Lamar Wilmington was convicted of first-degree murder and concealment of a homicidal death, receiving consecutive sentences of 50 and 5 years. He appealed on two grounds: 1) the circuit court failed to confirm his consent to a jury instruction on second-degree murder, and 2) the court did not comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) regarding voir dire. The appellate court initially found that while the court's questioning did not fully comply with Rule 431(b), this did not merit automatic reversal under the plain error doctrine, as the evidence was not closely balanced and there was no indication of a biased jury. The court also concluded that the failure to inquire about the defendant's consent regarding the second-degree murder instruction constituted error, but it did not rise to plain error. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment, although without fully endorsing its reasoning. Prior to trial, Wilmington's motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence, including his confession, was denied by the circuit court.
On March 4, 2004, Guan McWilliams was found dead in a garbage can in Chicago, having been shot twice in the head. A week later, the defendant approached police, claiming he overheard a man named “Dollar” confess to killing a "gay" man and disposing of the body. Following an investigation, Dollar was cleared as a suspect. On June 14, 2004, the defendant returned to the police station, reporting a bullet grazed his head. After being informed of Dollar's clearance, he admitted to Detective Hamilton that he lied about Dollar's involvement.
On June 15, detectives interviewed the defendant again and sought out two witnesses, Ram and Stennis, but were unsuccessful. They then searched the defendant's home, where he claimed the condition of the crime scene had changed since the murder. The defendant remained in police custody for two days while further investigations were conducted. On June 17, he provided a handwritten statement to Assistant State’s Attorney George Canellis, detailing his past sexual encounters with McWilliams, which he indicated were consensual, and describing an argument over money that escalated into violence. He claimed McWilliams threatened to report him for rape and revealed he had AIDS. During a struggle over a gun that McWilliams allegedly produced, the defendant asserted he fired four shots, fatally striking McWilliams, who was described as naked and unarmed at the time.
Defendant admitted to dressing McWilliams post-murder, concealing the gun, and disposing of McWilliams' body in a nearby garbage can with assistance from Ramsey, a gang member. He claimed the murder occurred during a failed drug deal and initially implicated others out of fear. After reporting a bullet grazed his head to the police, he also confessed to McWilliams’ murder, stating he wished to clear his conscience despite refusing to sign his statement. Evidence stipulations noted no incriminating evidence was found at his residence or suitable fingerprints on the garbage can, which belonged to a vacant building sharing an alley with his home.
Medical examiner Dr. Nancy Jones testified on the nature of McWilliams' injuries, indicating no close-range gunfire and suggesting he had been dragged post-mortem, with blunt trauma injuries consistent with being dropped. McWilliams had a blood-alcohol level twice the legal limit. Clinical neuropsychologist Dr. Robert Hanlon testified for the defendant, indicating his mild mental retardation (IQ of 67) and low reading ability, while also noting a history of seizures that could impact his capability to commit the crime, although he conceded that the State's narrative was plausible and that the seizure history was mostly self-reported.
Alesia Hines, a paramedic, testified that the defendant claimed his last seizure occurred in 1995, contrasting with his statements to Dr. Dawna Gutzmann, a psychiatrist, who reported that the defendant said he had a seizure in 2002 and experienced frequent seizures leading up to his arrest. Gutzmann suggested evidence of malingering and opined that the defendant had no mental or physical disorder affecting his ability to commit the alleged offense. During trial proceedings on July 27, 2007, the trial judge confirmed with the prosecutor that a second-degree murder instruction had been requested by the defense and subsequently decided to provide this instruction based on the evidence. However, it was unclear if the defendant fully understood these instructions, as there was no indication they were explained to him. In closing arguments, defense counsel challenged the reliability of the defendant’s police statements and highlighted the lack of physical evidence linking him to the murder. Counsel indicated that if the jury found the defendant guilty of any offense, it should be second-degree murder. The jury was instructed that for a first-degree murder conviction, the State must prove the defendant was not justified in using force. The instructions emphasized that the jury could only consider second-degree murder after determining that the State proved all elements of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt, allowing for a verdict of second-degree murder if the defendant acted under an unreasonable belief regarding the justification of deadly force.
During jury deliberations, the jury submitted three notes concerning exhibits and evidentiary issues, with the final note sent approximately 2 hours and 40 minutes after deliberations began. The jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder and concealment of a homicidal death, resulting in sentences of 50 years and 5 years, respectively. In the subsequent appeal, the defendant argued for reversal and a new trial based on two main points: (1) the trial judge did not adequately question prospective jurors about their understanding of the defendant's right not to testify and the principles outlined in Supreme Court Rule 431(b), and (2) the trial court provided an instruction on second-degree murder without confirming the defendant's agreement or understanding of its implications.
The appellate court's review focused on whether the trial court violated Rule 431(b) and the consequences of any noncompliance. Rule 431(b) mandates that jurors are to be individually asked if they understand and accept four key principles regarding the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, the defendant's right not to testify, and that the defendant's failure to testify cannot be used against them, provided there is no objection from the defendant regarding such inquiry. Prior to individual voir dire, the trial judge addressed these principles to the entire jury panel and reiterated them during the admonitions.
