State of Tennessee v. Michael A. Drake

Citation: Not availableDocket: M2003-02520-CCA-R3-CD

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; November 16, 2004; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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Michael A. Drake was indicted on two counts of vehicular homicide and two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide, following a jury's findings of guilt in both categories. The jury determined Drake was guilty of vehicular homicide by intoxication and later found him guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide, citing one prior DUI conviction and a blood alcohol level of .20 at the time of the offense. On appeal, Drake contended that the indictment was insufficient, arguing that it misled him into believing the State pursued aggravated vehicular homicide charges solely based on two prior DUI offenses, violating his rights to adequate notice under the Sixth Amendment and Article 1, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. The court found the indictment misleading, leading to the dismissal of the aggravated vehicular homicide convictions. Consequently, the court modified the convictions to vehicular homicide under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-13-213 and remanded the case for resentencing.

Count One of the indictment charged the appellant with unlawfully and recklessly killing Thomas Wilkerson through automobile operation while intoxicated, violating T.C.A. 39-13-213. Count Two charged aggravated vehicular homicide, citing the appellant's prior DUI convictions from January 25, 1994, and January 3, 1996, thus alleging he unlawfully and recklessly killed Wilkerson, violating T.C.A. 39-13-213 and 39-13-218. Count Three similarly charged the appellant with the reckless killing of Billy J. Lane while intoxicated. Count Four again charged aggravated vehicular homicide based on the appellant's prior DUI convictions related to the reckless killing of Lane.

During the jury trial, the court indicated it would instruct the jury on aggravated vehicular homicide based on T.C.A. 39-13-218, which requires prior DUI convictions or certain blood alcohol levels. The appellant objected to including the provision related to blood alcohol levels, arguing the indictment only cited his two prior DUI convictions. The court overruled this objection. After denying a motion for acquittal, the jury convicted the appellant of two counts of vehicular homicide. In the second trial phase, the State presented evidence of the appellant's prior DUI convictions and blood alcohol level, aiming to satisfy both T.C.A. 39-13-218(a)(1) and (3). The appellant contested the introduction of blood alcohol evidence, asserting that a different defense strategy would have been employed had the State indicated its intent to proceed under both provisions.

Testimony during the trial revealed that one of the appellant’s DUI convictions was dated 12/12/1994 but had been tried on 1/25/1994, suggesting the appellant was convicted prior to the commission of the current offense. The appellant’s counsel contested the validity of this conviction due to the inconsistency. Ultimately, the jury found the appellant guilty of two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide, linked to one prior DUI offense and a blood alcohol level of .20 or more during the current incident. The jury's verdict implied that one prior DUI conviction was deemed invalid. At sentencing, the appellant received a concurrent twenty-five-year sentence for each count.

On appeal, the appellant raised three issues regarding the sufficiency of the indictment notice: (1) the trial court improperly denied the motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) the jury was incorrectly instructed on Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-218; and (3) the conviction was for an offense not specified in the indictment. The appellant claimed these errors violated his constitutional right to due process by failing to provide adequate notice. The State countered that the indictment was sufficient for the appellant to prepare a defense.

The Sixth Amendment and Tennessee Constitution guarantee the accused the right to be informed of the charges. Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-13-202 outlines the requirements for indictments, emphasizing clarity and conciseness to inform the accused of the charges. The court in State v. Hammonds indicated a shift towards relaxed pleading standards, stating that an indictment is sufficient if it informs the accused of the charges, provides an adequate basis for judgment, and protects against double jeopardy. Indictments are not required to meet strict formalities, reflecting a modern approach to ensuring that notice to the accused is prioritized over strict adherence to form.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has established that an indictment referencing the statute defining an offense can meet constitutional and statutory standards, as evidenced by various cases. For example, in State v. Sledge, the Court found an indictment sufficient because it specifically referenced the statute, thereby notifying the defendant of the charges despite lacking details about the required mental state. Similarly, other cases upheld indictments that cited pertinent statutes without needing to specify the theory or means of proving each element of the offense. 

However, the indictment in question is distinct. While it adequately informed the appellant of the aggravated vehicular homicide charge based on prior DUI convictions, it failed to provide sufficient notice regarding the specific theory of aggravation the State intended to rely on, which was critical for the appellant to prepare an adequate defense. The indictment only indicated the use of two prior DUI convictions without mentioning the appellant’s blood alcohol level. Consequently, the jury, given the option to convict based on either the prior convictions or a blood alcohol level of .20 or more, found the appellant not guilty when only the two prior DUI offenses were presented as evidence. Although the indictment contained general facts about the offense, it did not specify the appellant's blood alcohol level at the time of the incident.

The indictment in this case misled the appellant regarding the method the State would use to prove aggravated vehicular homicide, which differs from established case law. The situation parallels State v. Goodson, where the defendant was convicted on a charge that did not match the evidence presented at trial. In Goodson, the court held that an indictment specifying one means of violating a statute could not support a conviction based on a different means, as this would violate the defendant’s due process rights by failing to provide adequate notice of the charges. In the current case, the State initially indicted the appellant with a specific charge but later introduced additional theories during the trial, preventing the appellant from adequately preparing his defense. The appellant believed he was aware of the charges against him until the closing arguments revealed the State’s intention to prove aggravated vehicular homicide under multiple provisions, which constituted inadequate notice. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, the aggravated vehicular homicide conviction is dismissed, and the conviction is modified to vehicular homicide, leading to a remand for resentencing.