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Reid v. Covert
Citations: 1 L. Ed. 2d 1148; 77 S. Ct. 1222; 354 U.S. 1; 1957 U.S. LEXIS 729Docket: 701
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; June 10, 1957; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Mr. Justice Black delivered the Court's judgment on significant constitutional issues regarding the military's role in civilian trials and Congress's power to subject civilians to military tribunals. The cases highlight that, for the first time since the Constitution's adoption, military trials were imposed on soldiers' wives, denying them jury trials in civilian courts. In case No. 701, Mrs. Clarice Covert was tried by a court-martial for murdering her husband while living on a military base. Despite her defense of insanity, she was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The conviction was reversed on appeal due to errors related to her insanity defense. While awaiting retrial, her counsel sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing her constitutional right to a civilian trial. The District Court agreed, referencing the precedent that civilians are entitled to civilian trials, leading to her release. In case No. 713, Mrs. Dorothy Smith was similarly tried by a court-martial after killing her Army officer husband in Japan. Her defense also included claims of insanity, yet she was found guilty and sentenced to life. Her father's habeas corpus petition argued that the military court lacked jurisdiction under the UCMJ, which he claimed was unconstitutional for trying civilian dependents. The District Court denied the petition, and the case was appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated both cases and ultimately upheld the constitutionality of the military trials for Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert, with a majority opinion and dissenting Justices. The majority opinion concluded that the constitutional protections under Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not extend to American citizens tried by the government for offenses committed abroad. Congress has the discretion to determine the trial procedures for such cases, provided they are reasonable and align with due process. The opinion stated that military trials for dependents of armed forces overseas were deemed not unreasonable or arbitrary. However, upon rehearing, the Court reversed its previous decision, ruling that military authorities could not constitutionally try Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert. The Court emphasized that the Bill of Rights applies to U.S. citizens regardless of their location and that the government's authority is derived solely from the Constitution, which must be adhered to even when acting against citizens abroad. This principle is rooted in historical precedents, asserting that citizens retain their rights irrespective of expatriation or location. Relevant constitutional provisions, including Article III.2, the Fifth Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment, were cited to support the assertion that the rights of individuals were intended to restrict government actions both domestically and internationally. Article III.2 mandates jury trials for crimes, while the Fifth Amendment stipulates the requirement of a grand jury indictment, with specific exceptions not applicable in this case. The language in question applies to criminal trials outside the United States, irrespective of where the crime occurred. Historical federal statutes have enacted provisions of Article III, Section 2, allowing trials for crimes committed outside any state to occur in the district where the offender is apprehended. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments encompass all individuals and criminal prosecutions, suggesting that constitutional rights should not be selectively applied to those outside the continental U.S. It argues against the notion that only "fundamental" rights protect Americans abroad, asserting that the right to a trial by a civilian judge and jury is fundamental. The excerpt emphasizes that trial by jury is a critical safeguard against government overreach, historically considered a cornerstone of rights. The opinion from a past case, In re Ross, which involved a trial before a consular court in Japan, is critiqued for its extreme consular powers that allowed for significant control over criminal proceedings. This context highlights the inadequacies of the legal framework applied in international cases and the historical concerns surrounding consular jurisdiction and American citizens' rights abroad. Blending executive, legislative, and judicial powers in one entity is viewed as absolutism. The Court upheld the conviction of Ross by the consul, asserting that constitutional protections are limited to U.S. citizens and individuals within the U.S. or tried for offenses committed elsewhere, not to residents or temporary visitors abroad. The Court declared that the Constitution does not apply outside the U.S., a stance that has since been repudiated in numerous cases, especially since the government can try citizens for crimes committed abroad. The Ross case was based on a misconception and is seen as a relic, especially after Congress ended the consular system for trying Americans. The Court's reliance on the "Insular Cases" to conclude that constitutional amendments did not apply to Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert was deemed misplaced. The "Insular Cases" involved newly acquired territories with distinct cultures and customs, and the Court ruled that certain constitutional protections did not apply there as they had not been incorporated into the Union. While fundamental rights apply universally, requiring jury trials in these territories was viewed as impractical. The document argues that these cases should not extend military jurisdiction over civilians and that the notion that constitutional protections can be disregarded for convenience poses a threat to the integrity of the Constitution. It emphasizes that if foreign commitments compromise constitutional operation, amendments should follow the prescribed process rather than creating exceptions. At