In the case involving the estate of Joyce Hawthorne and Kevin Guthrie against Senior Officer Timothy VanMarter, the Circuit Court of Roanoke County addressed several legal issues following a vehicular accident that resulted in Hawthorne's death and Guthrie's injuries. The court consolidated the plaintiffs’ motions for judgment against VanMarter, who claimed sovereign immunity based on his assertion that he was attempting to overtake a speeding vehicle at the time of the accident. The court found that VanMarter's actions were discretionary, thus barring claims of ordinary negligence under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The plaintiffs contended that sovereign immunity did not apply since VanMarter had not activated his emergency equipment and was overtaking rather than pursuing a vehicle. They also argued that factual determinations regarding gross negligence could not be resolved as a matter of law. During the hearing on VanMarter's plea in bar, the plaintiffs did not present any witnesses. The circuit court ultimately ruled in favor of VanMarter, concluding that he was pursuing a speeding vehicle and that his actions were discretionary.
Subsequent to this ruling, the plaintiffs conducted depositions of two witnesses who claimed not to have seen a speeding vehicle prior to the accident. They argued this testimony constituted newly discovered evidence, which could create a factual dispute regarding the circumstances of the accident. The plaintiffs requested the court to allow these witnesses to testify at trial and submit the question of whether VanMarter was pursuing a speeding vehicle to the jury, asserting that a negative finding could negate VanMarter's claim to sovereign immunity and warrant instructions on both ordinary and gross negligence.
VanMarter argued that the witnesses' testimony was not "newly discovered" since their names were disclosed by the plaintiffs at least two weeks prior to the hearing on the plea in bar. He claimed that their statements did not contradict his account of the events and would not have altered the circuit court's determination regarding sovereign immunity. The circuit court concurred, denying the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider, concluding that the testimony did not qualify as "after-discovered evidence" and would not influence the sovereign immunity ruling. Furthermore, the plaintiffs did not seek to present this testimony to the jury for impeachment or gross negligence claims.
At trial, evidence indicated that Guthrie was a passenger in Hawthorne's vehicle during an accident. Guthrie testified that Hawthorne looked both ways before turning onto Chaparral Drive, and he did not see any emergency vehicles or hear sirens prior to the collision, only recalling a sudden impact. Expert witnesses provided insights into the vehicles' conditions, sight lines, and emergency protocol for police vehicles. VanMarter's deposition revealed that he was pursuing a speeding vehicle without activating his siren or lights and attempted to strike the rear of Hawthorne's car after spotting it. In his defense, VanMarter called expert witnesses to discuss police protocol concerning emergency vehicle operations, emphasizing the factors police must consider when deciding to pursue and activate emergency equipment.
VanMarter introduced testimony from an accident investigator and a mechanical engineer during the trial. The accident investigator noted that Hawthorne had an unobstructed view before turning onto Chaparral Drive, while the mechanical engineer discussed the impact force and vehicle damage from the collision. After all evidence was presented, the parties proposed jury instructions, with the plaintiffs objecting to Instructions 3 and 11. The circuit court overruled these objections, resulting in a jury verdict favoring VanMarter. Subsequently, the circuit court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to set aside the verdict and entered final judgment, leading to an appeal by the plaintiffs.
VanMarter filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the Administrators of the Hawthorne Estate had filed it pro se, citing the precedent set in Kone v. Wilson, which prohibits estate administrators from filing actions in a pro se capacity. The Administrators contended that Kone did not apply to appeals and argued they had a personal interest in the outcome, allowing them to appeal pro se. They also claimed that a notice of appeal filed by Guthrie in a consolidated proceeding effectively perfected their appeal. The court rejected these arguments, clarifying that Guthrie's notice did not represent the Hawthorne Estate, as it lacked explicit authorization. It reaffirmed that the Kone ruling applies to the representative role of an administrator, emphasizing that such administrators cannot pursue appeals in a pro se capacity since they act on behalf of the estate's beneficiaries.
