Mitchell Presnell was found guilty of aggravated robbery by a Cocke County jury and sentenced to 20 years as a Range II multiple offender. In his appeal, Presnell raised four claims: insufficient evidence for conviction, the trial court's failure to instruct on lesser-included offenses (assault and aggravated assault), erroneous application of an enhancement factor indicating he was a leader in the offense, and denial of his right to a speedy trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee affirmed the trial court's judgment.
On March 22, 1995, the victim, Landon Holdway, was at K. W Café with approximately $2,400 in cash. He was assaulted and robbed outside the café by Presnell and his accomplices, who physically attacked him and took his money, keys, and other personal items. Witnesses, including Tom Shelton and Vanessa Joan Stewart, saw the attack and identified the defendants. Following the crime, police pursued a vehicle associated with the offenders, ultimately arresting Presnell with a significant amount of cash. The appeals court found no merit in Presnell's claims after reviewing the record.
On April 3, 1995, the defendant was indicted for especially aggravated robbery in Cocke County. After multiple delays, the trial occurred on January 15-16, 2003, resulting in a guilty verdict for aggravated robbery. The defendant was sentenced to 20 years as a Range II multiple offender. A motion for a new trial was denied on January 13, 2004, prompting a timely appeal.
The appeal raises four issues: 1) the sufficiency of evidence for conviction, 2) the trial court's failure to instruct on lesser-included offenses, 3) alleged improper sentencing, and 4) denial of the right to a speedy trial.
Regarding the sufficiency of evidence, the appellate court emphasized that a guilty verdict, supported by the trial judge, affirms the credibility of the state's witnesses. The defendant carries the burden to demonstrate insufficient evidence. The court noted that any rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and they must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The defendant challenged the credibility of three witnesses, citing their intoxication and past criminal records. However, the jury had the authority to evaluate witness credibility, and the appellate court cannot reassess this judgment. The jury accepted the testimony, rendering the defendant's arguments on this point without merit.
The defendant contends that the trial evidence fails to demonstrate an intentional or knowing theft, emphasizing the absence of direct testimony indicating he took money from the victim. However, circumstantial evidence supports the jury's verdict, as the defendant was seen participating in the assault on the victim and fleeing the scene with two accomplices. He was apprehended near a getaway vehicle with one accomplice and possessed $703, which correlates with the victim's loss of approximately $2,400, suggestive of his involvement in the robbery.
The court clarifies that credibility of witnesses and evidentiary conflicts are matters for the jury to resolve, and it will not reassess the evidence or inferences drawn from it. The jury could reasonably infer the defendant's participation in the robbery, rendering his argument meritless.
Regarding aggravated robbery, the court notes that it can be proven by either the use of a deadly weapon or by the victim suffering serious bodily injury. In this case, the jury was instructed on the latter. Testimony from the victim and a physician established that the victim sustained serious injuries, including a broken jaw that required surgical intervention, hospitalization, and significant pain. The court concludes that the injuries meet the legal definition of "serious bodily injury" under Tennessee law, thus supporting the aggravated robbery charge.
The defendant cites State v. Sims, 909 S.W.2d 46 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), claiming a parallel situation regarding the definition of serious bodily injury. In Sims, the court ruled that the victim's injuries, including a broken nose and lost teeth, did not amount to serious bodily injury, as the victim had minimal hospital time and no pain medication. In contrast, the current case involved a victim hospitalized for two to three weeks with his jaw wired shut for six to eight weeks, with clear evidence linking the injuries directly to the defendant's actions. Consequently, the jury's finding of serious bodily injury was supported by sufficient evidence, upholding the defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery.
Regarding lesser-included offenses, the trial court permitted instructions on aggravated robbery and related charges but the defendant contends the court erred by not including instructions for assault and aggravated assault. The State counters that this issue was waived since the defendant did not request these instructions at trial. The review of such failures is a mixed question of law and fact, warranting de novo review without a presumption of correctness. The applicable amended provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-18-110 govern the requirements for requesting lesser-included offense instructions. Specifically, a written request must be made prior to jury instructions, and failure to do so results in waiver of the right to appeal the trial court’s omission of such instructions.