the time of Mrs. Covert's alleged offense, an executive agreement allowed U.S. military courts to hold exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by American servicemen or their dependents in Great Britain. In Japan, the legal circumstances surrounding Mrs. Smith's killing of her husband are compared to U.S. military law. The Government argues that Article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), permitting military trials for dependents in Great Britain and Japan, is valid under international agreements. However, it is asserted that no international agreement can grant Congress or any branch of government authority that bypasses constitutional constraints. Article VI of the Constitution, the Supremacy Clause, establishes that the Constitution and laws made under it, including treaties, must comply with constitutional provisions. Historical context indicates that the framers did not intend for treaties to circumvent constitutional limits, as this would contradict the objectives of both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The Constitution's prohibitions apply to all government branches and cannot be overridden by the Executive or a combination of the Executive and Senate. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the Constitution's supremacy over treaties, as seen in Geofroy v. Riggs, which clarifies that treaty power is limited by constitutional restrictions. Moreover, Congress must enact laws in accordance with the Constitution, and if a statute conflicts with a treaty, the statute prevails. The case Missouri v. Holland does not contradict this view, as it involved a treaty that was not inconsistent with the Constitution. The ruling emphasized that the Tenth Amendment does not prevent the delegation of treaty-making powers to the National Government. The Constitution applies fully to the trials of Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert, and their court-martial did not comply with the requirements of Article III, Section 2, or the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. There is no constitutional authority for military trials of civilians, including dependents of armed forces, overseas. Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 allows Congress to create rules for the military but applies specifically to members of the armed forces, not their civilian dependents. The Government's argument that the Necessary and Proper Clause permits military trials for civilians lacks merit, as the Clause cannot extend military jurisdiction beyond the defined military personnel. Civilian courts are the standard for criminal trials, with the Constitution providing specific protections such as the right to a jury trial and indictment. Military tribunals have limited jurisdiction, intended as a narrow exception to civilian court processes. Consequently, any expansion of military jurisdiction encroaches on civilian authority and undermines constitutional rights. The principles established in McCulloch v. Maryland do not support extending military jurisdiction to civilians under the guise of the Necessary and Proper Clause. The excerpt addresses the limitations imposed by the Necessary and Proper Clause concerning military jurisdiction, emphasizing that Clause 14 restricts such jurisdiction to members of the "land and naval Forces." It asserts that constitutional safeguards for criminal prosecutions, outlined in Articles III, II, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, cannot be upheld in military trials, rendering military trials of civilians unconstitutional. The Fifth Amendment's provision that individuals cannot be tried for serious crimes without a Grand Jury indictment, except in military cases, further supports the view that Clause 14 does not extend to those not actively serving in the military. It distinguishes between civilians and military personnel, asserting that dependents of servicemen retain their civilian status and right to trial in civilian courts, regardless of their association with military members. The excerpt underscores the historical context of military authority and civil liberties, recalling the Founders' concerns about military power undermining liberty, particularly referencing historical events under Charles I and James II that highlighted the dangers of military jurisdiction over civilians. The Founders' intent was to ensure that military authority remained subordinate to civilian governance, emphasizing the right to jury trials as a fundamental protection against oppressive government practices. Two prominent English jurists, Lord Chief Justice Hale and Sir William Blackstone, expressed strong opposition to expanding military court jurisdiction, arguing that martial law lacks settled principles and should not be permitted during peacetime when civil courts are available. Their views were influenced by historical instances of military rule under royal governors, particularly the quartering of British troops in Boston to support unpopular governance and intimidate residents. This military interference in civil matters led to widespread concern across the colonies, exemplified by Samuel Adams' protests against soldiers being judged and executed under martial law without proper legal processes. The colonists had also experienced infringements on their right to trial by jury, particularly through admiralty courts established by British Parliament, which exacerbated resentment. In 1765, delegates asserted the importance of jury trials, which was echoed in the Declaration of Independence condemning military supremacy over civil authority. Consequently, the Founders embedded their distrust of military power and commitment to jury trials into the Constitution, aiming to prevent the trial of civilians in military courts that lacked constitutional protections. They intended to maintain the military as subordinate to civil authority, opposing any broad interpretation of Congress's regulatory powers that could threaten this principle. The Founders did not intend for military courts to have concurrent jurisdiction with civilian courts over civilians with connections to the armed forces. Historical cases such as Ex parte Milligan established that