A licensed attorney filed an action in the circuit court on behalf of the Administrators of the Hawthorne Estate. However, the Administrators later filed a notice of appeal in a pro se capacity, which is not permissible as they were not the true parties in interest and were acting solely as representatives for the beneficiaries. Their claim of a personal interest in the appeal outcome does not grant them the right to file pro se. Consequently, the court granted the motion to dismiss their appeal.
In a separate matter, Guthrie contested the circuit court's refusal to allow a jury to determine whether VanMarter was engaged in overtaking a speeding vehicle during a collision, arguing that the court improperly made a factual determination regarding witness testimony. Guthrie believed this factual issue was crucial to the trial. The court maintained that its decision not to reopen the record was a discretionary one and affirmed that a plea in bar focuses on a specific issue that can bar recovery if proven. The burden of proof lies with the party asserting the plea, and the court’s judgment will not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.
If evidence is presented on the plea ore tenus, the circuit court's factual findings are treated as jury findings and can only be overturned on appeal if clearly erroneous or unsupported by evidence. If factual disputes arise regarding the plea in bar, a party can request a jury to resolve those disputes; otherwise, the court may resolve both legal and factual issues. In this case, Guthrie did not inform the court of potential witnesses or seek additional time for depositions, nor did he request a jury trial on factual issues, effectively consenting to the court's decision on sovereign immunity. This waiver means the court's ruling on sovereign immunity stands, as the plea in bar serves to expedite litigation by addressing key issues before trial.
Additionally, the circuit court rightly determined that the testimony of two witnesses did not qualify as "after-discovered" evidence since Guthrie identified them before the court's ruling and could have obtained their testimony with reasonable diligence. Therefore, the court did not err in refusing to reopen its decision on the plea in bar to allow this testimony.
Regarding venue, the circuit court granted VanMarter’s motion to transfer, deeming the City of Roanoke an improper venue due to his relocation to Roanoke County prior to filing. Guthrie argued the City was a proper venue since VanMarter had retained a residence and conducted substantial business there. VanMarter testified he lived in the City until July 2005 but acknowledged retaining access to his previous residence and storing belongings there after his move.
VanMarter provided testimony indicating he completed a change of address with the USPS, yet some mail was still delivered to his previous address on Springtree Drive. He noted that his Police Department paycheck and voter registration still listed the Springtree Drive address as of October 2005. VanMarter also mentioned frequent travel to Roanoke City for shopping, dining, and attending movies, and was enrolled at Virginia Western Community College in Roanoke for six months prior to the action being filed. The circuit court concluded that VanMarter resided in Roanoke County when the lawsuit was initiated and that his activities in Roanoke City did not meet the definition of "substantial business activity" under Code § 8.01-262(3). On appeal, Guthrie contended that VanMarter did not prove he had moved to Roanoke County before the lawsuit was filed and that he engaged in substantial business activity in Roanoke City. The court disagreed, emphasizing that the burden of proving improper venue lies with the objecting party. The circuit court's discretion in determining venue was upheld, supported by evidence that VanMarter had moved from the City of Roanoke, maintained a change of address, and that transient activities such as attending classes and personal interests did not constitute substantial business activity. Guthrie's argument regarding a city ordinance permitting VanMarter to perform law enforcement functions in Roanoke City was not considered because it was not raised in the lower court. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's decision to transfer venue to Roanoke County.
Guthrie challenged the circuit court's decision to seat certain jurors during voir dire. Initially, all potential jurors stated they could be fair and impartial, denying any bias or prejudice. Juror Tuckwiller disclosed that his sister worked for the law firm representing VanMarter but claimed this would not affect his judgment. Juror Harris expressed uncertainty about her ability to serve impartially, noting her weekly attendance at church with police officers and suggesting that a verdict against a police officer might cause her concern. Juror Draper echoed Harris's sentiment but previously stated she would not find it difficult to serve. Juror Blankenship indicated a potential bias against finding VanMarter liable unless negligence was proven. Jurors Harris and Hodges agreed with Blankenship’s views. Despite Guthrie's motion to strike these five jurors for cause, the circuit court denied it, asserting the jurors could be fair and impartial based on their overall demeanor during questioning. Guthrie also sought to conduct individual voir dire and extend questioning, which the court refused, citing the already lengthy proceedings. On appeal, Guthrie argued that the comments from the five jurors indicated bias and that the circuit court erred in not granting his motions to strike them and to further question them individually.