The excerpt outlines critical aspects of a trial's jury selection process, specifically addressing the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof. The circuit court confirmed that the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant is not obligated to present evidence. During jury questioning, the court asked jurors if they disagreed with these principles, to which none raised their hands. However, the defendant contends the trial judge violated Rule 431(b) by not inquiring whether jurors understood and accepted that they could not hold the defendant's decision not to testify against him. The defendant did not object during voir dire or raise the issue in a posttrial motion, which subjects the alleged error to plain-error analysis. This doctrine permits consideration of unchallenged errors on appeal if they significantly impacted the trial's fairness or integrity. The court noted that Rule 431(b) requires the trial court to ask jurors if they understand and accept the specified principles. The court acknowledged that while asking for disagreement could imply acceptance, failing to confirm jurors’ understanding constitutes an error. Notably, there was no inquiry regarding the principle related to the defendant's right not to testify, marking a clear procedural error.
The analysis evaluates whether an error in the trial necessitates a reversal and remand for a new trial under plain-error review. The defendant's argument primarily references a prior case, *Thompson*, asserting that the violation of Rule 431(b) compromised the impartiality of the jury, thus affecting the trial's fairness. However, similar to *Thompson*, the prospective jurors in this case did not receive all required questioning, but the defendant has not proven that this led to a biased jury, failing to meet the second prong of plain-error review.
The defendant shifts focus to the first prong of plain error, claiming that the evidence was closely balanced and that the error could have affected the trial's outcome. However, both the appellate court and the current evaluation conclude that the evidence was not closely balanced, undermining this argument.
Key points include:
1. Jury deliberations did not indicate an impasse or perception of a close case; the deliberation length remains undisclosed, but there is no evidence of extraordinary circumstances.
2. Testimony from expert witnesses did not render the case close; the State's expert testified that the defendant had no mental or physical disorder affecting his ability to commit the crime, while the defendant's expert acknowledged the possibility of guilt despite claiming the defendant's conditions made it difficult to commit the crime.
3. There was substantial evidence against the defendant, including an inculpatory statement and physical evidence supporting that statement. The defendant's unsolicited involvement in the murder investigation, including false claims and subsequent admissions, further implicated him.
Overall, the conclusion is that the errors did not warrant a new trial, as the evidence was not closely balanced and the procedural violations did not result in a biased jury.
Defendant provided a statement admitting to the shooting and killing of McWilliams, detailing the disposal of the body. Forensic evidence corroborated his account, including the manner of the gunshot wounds, which aligned with the medical examiner's findings of two downward bullet paths to the top of McWilliams’ head. Scratches and bruises on the body indicated it had been dragged, which matched defendant's claim of dragging it outside and leaving it on the sidewalk. He also stated that he placed the body in a neighbor's garbage can, which was discovered about a block from his residence.
The absence of expected forensic evidence, such as semen, does not exonerate the defendant, as he did not clarify whether any sexual activity occurred. Despite no physical evidence found in his bedroom, the defendant claimed he cleaned the area with bleach and had drywall installed afterward. His later reluctance to sign the statement might stem from a desire to distance himself from admissions of engaging in “gay sex.” However, there was no indication that his statement was false or coerced; he acknowledged to the assistant state’s attorney that he had been treated well and was providing the statement voluntarily.
The only significant inconsistency in his statement was regarding the clothing on McWilliams’ body, which was found in additional garments not mentioned by the defendant. This discrepancy was not deemed sufficient to challenge the balance of evidence against him for the purposes of plain error analysis, which the defendant failed to address adequately.
Additionally, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in granting a second-degree murder instruction without confirming his agreement and understanding of its implications. The court noted, however, that the State could request such an instruction, and the trial judge could direct its preparation independently of the defendant’s objections, referencing relevant case law.
The court reaffirms legal principles from prior cases but finds the record insufficient to support the State's claim that the trial court independently provided a second-degree murder instruction without a defense request. The applicability of the decisions in *Medina* and *People v. Brocksmith* is under review. The defendant contends that requests for second-degree murder instructions should follow the same legal standards as lesser-included offense instructions, a position the court rejects.
In *People v. Ramey*, the court outlined specific decisions a defendant retains after consulting with their attorney, including plea entry and whether to appeal. *Brocksmith* added the right to decide on submitting a lesser-included offense instruction, equating that decision to the plea choice. The rationale from *Brocksmith* was reiterated in *Medina*, where the court emphasized that a defendant risks additional criminal liability by requesting a lesser-included offense instruction, thus necessitating a court inquiry to ensure the defendant is aware of the implications.
The court concluded that second-degree murder is not a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder but rather a lesser-mitigated offense. Consequently, a defendant does not expose themselves to avoidable liability by requesting a second-degree murder instruction, as a conviction for second-degree murder requires the State to first prove all elements of first-degree murder. Therefore, the principles established in *Brocksmith* and *Medina* are not applicable in this case.
Jurors are presumed to follow the law as instructed, which in this case allowed them to either find the defendant not guilty of first-degree murder or guilty. If the latter were determined, they could then consider if the defendant, who is mildly retarded, acted under an unreasonable belief justifying the use of deadly force, potentially leading to a second-degree murder verdict. The defense strategy involved challenging the reliability of the defendant’s confession and presenting expert testimony indicating he could not have committed the crime due to a seizure disorder and mental retardation. While defense counsel had initially sought to suppress the confession, they later requested a second-degree murder instruction as a fallback option, enabling the jury to consider this lesser charge if they believed the defendant had shot the victim. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's decision, stating it did not err in not inquiring about the defendant's consent to the second-degree murder instruction. A dissenting opinion emphasized the importance of specific jury selection inquiries, arguing that their absence constituted plain error, warranting a reversal of convictions and a new trial.
