Chris Edward Smith was convicted of selling less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, classified as a Class C felony, and sentenced to ten years as a Range III persistent offender. On appeal, Smith raised three issues: (1) insufficient evidence to support his conviction; (2) the trial court's error in allowing the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge against the only African-American juror; and (3) the trial court's mistake in informing the jury about an additional charge of possession of drug paraphernalia. Smith did not challenge his sentence. The court conducted a thorough review of the record and affirmed the trial court's judgment.
In the undercover operation, Captain Bill Matthews of the Athens Police Department coordinated with Agent Paul Allen from the Tenth Judicial Drug Task Force. Matthews surveilled the area and identified Smith as a suspect. Allen, equipped with recording devices, purchased drugs from Smith, who confirmed he was not a police officer and produced two rocks of cocaine from his sock. The transaction, recorded on video, resulted in Smith receiving $40, which matched the serial numbers of bills provided for the buy. Following the transaction, Matthews detained Smith, who was found in possession of the marked bills. Forensic analysis confirmed the substance was crack cocaine, weighing 0.2 grams.
Defendant contends that the evidence supports only a casual exchange rather than an unlawful sale of a controlled substance. When evaluating such claims, the evidence must be viewed favorably to the prosecution, allowing for all reasonable inferences. Once a jury finds a defendant guilty, the presumption of innocence is replaced with a presumption of guilt, which the defendant must overcome. The jury is assumed to resolve any conflicts in favor of the State, and issues of witness credibility and evidence valuation are within the jury's purview.
The offense of selling a controlled substance, specifically less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, constitutes a Class C felony unless deemed a casual exchange, which is a misdemeanor. Prior convictions elevate the severity to a Class E felony. The classification of a transaction as a casual exchange or an unlawful sale depends on the facts and circumstances surrounding it, including the amount of drugs involved. A casual exchange cannot be established if there was a prior plan or design for the transaction. In this case, the evidence indicates that Defendant engaged in a sale, as he handed a specific amount of cocaine to Agent Allen in exchange for money, which the jury ultimately found constituted an unlawful sale despite a provided instruction on the lesser included offense.
Additionally, under the Batson v. Kentucky standard, Defendant argues that excluding the only remaining African-American juror violated his equal protection rights. The trial court excused this juror alongside others for various reasons, including personal connections to the case or preconceived opinions, establishing that Defendant, as an African-American, is directly affected by the jury selection process.
The State employed a peremptory challenge to exclude Sheila Parks, an African-American prospective juror, citing a belief that she was related to the Defendant due to the shared surname "Scruggs," despite her non-response to inquiries about familial ties. The prosecutor also claimed that an intern observed Ms. Parks wink at the Defendant during jury selection. Defense counsel objected, asserting the challenge was racially motivated and lacking evidence of familial connection, with the Defendant denying any relation and claiming no wink occurred. The trial court ruled the challenge was not racially motivated, allowing the exclusion of Ms. Parks.
Referencing the Batson v. Kentucky decision, the excerpt explains that a defendant can contest race-based juror exclusions via a three-step process: (1) establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination, (2) requiring the prosecutor to present a race-neutral justification if the prima facie case is met, and (3) the trial court determining whether purposeful discrimination was proven. The trial court must provide specific reasons for its findings, and appellate review of these findings is limited to instances of clear error. Although the trial court did not explicitly find that a prima facie case was established in this instance, it would not have demanded a race-neutral explanation if it determined no such case existed.
The court assumed that the Defendant met the first prong of the Batson test, rendering the preliminary issue of a prima facie showing moot. Following the Supreme Court’s guidance, once a race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge is provided, the second step of the Batson inquiry focuses on the facial validity of that explanation. The prosecutor offered two reasons for challenging Ms. Parks: a presumed familial connection due to her maiden name and an observation by Ms. Berger that Ms. Parks winked at the Defendant during voir dire. A juror's familial relationship to the Defendant constitutes a legitimate, race-neutral basis for a challenge. Although the Defendant argued the explanations were implausible and suggested discrimination, the court found the prosecutor's justifications sufficiently race-neutral to withstand scrutiny. The determination of discriminatory intent hinges on the credibility of the prosecutor's explanations, with the demeanor of the attorney being critical. Ultimately, the trial court accepted the race-neutral reasons provided by the prosecutor for excluding Ms. Parks from the jury.
Defendant failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in accepting the State’s racially neutral rationale for excluding a prospective witness, thus he is not entitled to relief on this point. During voir dire, the trial court informed the jurors about the charges against the defendant, which included a count of possession of drug paraphernalia. Defense counsel objected, asserting that the indictment involved only the sale or delivery of cocaine and that the paraphernalia charge was irrelevant. After a bench conference, the trial court clarified to the jurors that they were addressing an alternative indictment for sale or delivery of cocaine.
The defendant did not raise this issue in his motion for a new trial, which typically waives the right to appeal on that matter according to Tennessee rules. However, he sought to argue it under the plain error doctrine, which requires establishing five specific factors: a clear record of the trial court's actions, a breach of a clear legal rule, adverse impact on a substantial right, lack of tactical waiver, and necessity for considering the error to achieve justice. The record must support all five factors for relief to be considered, and the error must significantly affect the trial's outcome. In this case, the trial court provided a timely curative instruction to the jury at defense counsel's request, addressing the error in the docket information.
Defendant did not object to the trial court's instructions, which effectively mitigated any potential prejudice from the misreading of the indictment. The jury is presumed to adhere to the court's guidance, as established in State v. Smith. There is no evidence that the jury encountered an indictment related to possession of drug paraphernalia, nor was any related evidence presented at trial. The evidence for the conviction of cocaine sale was substantial. To demonstrate that a 'substantial right' was impacted by an error, the defendant must prove actual prejudice, which was not established in this case. Consequently, the issue does not constitute plain error, and the defendant is not entitled to relief. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
