Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Lacy, S.J. presided over appeals involving two attorneys, Kenneth L. Singleton and Gordon Andrew Zedd, both convicted of criminal contempt under Code 18.2-456 for failing to ensure their clients' appearances in court.
In Singleton's case, he represented Darrell P. Simpson in an appeal regarding a DUI misdemeanor. Singleton arranged a continuance for the trial originally set for August 30, 2007, but failed to ensure the continuance order was entered by the court. He instructed Simpson not to attend the original trial date, which resulted in the court rejecting the continuance and fining Singleton $250 for contempt when both he and his client were absent. Singleton admitted he lacked authority to excuse his client but believed in good faith that the matter was resolved with the prosecutor. The court emphasized that agreements between attorneys do not constitute orders without judicial approval. Singleton's subsequent appeal contended insufficient evidence of contemptuous intent and claimed due process violations due to the use of summary contempt procedures instead of plenary ones.
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed Singleton's conviction for contempt of court, ruling that his failure to appear at the original trial date and his advice to his client not to appear undermined the trial court's authority. Singleton was barred from raising issues regarding procedural protections for plenary contempt for the first time on appeal. In a related case, Zedd, who represented Kiwani Scott in a reckless driving appeal, requested a continuance due to a scheduling conflict, which was granted because a key witness was unavailable. Zedd informed Scott she need not appear in court, leading to a bench warrant for contempt issued against him. Zedd was found guilty of contempt and fined, appealing on grounds of insufficient evidence and due process violations. The Court of Appeals upheld his conviction, stating that Zedd's appearance did not sufficiently distinguish his case from Singleton's. The primary issue for both appeals is the sufficiency of evidence for contempt convictions, with established appellate review standards favoring the Commonwealth unless proven plainly wrong or unsupported by evidence. Both defendants were convicted under Code § 18.2-456, which outlines specific conditions under which contempt may be punished.
All courts in Virginia have the authority to impose penalties for contemptuous conduct to uphold their power and dignity. In criminal contempt cases, the intent of the accused to undermine the court's authority is crucial. Acts intended to embarrass or obstruct the court are deemed contempt. In the current appeals, it must be determined if Singleton and Zedd intended to obstruct justice, as there is no contention that their actions fell under specific contempt provisions in the Code. Virginia courts have consistently required intent to sustain a criminal contempt conviction, as established in historical cases.
In **Wells**, an attorney was not held in contempt for advising a client to seek an injunction, as he acted in good faith without disrespect toward the court. In **Wise**, an attorney was fined for contempt after being late to a second trial; the court reversed the conviction, stating there was no indication of contemptuous intent. Finally, in **Carter**, the focus was on whether a defendant had the intent for contempt after sending a false telegram to his attorney regarding his illness. The consistent legal principle is that intent to disrespect the court is a necessary element for a contempt conviction.
Carter argued that his false statement regarding health was not intended to disrespect the court or to obtain a continuance, but he was convicted of criminal contempt under a statute similar to Code 18.2-456. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, noting that the intent behind his statement was to influence the court's decision, which obstructed justice. However, in the cases of Singleton and Zedd, the evidence did not indicate intent to obstruct justice, as both attorneys acted under the belief that a continuance would be granted due to the unavailability of key witnesses. Singleton’s actions were consistent with a good faith belief that the continuance would be approved, and Zedd excused his client based on similar reasoning. Therefore, the court found the evidence insufficient to support their contempt convictions. The court emphasized that attorneys should not assume a continuance will be granted without a formal order and should appear in court with their clients when seeking a continuance. The Court of Appeals' judgments sustaining Singleton's and Zedd's convictions were reversed and vacated, and no further issues needed to be addressed due to this conclusion.