The defendant did not request the inclusion of lesser-included offenses in the jury instructions, which typically results in a waiver of that claim under Tennessee law. However, a prior ruling by the Court deemed the waiver provision of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-18-110 unconstitutional, affirming a defendant's right to jury instruction on all relevant offenses supported by trial evidence. Consequently, the defendant’s failure to request such instructions does not constitute a waiver of this right. The Court, following this precedent, evaluated the defendant's issue using a harmless error analysis.
The determination of whether an offense qualifies as a lesser-included offense is guided by the Burns test, which outlines criteria including statutory element inclusion and variations in mental state or harm. In the context of this case, aggravated robbery is defined as the intentional theft via violence or fear, particularly where the victim suffers serious bodily injury. Aggravated assault, characterized by intentional or reckless actions resulting in serious bodily injury or the use of a deadly weapon, has been previously identified as a lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery when a deadly weapon is involved. The current case specifically examines the serious bodily injury aspect as a critical element of both aggravated robbery and aggravated assault.
In State v. Aaron Benard Gray, the court determined that aggravated assault and assault are lesser-included offenses of aggravated robbery based on their overlapping elements. Aggravated robbery requires proof of theft, while aggravated assault does not. However, both offenses share critical components when involving a deadly weapon or serious bodily injury, fulfilling the criteria of the Burns test. Specifically, assault, defined under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-101, includes causing bodily injury, instilling fear of imminent injury, or making offensive contact, all of which are encompassed within the elements of aggravated robbery.
The analysis further transitions into harmless error considerations, referencing State v. Ely, which mandates that upon identifying lesser-included offenses, the court must assess whether any failure to instruct on these offenses constitutes a harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Citing State v. Richmond, the court clarified that such an error is deemed harmless if the omitted element is uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence. In this case, the critical omitted element was the intentional theft of property. The State presented compelling witness testimony regarding the defendant's involvement in the robbery and assault, demonstrating that he forcibly took money from the victim, thus establishing sufficient evidence for a conviction of aggravated robbery without reasonable doubt.
The evidence against the defendant, including eyewitness accounts of him beating the victim and being found with $703 in cash, is deemed overwhelming. The court concludes that the failure to instruct the jury on assaultive offenses was a harmless error, as the jury had options for lesser charges but still found the defendant guilty of aggravated robbery.
In reviewing sentencing issues, an appellate court applies a de novo standard with a presumption of correctness regarding the trial court's decisions, contingent on evidence that the court considered relevant sentencing principles and facts. Factors considered in this review include the defendant's potential for rehabilitation, evidence from the trial and sentencing hearing, and any mitigating or enhancing factors. The trial court determined the defendant was a Range 2 Offender and noted his leadership role in the crime, which justified a twenty-year sentence.
The defendant contests the application of the enhancement factor that he was a leader in the offense, claiming insufficient support in the record, and argues that his role was minor, warranting a mitigating factor instead.
The State supports the trial court's application of enhancement factor (3), citing witness testimonies that the defendant handed a gun to his brother before the incident and instructed another witness not to observe the robbery. Additionally, cohort Jimmy Don Jones testified that the defendant drove his car during the robbery, distributed the stolen money, and instructed Jones to hold the gun. The court agrees with the State that sufficient evidence exists to uphold the trial court’s findings, emphasizing the presumption of correctness in the trial court’s decision when all sentencing principles and circumstances are considered.
Regarding the defendant's claim of a speedy trial violation, he was arrested eight years prior to his trial, with 14 continuances attributed to factors beyond his control, including five different appointed attorneys. The trial court acknowledged the delays, attributing them to the illness and death of the defendant’s first attorney, subsequent withdrawals by other counsel, and the time taken for appellate rulings on motions related to the speedy trial. Ultimately, the court found no fault with the State of Tennessee regarding the delays and determined that the defendant's right to a speedy trial had not been violated, dismissing the defendant's motions for dismissal of charges.
