fifteen years and six months, with ten years suspended. 

The Court of Appeals upheld the circuit court’s decision, finding the police encounter was consensual, as Montague provided his identity voluntarily and did not express a desire to leave. During the interaction, officers were in uniform and engaged Montague in conversation while checking for outstanding warrants. Montague's companion, Angela Davis, was present but there was no evidence that Montague knew the officers were contacting dispatch about him. The officers maintained a respectful distance, and Montague did not assert that he wished to terminate the interaction or leave. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support Montague's conviction for assault and battery against a law enforcement officer.

Officer Land checked a ban list for individuals prohibited from a property while waiting for a dispatcher response. Montague's name was not on the list. Upon learning of two outstanding warrants for Montague's arrest, officers informed him of his arrest. Montague resisted by struggling and attempting to reach into his pocket, resulting in a handgun falling to the ground and packets of cocaine spilling from his sweatshirt. During the struggle, Montague pushed Officer Land. After several minutes, officers subdued him and collected the firearm and drugs.

On appeal, Montague argued that the Court of Appeals wrongly upheld the circuit court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence, claiming the encounter was non-consensual and lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. He contended that he was unlawfully seized when officers checked for warrants and trespassing. The court disagreed, stating that whether a person is seized under the Fourth Amendment involves a mixed question of law and fact, reviewed de novo. A seizure occurs when police use physical force or show of authority to restrict movement, while voluntary encounters do not constitute seizures. The Fourth Amendment allows police to approach individuals and request identification without reasonable suspicion, and a voluntary response to such requests does not violate the amendment.

Police encounters with individuals do not require objective suspicion as long as officers do not indicate that compliance is mandatory. The Supreme Court has established that a consensual encounter does not constitute a seizure merely because individuals feel compelled to respond to police questioning. A seizure occurs only if a reasonable person would believe they are not free to leave, considering all circumstances. Factors suggesting a seizure include the presence of multiple officers, weapon display, physical contact, or language implying compliance is required. In this case, the encounter with Montague was deemed consensual: police simply approached him and asked for information, which he provided voluntarily. The interaction lasted two to three minutes without any show of force or indication that Montague was obligated to stay. Montague's decision to remain nearby, rather than attempting to leave, further supports the conclusion that he did not perceive himself as being seized. The absence of a direct statement from officers affirming that Montague was free to leave does not negate the consensual nature of the encounter. Additionally, there is no evidence that Montague was aware of prior police contact regarding him.

The Court of Appeals correctly upheld the circuit court's denial of Montague's motion to suppress evidence. Montague's claim that the evidence was inadequate to support his conviction under Code 18.2-57(C) for assault and battery against Officer Land was rejected. Montague acknowledged knowing Officer Land was a law enforcement officer, leaving the only question whether the evidence supported the circuit court's finding of assault and battery. In reviewing the evidence favorably for the Commonwealth, the court will affirm unless the judgment is clearly incorrect or unsupported by evidence.

Assault and battery are defined as common law crimes, where assault involves an attempt to inflict bodily harm and battery is the actual infliction of harm done willfully or angrily. Intent to harm can be inferred from the circumstances, including the actor's conduct. Evidence indicated that Montague pushed Officer Land and elbowed him in the chest while resisting arrest. This behavior demonstrated Montague's intent to inflict physical harm to avoid being subdued. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that sufficient evidence existed to convict Montague of assault and battery against a law enforcement officer. The judgment is affirmed.