Civil litigants have the right to a fair and impartial jury as per Code § 8.01-358. Circuit courts exercise broad discretion in jury selection, particularly in assessing jurors' ability to remain indifferent. An appellate court will not overturn a circuit court's decision on a motion to strike a juror unless there is manifest error. Each party must have a full opportunity to question jurors, but the court decides on the adequacy of this opportunity and whether questioning can occur individually or in front of other jurors.
In reviewing five jurors' voir dire, the court found all capable of serving impartially. Juror Tuckwiller affirmed that a familial connection with the law firm would not affect his impartiality. Although Juror Blankenship expressed initial hesitation about judging a police officer, she later clarified her stance. Juror Hodges echoed Blankenship's initial concerns without claiming bias. Jurors Harris and Draper, who had connections to police officers, expressed uncertainty but stated they would follow the law despite personal feelings. Their responses did not indicate an inability to adhere to court instructions.
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Guthrie's questioning of the jurors, noting that questioning had been thorough and individual voir dire unnecessary. The court upheld the decision not to strike the jurors.
Regarding jury instructions, Guthrie challenged Instruction 3, which allowed emergency vehicles to exceed speed limits unless grossly negligent, arguing it failed to inform jurors that police must activate emergency lights when exceeding the speed limit.
The circuit court upheld that Instructions 3 and 4 accurately represented the law, specifically regarding the operation of law enforcement vehicles. Instruction 4 established that a law enforcement driver may disregard speed limits if their vehicle displays emergency lights and sounds a siren, while Instruction 11 imposed a duty on drivers exiting a private driveway to stop and yield to approaching vehicles. Guthrie objected to Instruction 11, arguing it failed to inform the jury that a driver exceeding the speed limit forfeits the right of way. Guthrie proposed an alternative instruction (Instruction C) addressing this forfeiture, which was rejected by the court. The circuit court found that Instructions 11 and 10, the latter stating that drivers can assume others will act with ordinary care, provided a comprehensive view of the law. On appeal, Guthrie contended that Instruction 3 misrepresented the law by allowing the jury to conclude that VanMarter could legally exceed the speed limit without activating emergency signals and that the jury might have inferred VanMarter forfeited his right of way due to speeding. Guthrie argued that Instruction 11 needed to clarify this forfeiture, which was not addressed by Instruction 10, leading to inconsistencies between the two. The court disagreed, emphasizing that jury instructions should convey the law clearly and fairly, and that Instructions should be read collectively. The accuracy of jury instructions is assessed de novo by the court.
Instruction 3 correctly informed the jury that VanMarter could disregard the speed limit as long as he was not grossly negligent. Although it did not specify that emergency vehicles must activate lights and sirens when exceeding speed limits, it did not misstate the law. Instruction 4 addressed the conditions under which police officers may disregard speed limits, including the activation of emergency lights and sirens. Instruction 11 correctly stated that drivers have a duty to use ordinary care, while Instruction 10 noted that drivers can initially assume others are acting with ordinary care. The matter of forfeiture of right of way was considered a separate legal issue from the duty of ordinary care, and thus the circuit court did not err in excluding it from Instruction 11. The refusal of proposed Instruction C regarding the forfeiture of right of way was not challenged as an error. Collectively, the jury was properly instructed on the relevant issues, leading to the dismissal of the Hawthorne Estate's appeal and affirmation of the circuit court’s judgment in favor of VanMarter in Guthrie’s appeal.
