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Perez v. Brownell
Citations: 2 L. Ed. 2d 603; 78 S. Ct. 568; 356 U.S. 44; 1958 U.S. LEXIS 1283Docket: 44
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; March 31, 1958; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the Court's opinion regarding a petitioner who, born in Texas in 1909, was deemed to have lost his U.S. citizenship under the Nationality Act of 1940, as amended in 1944. This act specifies that a national can lose their nationality through actions such as voting in foreign elections or avoiding military service during wartime. The petitioner, who moved to Mexico with his parents around 1919 and lived there until 1943, sought to reverse the judgment against him, claiming Congress lacked the authority to enact such provisions. Upon returning to the U.S. in 1943, he identified himself as a Mexican citizen and later applied for U.S. entry as a native-born Mexican. He admitted to having voted in Mexico and to remaining outside the U.S. to evade military service. In 1947, he applied for U.S. citizenship but was excluded based on self-admitted expatriation. After several legal proceedings, a District Court found that he had indeed expatriated himself and denied his claim to citizenship. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this ruling, leading to the Supreme Court's review due to constitutional questions raised by the petitioner. The opinion notes that statutory expatriation was introduced to address international relations issues, particularly concerning the allegiance of naturalized citizens who returned to their countries of origin. In 1868, Congress affirmed the principle that all individuals have the inherent right to renounce their allegiance to any state, addressing the challenges faced by naturalized Americans regarding their former citizenship. This legislation, influenced by other nations' reluctance to recognize such rights, was interpreted by the Attorney General to apply to both native-born and naturalized U.S. citizens. Simultaneously, treaties were established to resolve citizenship disputes with other nations, enabling automatic divestment of U.S. citizenship for specific actions impacting foreign relations. Throughout the late 19th century, the State Department ruled on citizenship forfeiture based on actions taken abroad, particularly for naturalized citizens who returned to their countries of origin or accepted public office there. Native-born citizens generally retained their citizenship unless they acquired foreign citizenship. The Executive Branch recognized the State Department's lack of explicit legislative authority to nullify citizenship, prompting several Presidents to call for clearer legislative definitions of expatriation acts. In 1906, prompted by a Senate resolution and House Committee recommendations, the Secretary of State established the Citizenship Board to address issues of citizenship and expatriation. The board's report recommended that expatriation be presumed under certain conditions, including naturalization in a foreign state, engagement in foreign service involving an oath of allegiance, or residing abroad for five years without intent to return. It also suggested that American women who married foreigners should lose their citizenship during coverture. The board emphasized the need to prevent dual allegiance and highlighted the increasing challenges of protecting American citizens abroad. A bill was introduced in the House by Representative Perkins of New York based on board recommendations, declaring that a citizen would be considered to have expatriated if they became naturalized in a foreign country during peacetime or pledged allegiance to a foreign state. The bill presumed that a naturalized citizen residing abroad for five years had lost American citizenship, and stipulated that an American woman marrying a foreigner would adopt her husband's nationality. Perkins aimed to discourage evasion of responsibilities to the U.S. and prevent diplomatic issues with foreign nations. The bill, which faced minimal debate—primarily on the foreign domicile provision—passed the House and the Senate with a committee amendment regarding citizenship termination for naturalized citizens residing in their country of origin for two years, becoming the Expatriation Act of 1907. The constitutionality of Congress's power to revoke citizenship arose in the case of Mackenzie v. Hare, where Mrs. Mackenzie, a native-born citizen married to a British national, was denied voter registration on the grounds that her marriage had caused her to lose citizenship. The state courts denied her petition for a writ of mandamus, leading her to appeal. The Court, led by Justice McKenna, acknowledged the significance of merging husband and wife identities in international policy and upheld the legislation, noting that citizenship affects national relations and potential government complications. The Court recognized that the voluntary marriage of an American woman to a foreigner could yield similar national complications as traditional expatriation, concluding that the legislation was not an arbitrary governmental act. By the early 1930s, U.S. nationality law was fragmented and inconsistent, prompting President Franklin D. Roosevelt to establish a committee to review and propose a comprehensive statute to revise and codify these laws, with particular attention to existing discriminations. Research for the draft code was conducted over five years by specialists from three departments, culminating in a submission to the President by the Cabinet Committee. They emphasized the significance of the 'Loss of Nationality' provisions, clarifying that these were not punitive but aimed at individuals demonstrating allegiance to foreign countries over the U.S. The draft code, structured as an omnibus bill with five chapters, included a chapter detailing conditions under which a citizen would lose nationality, such as naturalization in a foreign country, taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign state, serving in foreign armed forces, employment by a foreign government, voting in foreign elections, and formal renunciation of American