Kenneth Lamar Hopkins pled guilty to a misdemeanor assault charge and received a suspended sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that his plea was not made knowingly or voluntarily, that he did not adequately waive his right to counsel, that due process was violated, and that he was promised by the district attorney general that his parole would not be affected by the plea. The post-conviction court denied his petition, leading to an appeal where Hopkins contended that the court improperly allowed the assistant district attorney's expected testimony as a stipulation, violated the missing witness rule, and infringed upon his due process rights.
During the post-conviction hearing, Hopkins testified that he was misled into believing his parole would remain intact if he accepted the plea and that he was advised against needing an attorney. He claimed he did not understand the implications of his plea and admitted to signing the waiver of counsel and plea agreement without reading them. The post-conviction court's judgment was affirmed, with the court concluding that there was no error in the proceedings.
The petitioner claimed that he would not have pled guilty if he had been informed by the district attorney general about a potential parole violation. Testimony from the victim, Quinita Stengal, confirmed she expressed to the district attorney that she did not wish to press charges due to the petitioner’s positive role as a father. She recalled being told by the assistant district attorney that accepting the plea would not result in parole revocation. The assistant district attorney, John Lee, was absent from the post-conviction hearing, and the State's counsel planned to introduce a stipulation regarding the expected testimony, indicating that it is not standard practice for Sessions Court Assistants to inform defendants about parole implications. The petitioner’s counsel did not object to this stipulation. The post-conviction court ultimately denied the petition, concluding the plea was made knowingly and voluntarily, regardless of any perceived poor decision-making by the petitioner. On appeal, the petitioner contends the stipulation constituted hearsay and violated the missing witness rule, alleging that the trial court infringed upon his due process rights. The appeal standard affirms the post-conviction court's factual findings unless evidence suggests otherwise, while legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. The petitioner contests the propriety of allowing the State’s counsel to present expected testimony as it was deemed hearsay.
The petitioner claims the trial court improperly considered "expected testimony," arguing this violated the missing witness rule and undermined his due process rights to a fair hearing. The State contends the post-conviction court correctly viewed this stipulation as valid evidence, asserting it did not contradict the court's decision. During the post-conviction hearing, the assistant district attorney presented a stipulation regarding Mr. Lee's expected testimony about the lack of promises made to defendants in state parole revocation hearings, which the petitioner did not object to at the time. Later, the petitioner argued this stipulation was misrepresented as Mr. Lee's when it was merely that of the State’s attorney.
In post-conviction proceedings, the burden of proof lies with the petitioner, who must demonstrate claims by clear and convincing evidence (Tenn. Code Ann. 40-30-110(f)). The petitioner did not produce Mr. Lee as a witness or object to the stipulation's inclusion, resulting in a waiver of the issue (Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a)). The post-conviction court implicitly found Mr. Lee's stipulated testimony credible, discounting the petitioner's and his girlfriend's accounts regarding the plea process. Credibility assessments and evidence weight are matters for the trial judge.
The petitioner argued a denial of a fair hearing, but the record shows he was given a meaningful opportunity to present his claims and evidence (Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204; House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705). Ultimately, the post-conviction court's judgment was affirmed, with the court finding no merit in the petitioner's claims.
