The legal document addresses the appeal concerning the validity of the Windover Heights Historic District (WHHD) Ordinance and the denial of a certificate of appropriateness (COA) for property modifications in Vienna, Virginia. The case involves three consolidated matters related to six parcels within the WHHD, with Michael Covel owning two parcels, and Jerome and Johanna Covel, Matthew and Susan Stich, and PMY Associates owning the others.
In Case No. CH-2003-184618, Michael Covel applied for a COA to build a fence but submitted an incomplete application, lacking necessary details and documentation. The Windover Heights Board of Review rejected his application, stating that more information was required but indicated no objection to the fence itself. Covel subsequently appealed to the town council and the circuit court, challenging the constitutionality and validity of the WHHD Ordinance. The circuit court ruled that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague.
Case No. CH-2003-186629 involves Covel's prior request to withdraw his Pleasant Street parcel from the WHHD, which was denied by the town council. Along with other landowners, Covel sought a declaratory judgment on the ordinances' validity, echoing his previous claims.
In Case No. CL-2006-7105, PMY Associates also sought to remove its parcel from the WHHD, but this request was denied, leading to an appeal to the circuit court.
Overall, the appeals highlight issues of procedural compliance regarding COA applications and challenges to the ordinances governing the historic district.
The appeal involved several cases with similar grounds, yet PMY did not challenge the validity of the ordinances. In January 2008, the circuit court consolidated the cases, incorporating a prior ruling that the WHHD Ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague. Following a three-day bench trial in October 2008, the court dismissed all appeals and denied the Landowners' request for declaratory relief, leading to the current appeal.
The review of the governing body's decision regarding historic districts is limited to whether it is arbitrary, constitutes an abuse of discretion, or is contrary to law, with the governing body's decision presumed correct. The burden lies on the challenging party to prove the decision is unreasonable or lacks a reasonable relation to public welfare. The evidence must show that the issue is "fairly debatable" to maintain the ordinance's validity. In this case, neither the Landowners nor PMY provided evidence to rebut the presumption of validity, claiming instead that the Town's denial of Michael's COA application and their removal requests were unreasonable due to the alleged invalidity of the underlying ordinances. However, the court stated that challenges to the ordinance's validity cannot be considered in this appeal and must be pursued through separate actions against the governing body.
The court found no error in the circuit court's judgment regarding the denial of the COA and the parcel removal requests. Additionally, the Landowners argued that the Historic Districts Ordinance was invalid for exceeding the authority granted by the General Assembly since it referred only to an "area" rather than specific buildings or structures. The enactment's legality is reviewed de novo.
The authorizing statute, former Code § 15.1-503.2, permits localities to enact historic district ordinances associated with landmarks recognized by the Virginia Historic Landmarks Commission, as well as other buildings or structures of historic, architectural, or cultural significance. The courts maintain that the plain meaning of statutory language is to be applied unless it is ambiguous or leads to absurd results, as established in Boynton v. Kilgore. Ambiguity arises when statutory text can be interpreted in multiple ways or lacks clarity. The Landowners do not contest the original 1975 enactment of the Historic Districts Ordinance but challenge its form as of April 1979. At that time, the statute explicitly allowed for the adoption of ordinances that could include historic landmarks, significant buildings, and historic areas, permitting the creation of a historic district even without existing buildings. The statute's conjunctive structure allows the governing body to define districts based on various criteria, but the relevant interpretation for this case emphasizes a disjunctive reading of the language, enabling broader authority in establishing historic districts.
The governing body is empowered to designate historic districts that may be adjacent to or encompass historic landmarks, buildings, and areas, as indicated in former Code §§ 15.1-503.2(a) and 15.1-430(b). These provisions suggest that the General Assembly intended for localities to establish historic districts even in the absence of specific landmarks or structures. Consequently, the argument from the Landowners claiming the Historic Districts Ordinance is invalid due to the lack of identified landmarks fails.
The Landowners also contend that the WHHD Ordinance's enactment did not comply with VTC § 18-261, which mandates a detailed report from the planning commission prior to creating a historic district. The Town argues this section does not apply, but it is found applicable as VTC § 18-261 governs amendments to the Historic Districts Ordinance, including new district establishments. Given that the WHHD Ordinance was enacted as an amendment, VTC § 18-261's requirements are relevant.
Additionally, the Town asserts that Code § 15.2-1427(C) remedies any non-constitutional enactment issues. However, the Landowners argue that specific requirements of VTC § 18-261 take precedence. Code § 15.2-1427(C) states that ordinances adopted before its current version in 2000 are considered valid unless unconstitutional, thus preventing the Landowners from challenging the WHHD Ordinance's enactment despite any procedural discrepancies.
The Landowners' reference to Code § 15.2-2315 and the case Gas Mart Corp. v. Board of Supervisors does not support their position, as Code § 15.2-2315 does not limit the applicability of Code § 15.2-1427(C). It governs the hierarchy of regulatory standards but does not alter the validation of existing ordinances under Code § 15.2-1427(C). The Landowners' interpretation of "other higher standards" as including VTC § 18-261's requirements lacks contextual support.
General words in legal text are interpreted as limited by specific words, applying only to objects similar to those specified. In this context, terms related to 'higher standards' pertain solely to sizes, heights, or percentages, excluding prerequisites for enacting ordinances like report completion, rendering Code § 15.2-2315 inapplicable. The case distinguishes itself from Gas Mart, where general and specific requirements for enacting ordinances were compared. Here, the focus is on Code § 15.2-1427(C), which addresses procedural non-compliance in ordinance enactment, and VTC § 18-261, detailing procedural requirements. When a statute and an ordinance conflict, the statute prevails, as established in previous rulings. Consequently, the circuit court's judgment affirming the ordinances' validity is upheld.
Regarding the vagueness challenge to the WHHD Ordinance, the Landowners' argument is limited due to the procedural posture of their appeal. The circuit court dismissed Michael's facial challenge as unpreserved, which similarly applies to the Landowners. Michael claimed the ordinance was vague for lacking adequate standards for evaluating applications for certificates of appropriateness, a point the circuit court found unfounded. The criteria for such applications are detailed in VTC § 18-280.8, which the circuit court deemed not unconstitutionally vague. The Landowners also lacked standing for an as-applied challenge, as they did not seek certificates of appropriateness in the relevant case, and failed to contest this ruling. Thus, their as-applied challenge is waived. The only remaining issue is Michael’s as-applied challenge in Case No. CH-2003-184618.
The constitutionality of the WHHD Ordinance is reviewed de novo, with the presumption that duly enacted laws are constitutional. Any reasonable doubt regarding a law's validity must be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. The ordinance's vagueness challenge is evaluated against the Due Process Clause, which requires laws to be sufficiently clear to provide fair notice of their requirements and to prevent arbitrary enforcement.
The WHHD Ordinance mandates that a fence cannot be erected without a Certificate of Appropriateness (COA). Applicants must submit a house location survey or dimensional drawing showing existing structures and the proposed fence location. Michael failed to comply with these submission requirements. The Town also assesses construction materials and the fence's similarity to existing structures in the area. Since Michael did not provide the necessary information, the Town could not evaluate his application based on the established criteria and deemed it incomplete.
The court concluded that the requirements of the ordinance are clear and provide adequate notice of what is expected from applicants. Michael's refusal to supply the necessary information negated any claim of vagueness. Therefore, the circuit court's dismissal of Michael's challenge to the WHHD Ordinance was affirmed.