military authorities lack the power to try civilians in areas where civil courts remain operational. This principle was reinforced by the Court's assertion that the right to a jury trial is fundamental and protected from military encroachment for those not actively serving in the armed forces. In Duncan v. Kahanamoku, the Court reiterated the subordination of military authority to civilian governance, rejecting the military trial of civilians during wartime. The case of United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles further clarified that discharged servicemen cannot be tried by military courts for crimes committed while in service, emphasizing the constitutional right to indictment by a grand jury and trial protections for civilians. The similarities among the cases of Toth, Mrs. Covert, and Mrs. Smith—each being civilians tried for murder, albeit with Toth being an ex-serviceman—highlight that constitutional protections do not diminish based on location or military association. The historical opposition to military jurisdiction over civilians is firmly established in these cases. Efforts to extend military court jurisdiction to civilians have consistently failed. Lower federal court decisions have allowed the military trial of civilians working for the armed forces "in the field" during wartime, justified by the government's "war powers." Military commanders possess broad authority over individuals in combat zones, and historically, extraordinary circumstances in active fighting areas have permitted military courts to punish civilians under military rules. However, at the time of the offenses committed by Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert, neither Japan nor Great Britain was an active combat zone. The government argues for a broader interpretation of “in the field” to include military dependents overseas during global tensions, asserting that "war powers" encompass defensive preparations and military positioning worldwide. Nonetheless, the court rejects this notion, emphasizing that military trials of civilians should not occur in areas without active hostilities, as such jurisdiction is extraordinary and should not infringe on the Bill of Rights. The court agrees with Colonel Winthrop's assertion that civilians cannot be subjected to military jurisdiction in peacetime. Military justice is characterized by summary procedures, swift convictions, and strict penalties aimed at maintaining discipline, with less emphasis on individual rights compared to civilian courts. Courts-martial, often ad hoc and influenced by command authority, operate under the executive chain of command, where members depend on the appointing officer for their careers. Members of a court-martial, despite their honesty and sense of justice, lack the independence characteristic of civilian jurors or judges. Recent improvements in military justice have incorporated some civilian court methods, largely influenced by civilians' experiences during the World Wars. However, military trials do not afford the same protections as civil trials, most notably the absence of jury trials and independent judges. The extent to which the Bill of Rights applies to military trials remains unclear. Individuals under military jurisdiction are subject to distinctly harsher and vaguer military law, which prioritizes discipline over justice. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, has broad powers to establish and modify military law and procedures, raising concerns about the blending of legislative, executive, and judicial powers that the Constitution intended to separate. Consequently, military tribunals are inherently limited in achieving the fair trial standards required in civilian courts, largely due to differing values that prioritize group security over individual rights. The expansion of military jurisdiction over civilians, while viewed as minimal, is argued to be practically necessary. A slight encroachment on constitutional rights is viewed as posing a significant risk, potentially establishing a dangerous precedent for military trials of civilians, specifically wives of military personnel. Historical justifications for such encroachments are criticized as they often lead to more extensive violations of rights. It is emphasized that constitutional protections should be interpreted broadly to maintain their effectiveness. Courts have a responsibility to vigilantly protect citizens' rights from subtle infringements, which are often dismissed as minor. The text highlights the importance of maintaining civilian authority over military power, a principle embedded in the Constitution and upheld for nearly 170 years. Military personnel, unlike in other nations, have historically respected this division of authority. The excerpt also quotes Lord Coke, warning against the dangers of allowing military and judicial powers to overlap. Ultimately, in the cases mentioned, the judgment affirming Mrs. Covert's release is upheld, while Mrs. Smith's case is reversed and remanded for her release. Justice Whittaker did not participate in these decisions. The precedent established by earlier cases reinforces the need to adhere strictly to constitutional language and meanings. The Constitution is designed for public understanding, using ordinary language rather than technical terms, which eliminates the need for interpretation when the intent is clear. The absence of limiting phrases in such a carefully crafted document indicates no qualifications were meant. James Madison stated that the Constitution aimed to ensure trial by jury for offenses committed outside any state, a provision now reflected in 18 U.S.C. § 3238. The right to a jury trial in criminal cases is constitutionally guaranteed, with the Sixth Amendment reaffirming this right and the Seventh Amendment extending it to civil cases. The fear of abolishing jury trials was a significant concern during the drafting of the Federal Constitution, influencing the adoption of the Bill of Rights. Prominent legal commentators and historical figures emphasized the importance of jury trials, linking them to the power of the governed over their government. Notably, past U.S. officials argued for the necessity of jury trials