Joseph Miles appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirms the lower court's judgment. Miles was convicted of second-degree murder on May 12, 1999, and sentenced to forty years. His conviction stemmed from the shooting of Antwaun Elliott in an Arby's Restaurant, following a history of antagonism between the two, exacerbated by Miles's ex-wife's relationship with Elliott.
Miles's post-conviction petition, filed on December 4, 2001, alleges ineffective assistance from both trial and appellate counsel, including concerns about jury awareness of his prior incarceration and failure to address prosecutorial misconduct. He later amended the petition to include claims of newly discovered evidence and additional instances of ineffective assistance, such as not calling certain witnesses, failing to present evidence regarding a prior shooting incident, neglecting to introduce expert testimony on his state of mind, not objecting to an all-white jury panel, and inadequately addressing self-defense. The court, however, found these claims unpersuasive and upheld the original conviction.
At the evidentiary hearing, the petitioner expressed that his primary defense theories were voluntary intoxication and self-defense. He claimed to have provided his trial counsel with a list of witnesses who could support his self-defense argument, including Renea Mitchell, who had relevant past experiences with the victim; Tammy Johnson, who had knowledge of a prior stabbing incident; Ruby Brewer, who could testify about the victim's behavior; and James Overby and Larry Cook, who had information regarding the victim's potential armament during the incident. The petitioner was disappointed that none of these witnesses were called to testify. He asserted that he believed a preemptive strike was necessary for survival in ongoing feuds and criticized the police for inadequate protection after a prior shooting incident. He alleged misconduct by Detective William Watkins regarding evidence suppression. The petitioner also expressed dissatisfaction with how his trial counsel handled the testimony of Lance Baker, who had been called to highlight the victim's prior criminal charges but whose testimony was disregarded at trial. Despite not testifying during his trial, the petitioner recounted a previous incident where the victim shot him. He requested a psychological evaluation, but felt the trial's psychological testimony was inadequate. The petitioner noted his trial counsel failed to challenge an all-white jury and did not request appropriate jury instructions on self-defense. During cross-examination, it was revealed that Dr. Anne Durrant, a psychologist who had counseled the petitioner, noted his emotional distress related to the victim and Ms. Groves, but he had not threatened anyone during their sessions. The petitioner admitted to substance use, specifically crack cocaine, prior to the shooting. Trial counsel confirmed having investigated the victim's past aggravated assault charge.
The petitioner, along with four associates, arrived at Ms. Groves's residence where the victim was present. After a confrontation, the victim shot the petitioner in the arm. The trial counsel, at the petitioner’s request, called the assistant district attorney as a defense witness to argue that the police displayed favoritism toward the victim and improperly handled the case, as the victim's charges were reduced without consulting the petitioner. The petitioner, who had four prior felonies and was on parole for five days before the incident, opted not to testify. The trial counsel indicated that the victim was unarmed at the time of the shooting and mentioned that the petitioner had been using crack cocaine before the incident, as testified by his cousin Eric Miles. Miles also recounted seeing the petitioner shoot at a male running toward an Arby’s and then pursuing him in a blue car.
Trial counsel claimed that the charge was not first-degree murder due to an indictment preparation error that omitted premeditation. Although trial counsel was satisfied with the provision of voluntary manslaughter instructions, he acknowledged the absence of self-defense instructions. The trial court ultimately denied relief, concluding that the petitioner had knowingly waived his right to testify due to his criminal history and that trial counsel was not ineffective in various aspects, including not calling additional witnesses or objecting to the prosecution's comments. The petitioner appeals, arguing trial counsel's ineffectiveness for not calling specific witnesses. The state counters these claims, emphasizing that the petitioner must prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence, as defined by Tennessee law.
In Hicks v. State, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals established that the findings of fact by a post-conviction court are conclusive unless the evidence strongly contradicts them. The burden lies with the petitioner to demonstrate that the evidence does not support the court's findings. Credibility assessments and the value of witness testimony are determined by the post-conviction court. To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must show that counsel's performance fell below acceptable standards and that this deficiency adversely affected the defense, leading to an unreliable outcome. A lack of evidence to prove either deficiency or prejudice results in denial of relief. The court emphasizes that petitioners cannot benefit from hindsight or critique reasonable strategies employed by counsel, provided those strategies were made with adequate case preparation. Claims of ineffective assistance are treated as mixed questions of law and fact, with de novo review of legal applications. Additionally, to prove prejudice from a failure to call witnesses, the petitioner must produce the witnesses at the post-conviction hearing, demonstrate that trial counsel could have located them with reasonable diligence, and obtain favorable and material testimony from them. Since the petitioner did not present any witnesses at the evidentiary hearing, the court lacked evidence on their potential testimonies, and the post-conviction court appeared unimpressed with the proffered evidence. The record indicates a history of conflict between the petitioner and the victim, which is a critical context for the case.
The petitioner's decision not to testify, given his four felony convictions and recent release from prison, was a strategic choice, as he would have faced significant challenges during cross-examination. This decision also limited the effectiveness of the witnesses he intended to call to support his case. The post-conviction court found that the petitioner did not demonstrate any deficiency in legal representation or prejudice resulting from the failure to call these witnesses. Additionally, his choice not to testify weakened his ability to argue for a self-defense instruction. Testimony from the assistant district attorney indicated that the petitioner initiated a confrontation with the victim, which undermined any self-defense claim. The evidence showed that the petitioner armed himself and shot the victim, who was unarmed, creating a difficult situation for trial counsel to argue self-defense effectively. The post-conviction court concluded that the circumstances did not justify a self-defense charge and that the petitioner failed to present evidence to the contrary.
Regarding jury composition, there is no constitutional requirement for juries to reflect community demographics. To claim an improper jury venire, one must prove that a distinctive group was underrepresented due to systematic exclusion in jury selection. There is no constitutional right to a jury of one's own race, and the absence of African Americans on the jury does not constitute a violation of rights.
No evidence was presented at the post-conviction hearing to demonstrate that the jury selection process was unconstitutional, aside from a complaint from trial counsel regarding an all-white jury. While excluding black jurors may violate equal protection, the petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, which would shift the burden to the state to provide a neutral explanation. The petitioner did not show that the state used its peremptory challenges to achieve an all-white jury. Additionally, although the petitioner claimed trial counsel was ineffective for not adequately developing medical evidence regarding his state of mind during the shooting, the petitioner did not present any expert testimony, such as from Dr. Durrant, to support this claim. The responsibility to provide such evidence lies with the petitioner to demonstrate either ineffective performance or resulting prejudice. Consequently, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
