Shatwell v. State

Citations: 2013 Ark. App. 568; 430 S.W.3d 142; 2013 WL 5556923; 2013 Ark. App. LEXIS 591Docket: CR-13-144

Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas; October 9, 2013; Arkansas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Savanna Dickinson died in November 2011 from a gunshot wound to the head, with a .45-caliber pistol found near her body. Initial reports indicated suicide, but her boyfriend Jon Shatwell became a suspect after inconsistencies in his statements emerged. Following a confrontation with police regarding forensic evidence, Shatwell admitted to accidentally shooting Savanna. He was charged with first-degree murder, tampering with evidence, and using a firearm in commission of a felony. At trial, he was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 56 years in prison. Shatwell appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in several respects: denying a mistrial after testimony about his past abuse of a former girlfriend, allowing evidence of prior bad acts, and not granting directed verdicts for insufficient evidence on the murder and tampering charges.

Shatwell was convicted of first-degree murder, which under Arkansas law requires proof that he intentionally caused Savanna's death. The review of the sufficiency of the evidence focuses on whether substantial evidence supports the verdict, which can include both direct and circumstantial evidence. For circumstantial evidence to be deemed substantial, it must exclude any reasonable alternative hypotheses consistent with innocence. The jury is responsible for assessing the evidence and the credibility of witnesses.

Shatwell contended that the State did not prove he intended to kill Savanna. However, evidence showed he was alone with her after an argument, held a loaded gun with his finger on the trigger, and that the gun fired at close range. The forensic expert indicated the shooting was atypical for a suicide, and blood patterns contradicted Shatwell’s account. His changing stories were considered by the jury as indicative of his mental state. Additionally, testimony from a former girlfriend about Shatwell threatening her with a gun added to the evidence against him.

The jury found substantial evidence supporting the first-degree murder charge, leading to the affirmation of his conviction. The excerpt also cites the definition of tampering with evidence under Arkansas law, which involves altering, destroying, or concealing evidence to impair its reliability in legal proceedings.

Shatwell contends the State failed to demonstrate that he altered or removed items from the crime scene with the intent to hinder the investigation. The court applied the same review standards from Shatwell's murder conviction, affirming the jury’s decision based on substantial evidence. Although there was no proof that Shatwell completely removed the gun or concealed it, the evidence indicated he manipulated the positioning of both Savanna’s body and the murder weapon to mislead the investigation into her death. Shatwell claimed Savanna accidentally shot herself and that he moved her body to the couch, but Detective Schaeffer testified that her body had been repositioned by 5 to 12 inches, suggesting Shatwell staged the scene to appear as a suicide. Blood patterns further supported that Savanna was found in a different position than where she was shot.

Regarding prior bad-acts evidence, Shatwell challenged the admission of testimony from Melissa Weaver, a former girlfriend who described a history of threats and abusive behavior involving firearms. Weaver detailed multiple incidents where Shatwell threatened her with a gun, including one where he forced her to kneel and placed a gun to her head, and another where he fired a gun during an argument. She also recounted an incident shortly before Savanna's death where Shatwell threatened her, indicating that he believed investigators would perceive Savanna's death as a suicide. The court found that the jury did not receive inadmissible or prejudicial evidence, thus upholding the circuit court's decision to admit Weaver's testimony.

Shatwell contended in the circuit court that Weaver's testimony was inadmissible character evidence intended to portray him negatively, asserting that he should be tried based on the case's merits rather than past conduct. He argued that Weaver's accounts and the physical evidence presented were dissimilar and irrelevant. Conversely, the State maintained that Weaver's previous encounters with Shatwell were pertinent to demonstrate that Savanna's death was not accidental and to establish Shatwell's criminal intent. The court partially granted and denied Shatwell’s motion to exclude Weaver's testimony, allowing her to discuss threats made with a gun but prohibiting details of other physical abuse. Posttrial written orders denying Shatwell's motion in limine were issued but not considered for appeal since they were filed after the jury's verdict. During the trial, Shatwell objected again to Weaver’s testimony under Ark. R. Evid. 404 (b) and 403, but the court allowed it. Weaver confirmed a past romantic relationship with Shatwell, indicating it turned abusive towards the end. Despite Shatwell's requests for a mistrial based on Weaver mentioning physical abuse, the court determined that she had only referred to verbal abuse and allowed her testimony. Shatwell argues the court erred in denying his mistrial motion, claiming Weaver's testimony was prejudicial and warrants a new trial, while the State counters that Shatwell failed to preserve his arguments for appeal or that the testimony's probative value outweighed any potential prejudice.

The admissibility of Weaver’s testimony is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard, with the circuit court having broad discretion in granting or denying mistrial motions. Character evidence is generally inadmissible if its sole purpose is to imply a defendant's propensity to commit the charged crime, as per Ark. R. Evid. 404(b). However, prior bad conduct may be admissible if it establishes specific points relevant to the current charges, such as motive or intent. Weaver's testimony, which included a remark from Shatwell suggesting the perception of suicide and a description of the firearm used in the murder, was deemed relevant to Shatwell’s charges of murder, tampering, and firearm possession. The temporal proximity of her account to Savanna’s death supports its admissibility. Weaver's testimony also provided insight into Shatwell's mental state, indicating potential intent rather than an accidental shooting, which is critical for the prosecution's case. 

The circuit court's ruling on the admissibility of prior acts is supported by precedents, distinguishing this case from Green v. State, where the testimony was deemed irrelevant to the murder charge. Unlike Green, Weaver's testimony was materially relevant to Shatwell’s mental state and the nature of the shooting. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial after Weaver mentioned "physical abuse," as Shatwell did not adequately preserve the mistrial motion or request jury instructions regarding this term.

Shatwell preserved his argument regarding Weaver's detrimental testimony, asserting that Weaver exceeded permissible bounds. According to case law, a defendant must obtain a circuit court ruling on a mistrial motion if a prior favorable ruling is violated. The circuit court incorrectly noted that Weaver referenced "verbal abuse" instead of "physical abuse." However, no reversible error was found in the treatment of Weaver's testimony; she did not detail any acts of violence unrelated to the gun. After mentioning "physical abuse," Shatwell's attorney promptly objected, and Weaver did not mention any inadmissible past abuse post-bench conference. Shatwell failed to prove that the alleged error severely prejudiced the trial's fairness. As a result, Shatwell’s convictions are affirmed, with agreement from Justices Wynne and Brown. Rebekah J. Kennedy represented the appellant, while the appellee was represented by Eileen W. Harrison for the Attorney General's office.