Karen Thomas v. Robert D. Mayfield, M.D.

Citation: Not availableDocket: M2000-02533-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; April 27, 2004; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Karen Thomas's medical malpractice claim against Robert D. Mayfield, M.D., and his practice, which was re-filed after the original statutory period had expired. The initial claim was filed in 1993 and nonsuited in 1997, allowing one year to refile under Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-1-105. Thomas refiled on the last day allowed, July 1, 1998, in Montgomery County, despite Dr. Mayfield’s practice having relocated to Erin, Tennessee. The defendants moved to dismiss for improper venue, and the court granted this motion in June 1999. Subsequent motions by the plaintiff for alterations and additional findings were denied. Thomas filed a notice of appeal in October 2000 and, 37 months later, sought a remand to transfer the case to Cumberland County, citing Tennessee Code Annotated § 16-1-116. This statute, enacted in response to the Tennessee Supreme Court’s guidance, addresses issues of subject matter jurisdiction. However, the court upheld the trial court's judgment, denying the motion for transfer.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-1-116 allows for the transfer of civil actions, appeals, or petitions for review when a court determines it lacks jurisdiction. If transferring the case serves the interest of justice, the court must transfer it to another court where it could have originally been filed, treating it as if it were filed there on the original date. The statute does not differentiate between subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and venue. Tennessee courts have historically treated venue and subject matter jurisdiction as synonymous when localized. Although the distinction between personal jurisdiction and venue is recognized, it is not necessary for the current case's resolution. 

In this matter, the statute became effective while the case was pending, yet the Appellant did not raise it before filing the notice of appeal on October 9, 2000, nor was it mentioned until a motion for remand was filed on November 3, 2003. The motion seeks to transfer the case to Cumberland County, which lacks venue based on the complaint's allegations that the defendant was a resident of Montgomery County. The case had effectively concluded in the trial court before the statute's enactment, and there is no justification for the failure to raise the statute earlier. Furthermore, the motion does not seek transfer to the appropriate county where the defendant resided, indicating a waiver of reliance on the statute. The trial court's judgment was rendered on May 12, 2000, but entered on June 12, 2000, after the statute's effective date of May 23, 2000.

The motion to remand has been denied, prompting a review of whether the trial court erred in granting the Appellee's Motion to Dismiss due to improper venue. Venue is governed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-4-101, et seq. The Appellant claims venue is appropriate based on two assertions: first, that the Defendant was a resident of Montgomery County at the time the suit was filed on July 1, 1998; and second, if not a resident, the Defendant was "found" in Montgomery County when process was served on July 24, 1998. The Defendants contested the venue in Montgomery County through both an answer and a motion under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(3). 

The analysis begins with establishing the standards for addressing a Rule 12.02(3) motion, noting that it does not convert to a Rule 56 summary judgment motion upon receipt of extraneous evidence, differing from a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12.02(6). Comparisons are drawn between Tennessee Rule 12.02(3) and the federal counterpart, Rule 12(b)(1), indicating that federal law is persuasive for interpreting the Tennessee rule. Two federal cases are referenced: Osburn v. U.S., which discusses the distinction between subject matter jurisdiction and summary judgment standards, and outlines how the district court can consider evidence beyond pleadings without converting to summary judgment standards for a 12(b)(1) motion. The analysis concludes with considerations regarding the proper standards for both the district court's evaluations and the appellate review when extraneous evidence is involved.

Disputed issues of material fact do not preclude a trial court from deciding jurisdictional claims, as established by various circuit court rulings. A motion under Rule 12(b) can only be converted to a summary judgment if it is a 12(b)(6) motion. The district court retains the authority to resolve factual disputes when addressing a 12(b)(1) motion regarding subject matter jurisdiction, which must be determined prior to trial. There are two types of 12(b)(1) motions: a facial attack, which questions the sufficiency of the complaint's allegations and assumes them to be true, and a factual attack, where no presumption of truth applies, necessitating the court to evaluate conflicting evidence. For factual jurisdictional challenges, courts may consider affidavits, documents, and conduct limited evidentiary hearings. In contrast, 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are treated differently; if external materials are submitted, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment, requiring the court to accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and to ensure no genuine issue of material fact exists. The principles concerning subject matter jurisdiction similarly extend to in personam jurisdiction and venue issues. The Supreme Court, in Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., emphasized that the court could reverse on venue grounds without addressing the merits of personal jurisdiction.

Personal jurisdiction pertains to a court's authority over parties and is typically assessed before venue, which addresses the suitability of the forum. Both personal jurisdiction and venue are personal privileges of the defendant, not absolute court limitations, and can be waived. Courts may alter the usual order of evaluating personal jurisdiction and venue when justified. In this case, the court acknowledges that while the 1934 Act does not support personal jurisdiction, the application of the Texas long-arm statute presents a more complex issue that raises constitutional questions not yet addressed by the Texas Supreme Court. Prudently, the court opts to bypass these constitutional issues due to a clear determination that venue is improper under both the 1934 Act and the Judicial Code.

Regarding venue, it is distinct from jurisdiction as it is a personal privilege that must be timely asserted to avoid waiver. There is a division of authority about the burden of proof in venue disputes: some argue that the burden lies with the defendant to prove improper venue, while others assert that once venue is challenged, the onus shifts to the plaintiff to establish its propriety. The court critiques the latter view as generally unsound, emphasizing that it is reasonable to require a defendant invoking a personal privilege to substantiate their claim. The discussion reinforces that both personal jurisdiction and venue are personal privileges of the defendant, akin to subject matter jurisdiction in their treatment under the law.

Professor Moore advocates for placing the burden of proof regarding venue on the defendant, but Tennessee Federal cases generally support placing this burden on the plaintiff. The trial court accepted the defendant's proof that he was neither a resident of Montgomery County nor present there on the relevant dates in July 1998, which is critical as the action is transitory. According to T.C.A. § 20-4-101, a transitory right of action follows the defendant, meaning jurisdiction in Hamilton County was only established when the defendant entered that county. The argument for a different rule for non-residents was rejected; jurisdiction is conferred by the defendant's presence, regardless of their prior location. The service of process relates back to the issuance of the writ, indicating that service occurring after the defendant's presence in the county does not affect the venue issue. The trial court found that the objection to venue was timely raised, supported by the defendant's residence claims and timely motion for dismissal. The court's findings regarding the defendant's residency and practice location were well-supported by affidavits and depositions, and those factual determinations cannot be reversed under the applicable standard of review. Consequently, the trial court's dismissal of the case due to improper venue was affirmed, and the appellant's motion to amend the record was denied, with costs taxed against the appellant.