Aaron Jackson was charged with the Class 4 felony of driving on a revoked license under Illinois Vehicle Code section 6-303 due to an incident on July 9, 2010. Jackson moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him. The circuit court agreed, ruling that the statutory scheme violated his due process rights and dismissed the charge. The State, including the Illinois Secretary of State, appealed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of Illinois vacated the circuit court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, stating that the issue could be resolved on nonconstitutional grounds regarding the proof of the offense's elements. The court noted that Jackson had a driving record created by the Secretary of State despite never applying for a license, stemming from a DUI charge when he was 15 years old, which had led to a suspension of his driving privileges. The court highlighted that the statute required suspension for DUI arrests and that the suspension remains until reinstatement fees are paid.
On April 19, 1998, the defendant was charged with and later convicted of driving with a suspended license on April 6, 1999. Concurrently, on March 25, 1999, he was sentenced to court supervision for a DUI offense from November 6, 1997, which lasted until March 24, 2000. His court supervision was revoked on November 29, 2000, leading to a judgment for the DUI charge.
On February 24, 2006, the defendant obtained an Illinois driver’s license using the name Aaron Jackson and a valid social security number, falsely answering that his license was not suspended. He renewed this license on January 16, 2008, without issues from the Secretary of State. In 2009, he received citations for speeding and driving an uninsured vehicle, which he pleaded guilty to, and the Secretary of State was notified of these violations.
On July 9, 2010, he was cited again for driving with a suspended license, and on July 20, the Secretary of State informed him of the suspension. Subsequently, on March 31, 2011, the State’s Attorney filed a felony charge against him for that offense.
The circuit court's order from February 16, 2012, acknowledged the parties' arguments and established that the primary elements of the driving while license suspended offense are whether the defendant was driving and if his license was suspended at that time. The Attorney General contended that the defendant committed fraud by applying for a second license under a different name, while the defendant argued that denying him the ability to present evidence would violate his due process rights. The court noted that the Secretary of State may have failed in its duty by issuing the license without confirming the suspension status. While acknowledging the potential for fraudulent intent, the court ruled that the defendant should be allowed to present evidence of his lack of intent. Ultimately, the court found the statutory scheme (625 ILCS 5/6-303 (a) and (d)) unconstitutional as applied to the defendant in this case.
The court found the statutory provisions of 625 ILCS 5/6-303 (a) and (d) unconstitutional based on due process clauses from both the Illinois and United States Constitutions. It determined that these provisions could not be construed in a way that would allow for their validity as applied to the defendant. The court's ruling on unconstitutionality was deemed essential for its decision, with no alternative grounds available. Notice as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 19 was properly served on the Illinois Secretary of State and Attorney General, who were given adequate opportunity to defend the statute. Consequently, the charge against the defendant was dismissed, and he was discharged.
In the statute, section 6-303 outlines penalties for driving with a suspended or revoked license, classifying it as a Class A misdemeanor for a first offense and a Class 4 felony for a second violation under certain conditions. The State appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in its declaration of unconstitutionality, suggesting the issue could have been resolved on nonconstitutional grounds. The State acknowledged that the defendant's license was suspended but contended that this did not preclude the defendant from using evidence of a subsequently obtained driver’s license at trial. The primary dispute focused on whether the defendant could introduce this evidence to challenge the government's proof of the statutory requirements. The circuit court's conclusion that the statute was unconstitutional stemmed from the perceived inequity of not allowing such evidence.
Defendant's case focuses on whether he can present a defense to the jury, asserting he believed he had a valid driver's license. Although there are broader concerns regarding the 'absolute liability' nature of the offense without notice to a driver, this case does not address those issues. The parties agree that the defendant should be allowed to challenge the State's burden of proof regarding the second element of the offense. The court clarifies that the issue at hand revolves around the proof of the offense's elements, rather than the constitutionality of the relevant statute, contrary to the circuit court's findings.
The court emphasizes that constitutional issues will be addressed only as a last resort, prioritizing nonconstitutional grounds. Consequently, the circuit court erred in its constitutional ruling, leading to the vacating of its order and remand for further proceedings. The review of the nonconstitutional issue is conducted de novo, as it presents a purely legal question.
To prove the offense of driving with a suspended or revoked license, two elements must be established: 1) the act of driving a motor vehicle, and 2) the revocation of the driver's license. Only the second element is contested in this case. The defendant is entitled to present evidence at trial showing he possessed a valid license, thereby contesting the State's claims. Precedents cited indicate that defendants in similar cases successfully presented evidence of valid licenses, but in one case, the court noted that the defendant's license had been revoked and could only be restored by complying with statutory provisions.
A defendant cannot use a license obtained through concealment of prior revocation as a defense against charges of driving with a revoked license. If the State demonstrates that the defendant misled authorities regarding the status of their license, the validity of the license can be challenged. A valid license can only be restored in compliance with relevant legal provisions, specifically section 6-208 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, which prohibits renewal or restoration of a revoked license unless certain conditions are met, including the payment of a reinstatement fee and a review by the Secretary of State to ensure public safety. If a defendant claims ignorance of their license status or provides false information during the application process, that constitutes misleading behavior, which undermines their defense. The State may present evidence that any erroneous statements led to the improper issuance of a license, thereby reinforcing the charges against the defendant.
A defendant’s compliance with the applicable Code provisions for restoring a suspended license, without evidence of fraud, exempts him from the Turner rule regarding unintentional errors in applications. The court referenced the Papproth case, where the defendant's incorrect disclosure about the reasons for his license revocation did not indicate an intention to deceive, as he did not hide his identity or prior revocation details. The issuance of a temporary license by the examiner without proper investigation further supported the conclusion that oversight should not result in criminal liability.
In trials for violations of section 6-303, the court allows for a factual determination of whether a defendant misled authorities through intentional concealment or erroneous representation. However, there are no affirmative defenses available for violations of this section if the defendant acknowledges the suspension or revocation of their license. The court concluded that the prior ruling declaring sections 6-303 (a) and (d) unconstitutional was unwarranted as it was not necessary for resolving the case. Consequently, the circuit court's dismissal of the charges against the defendant was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
