Raymond D. Simpson pled guilty to criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony, and received a Range I sentence of two years, with seven months in confinement and the remainder on probation. He appealed the trial court's denial of full probation and/or community corrections. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment but modified the sentence to one year, with 105 days in confinement and the rest on probation.
The incident occurred on August 8, 2002, when Simpson, driving with his wife and two children, crashed his truck. His daughter was unrestrained on the floor, while his eleven-month-old son, Jonathan Ferrell, was held by his wife. Simpson lost control while looking at his daughter, leading to the truck rolling over. Despite his attempts to save his son, who suffered fatal head trauma due to not being restrained, the child died. Testimony indicated that the accident's severity was mild and that Simpson was not speeding or under the influence of substances. A prior court order mandated the use of child restraint seats during transportation, which Simpson failed to follow.
The defendant's mother testified that she was unaware of any visitation plans for her son that week and had not intended to lend him her van, although it was equipped with child restraint devices and could have been available for use had he requested it. Donald Lewis, a member of a church support group who also lost a child, noted the defendant's evident remorse post-accident. Michelle Ogle, a neighbor, corroborated the defendant's sincere remorse. The defendant's wife highlighted his emotional distress since the loss of their son. The defendant recounted performing CPR on his son after the accident and checking on his family when the ambulance arrived. At the time of sentencing, he was employed at Trident Boats and had a certification in electrical engineering, described as a responsible employee. He sought judicial diversion, indicating that such a decision could enhance his job prospects. The defendant had recently welcomed a daughter with his current wife and pledged to use proper child restraints going forward. He had not seen his older daughter since the accident due to financial constraints regarding visitation payments. To support a probationary sentence, he expressed a commitment to comply with any release terms and to engage in community service focused on child safety education. The trial court sentenced him to two years, with the possibility of early release after serving one year, later modified to seven months and six days. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court wrongly denied full probation and community corrections. The appellate court is mandated to conduct a de novo review, presuming the trial court's determinations are correct unless improperly applied factors or failure to adhere to the 1989 Sentencing Act are demonstrated. The review will examine evidence from the trial and sentencing hearing, the presentence report, sentencing principles, the nature of the offense, mitigating and enhancing factors, the defendant's statements, and his potential for rehabilitation. Class C, D, or E felons are generally seen as favorable candidates for alternative sentencing unless otherwise evidenced. Probation consideration is required for sentences of eight years or less, barring specific statutory exceptions.
The trial court's evaluation of a defendant’s eligibility for alternative sentencing and suitability for full probation involves distinct inquiries with differing evidentiary burdens. When a defendant is presumed to qualify for alternative sentencing, the state must provide contrary evidence to overcome this presumption. In contrast, the defendant bears the burden of proving suitability for total probation. Factors influencing probation decisions include the nature of the offense, the defendant’s criminal history, social background, current condition, and the impact on both the defendant and public safety. Severe circumstances surrounding an offense can render probation inappropriate, as can a lack of honesty from the defendant. Courts are granted considerable discretion in these matters, and decisions should be based on individual case facts. The Community Corrections Act of 1985 aims to offer alternative punishments for nonviolent felony offenders, allowing for flexibility that benefits both the defendant and society. However, meeting the Act’s minimum requirements does not guarantee a community corrections sentence. Eligibility criteria include being at risk of incarceration, committing nonviolent felony offenses without weapon involvement, and lacking a violent behavior history. In this case, the trial court denied judicial diversion and, after a comprehensive review, found the defendant presumptively eligible for alternative sentencing but ultimately denied full probation due to serious concerns about public safety stemming from the defendant's failure to use child safety restraints, despite prior warnings.
The trial court ruled against total probation for the defendant due to repeated legal violations and failure to protect passengers, emphasizing that probation would not deter similar behavior. Although the defendant had no prior criminal history and the accident was not due to impairment or reckless driving, his disregard for child restraint laws, despite warnings, justified the denial of immediate probation. The court found that the serious nature of the crime often warrants such a denial and that a split confinement sentence was appropriate.
The defendant's request for community corrections was denied as he did not meet the minimum eligibility requirements, having pleaded guilty to criminally negligent homicide, which is statutorily disqualifying unless special needs are demonstrated. No evidence of special needs was presented.
The court noted a separate issue regarding the length of the sentence. Although the defendant did not contest the two-year sentence, the sentence violated the principles established in *Blakely v. Washington*, which requires that any enhancements to a sentence must be based on facts proven to a jury or admitted by the defendant. The trial court's enhancements were not based on prior convictions, as the defendant had none. Therefore, the sentence was modified to one year, with 105 days in confinement followed by probation. The trial court's judgment was affirmed as modified.