citizenship. The Committee asserted that voting in foreign elections indicated a political attachment incompatible with U.S. allegiance, referencing the Saar plebiscite where Americans could have faced expatriation had the provisions been in effect. Representative Dickstein had previously introduced a similar bill in 1935, which died in the House despite favorable reports. The Cabinet Committee’s draft was submitted to Congress in June 1938, leading to extensive hearings in early 1940, where concerns over the voting provision were discussed. The Assistant Legal Adviser of the State Department noted its particular relevance to dual nationals, although a proposal to limit its application to them was not accepted. A new bill, H. R. 9980, was introduced after hearings in June 1940, modifying the Executive Branch draft by eliminating the foreign passport provision and adding a five-year residency requirement for naturalized citizens in foreign countries as grounds for loss of nationality. The House debated the bill in September 1940, with Chairman Dickstein emphasizing its intent to end dual citizenship and relieve the U.S. of responsibilities towards citizens residing abroad who claim citizenship only when beneficial. Representative Rees highlighted the need for clarifying legislation to protect citizens abroad. The bill passed the House and was briefly debated in the Senate, where amendments were made to limit expatriation due to foreign military service to dual nationals, classify treason as an act of expatriation, and establish a judicial process for those administratively declared expatriated. The final version of the Nationality Act of 1940, which included these provisions, was passed on October 14. The loss of nationality provisions were a minor aspect of a larger omnibus nationality statute, leading to limited discussion on their constitutional basis. The bill was viewed as a codification rather than a substantial revision of longstanding laws, reflecting Congress's reliance on the Executive Branch, particularly the State Department, for guidance in matters affecting foreign relations. The inquiry into congressional power in this context begins with recognizing that, while the Constitution does not explicitly grant Congress power over foreign affairs, such authority is implied as necessary for the effective functioning of a federal government in international relations. The historical context suggests that Congress intended to regulate foreign affairs by designating actions like voting in foreign elections as acts of expatriation. Legislators, guided by trusted advisors, expressed concerns over actions by U.S. citizens participating in foreign political activities that could undermine American interests and create diplomatic issues. The Act of 1907, which includes provisions on loss of nationality in the 1940 Act, reflects these concerns. While Congress holds broad power to regulate foreign affairs, it is not unlimited; any exercise of this power must have a rational connection to its constitutional authority. The central issue for the Court is whether Congress can reasonably assert that its power over foreign relations encompasses the regulation of American citizens voting in foreign elections. Given today's global interactions, such participation can lead to significant diplomatic challenges, potentially misrepresenting U.S. interests and policies. Therefore, Congress is justified in believing that regulating this activity is essential to safeguard international relations. The term "political election" provides a clear framework for regulation, excluding non-political activities that would not affect U.S. relations. Although specific cases can be judicially reviewed, the classification used by Congress is rationally related to the diplomatic challenges faced. Ultimately, the question is whether Congress, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, can impose loss of nationality as a consequence for voting in foreign elections. The means of citizenship revocation must be reasonably linked to the legitimate goal of preventing diplomatic embarrassment, warranting Congress significant discretion in its regulatory methods. The loss of American citizenship is tied to actions that embarrass the U.S. government or could lead to international disputes, with Congress viewing such conduct as indicative of divided allegiance. Congress's authority to terminate citizenship is based on voluntary conduct, but it does not require intent to renounce citizenship, as established in prior cases (Mackenzie v. Hare and Mrs. Savorgnan's case), where individuals engaged in actions resulting in denationalization despite lacking intent to abandon their citizenship. It is incorrect to argue that a citizen's consent to lose citizenship can be inferred from their conduct. Congress's power includes regulating citizenship in relation to foreign elections, and the court affirms this authority without ruling on the constitutionality of a specific provision (401(j)) of the Nationality Act. Petitioner claims citizenship under the Nationality Act of 1940, allowing individuals to challenge citizenship denial in court, where the government must provide clear evidence of expatriation. The Fourteenth Amendment outlines primary methods of acquiring citizenship through birth or naturalization. In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, the court affirmed that a person of Chinese descent born in the U.S. is a citizen, exempt from the Chinese Exclusion Acts. It clarified that the Fourteenth Amendment does not restrict Congress's authority to withdraw citizenship. This principle was supported by Perkins v. Elg, which established that citizenship acquired at birth continues unless revoked by a treaty, congressional act, or voluntary actions aligned with legal standards. In the current case, the petitioner did not dispute the classification of the election he participated in as a 'political election,' which was identified as the election for the president of Mexico. The District Court in Savorgnan highlighted that the plaintiff, when signing applications for Italian citizenship and allegiance, lacked any intent to expatriate herself at that time.