The court addressed a motion to dismiss charges based on a claim of violation of the right to a speedy trial. The judge confirmed that the defendant was held for a period to allow for communication with Mr. Ervin and recognized delays in the case. However, the court concluded that these delays were not the prosecution's fault and did not warrant dismissing the charges. The judge noted the complexities in scheduling due to the recusal of Judge Hooper, which contributed to the delays but were outside the prosecution's control. The court ruled that the constitutional right to a speedy trial, as outlined in both the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions, had not been violated. The court also referenced Tennessee law and rules regarding unnecessary delays and the requirement for formal actions to trigger speedy trial analysis. Ultimately, the motion to dismiss was overruled.
An accused seeking to dismiss charges due to a violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial must demonstrate a delay that is "presumptively prejudicial." Courts generally regard a delay of one year or more as unreasonable, triggering a deeper analysis under the balancing test established in Barker v. Wingo, which incorporates four factors: the length of the delay, reasons for the delay, the accused's assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and the resulting prejudice. In this case, the defendant's indictment occurred on April 3, 1995, and the trial did not commence until January 15, 2003, resulting in an almost eight-year delay, surpassing the one-year threshold.
The reasons for the delay can be categorized as: intentional delay for tactical advantage, bureaucratic negligence, necessary delay for effective prosecution, or delays due to defense actions. The trial court identified multiple factors contributing to the delays, including the defendant's failure to appear for scheduled court dates, the illness and subsequent death of the initial defense counsel in 1997, and the recusal of a trial judge. Additionally, a motion for continuance was filed by the defense in 1999. Findings of fact by the trial judge are presumed correct unless contradicted by a preponderance of evidence. The credibility of witnesses and resolution of evidence conflicts fall under the trial judge's purview, with the prevailing party entitled to the most favorable interpretation of the evidence.
The trial was rescheduled multiple times, initially set for January 2000, then postponed to April 25, 2000, due to the defendant's non-appearance, which resulted in a capias being issued. On March 8, 2001, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, which the trial court denied on April 30, 2001. Following this, the defendant sought an interlocutory appeal, which was denied on June 25, 2001, with the court noting unexplained delays and the defendant's representation by four different appointed counsels since 1994, although the impact of these changes was not detailed. The defendant first asserted his right to a speedy trial in March 2001, and despite his claims of prejudice and the desire for an interlocutory appeal, the court deemed granting such an appeal could prolong the proceedings.
After the denial of his appeal, the defendant sought a continuance to file an application for permission to appeal to the supreme court, which is presumed denied due to ongoing proceedings. The defendant subsequently filed a pro se motion for a speedy trial on February 4, 2002, followed by more continuances and another motion for a speedy trial on May 17, 2002.
The court observed that many delays were attributable to the defendant, including his failure to appear in court and his multiple requests for continuances. It concluded there was no evidence of prosecutorial delay aimed at gaining a tactical advantage or harassing the defendant. Delays associated with the withdrawal and appointment of counsel and recusal of a trial judge due to personal circumstances were deemed justified. Ultimately, the court found that the reasons for the delays did not favor the dismissal of charges against the defendant.
The accused was aware of the charges against him, having been indicted on May 3, 1995, yet did not assert his right to a speedy trial until March 8, 2001, nearly six years later. The court notes that an accused individual cannot be penalized for failing to assert this right if unaware of pending charges, but in this case, the indictment was not sealed, and the defendant was informed. The court emphasizes that the most critical factor in determining a speedy trial violation is whether the defendant suffered prejudice due to the delay, which includes undue incarceration, anxiety from public accusation, and impairment of defense preparation.
The defendant claimed several forms of prejudice due to the delay, including the loss of the preliminary hearing tape and the inability to present witness testimonies, arguing that witness recollections had diminished over time. However, the trial court found that these claims did not demonstrate actual prejudice, noting that the defendant could have deposed witnesses and did not subpoena others. The trial court's findings are presumed correct unless contradicted by a preponderance of evidence. Ultimately, while acknowledging the substantial delay in trial, the court concluded that it did not warrant dismissing the charges, attributing much of the delay to factors beyond the State's control and the defendant's own actions. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