for American citizens abroad, underscoring the global expectation of this right. Various court cases have also underscored these principles of jury trials. The excerpt outlines several key legal principles and historical cases related to the application of the Constitution in U.S. territories, particularly focusing on the "Insular Cases." In *Downes v. Bidwell*, the Court ruled that not all constitutional protections apply to U.S. territories, a stance met with strong dissent from Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham, who argued for the universal applicability of the Bill of Rights. This dissent reflects the established precedent prior to these cases. The excerpt also notes that constitutional protections become applicable once a territory is incorporated, as established in *Rassmussen v. United States*. The discussion highlights the rigidity and flexibility of constitutional amendments, referencing the rapid ratification of the Eleventh and Twenty-First Amendments in response to pressing public demands. Additionally, it touches on the implications of consular courts and the lack of fundamental rights for citizens abroad, illustrated by Senator Carpenter's remarks in 1881. The NATO Status of Forces Agreement is mentioned as a contemporary arrangement defining jurisdiction over U.S. servicemen's dependents in foreign nations, emphasizing the primary jurisdiction of the host nation while ensuring procedural safeguards for American nationals. Ultimately, the text asserts that apart from specific agreements, foreign nations maintain full criminal jurisdiction over Americans committing offenses within their territories. Executive agreements are acknowledged but do not possess a higher authority than treaties. The Constitution equates treaties with legislative acts, both being the supreme law of the land, with the most recent document prevailing in case of conflict. Judicial precedents affirm this interpretation, including Whitney v. Robertson and others. Colonel Winthrop's treatise argues that Congress lacks the constitutional authority to govern civilians as part of the military without their consent, emphasizing the distinct separation between military and civilian communities as mandated by the Fifth Amendment. The legislative clause granting Congress power over military governance was included without debate, highlighting its contentious nature. Historical references to the Mutiny Acts illustrate the evolution of military jurisdiction, originally limited and only later extending to peacetime trials of soldiers in overseas territories. Colonial reactions to military trials of soldiers prior to the American Revolution highlighted tensions regarding military interference in civil justice. It wasn't until 1863 that Congress permitted courts-martial to try soldiers for civil crimes like murder and arson during wartime, marking a shift from prior practice where such cases were handled by state courts. In the case of Coleman v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court ruled that the 1863 statute did not eliminate civilian courts' concurrent jurisdiction over military personnel, emphasizing the public's aversion to military encroachment on civil justice. Historical warnings from figures like Washington and Madison echoed concerns about military power undermining liberties, with the common law historically treating soldiers' and civilians' crimes alike in peacetime. Exceptions arose during wartime, allowing military trials in the field, but English history illustrates an ongoing struggle between common-law courts and military tribunals. The jurisdiction of the Court of the Constable and Marshal over military offenses diminished over time, leading to military councils assuming such authority. The terms "martial law" and "military law" originated as synonymous, with early legal documents protesting the use of martial law against soldiers for various crimes, reflecting broader concerns about due process and justice. Commissions authorizing martial law can be revoked to prevent the unjust execution of subjects contrary to established laws and rights. Historical references indicate that military trials in peacetime are deemed illegal and contrary to law, as noted by legal authorities like Lord Chief Justice Herbert and Sir John Holt. Hale argues that martial law is not a true law but a temporary measure for military order, applicable only to military personnel, and should not extend to civilians, especially in peacetime when civil courts are operational. Various historical instances, such as General Gage's declaration of martial law in Boston and the Virginia Assembly's rejection of martial law as unconstitutional, highlight the widespread condemnation of martial law's imposition. The South Carolina Provincial Congress also expressed grievances regarding the replacement of civil law with martial law by royal governors. Additionally, Thomas Jefferson criticized Parliament’s expansion of admiralty court jurisdiction, which undermined the right to trial by jury. State constitutions from the specified period typically included protections for the right to trial by jury and cautions against military authority. Key references include Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia constitutions, alongside federal constitutional provisions. Historical debates and documents, including those from the 1787 Federal Convention, illustrate the context of these rights. The legal cases referenced demonstrate a clear distinction in the constitutional applicability of court-martial proceedings, especially concerning individuals like Toth, who was a soldier at the time of his offense, compared to civilians. Examination of military trials, particularly those involving civilians during wartime, indicates that such trials were primarily conducted in combat zones or occupied territories, with limited instances of military trials for dependents accompanying troops. Expert opinions from military law authorities consistently define "in the field" as areas of active combat. Under Article 2(10) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), individuals accompanying armed forces in wartime conditions fall under military jurisdiction, which reflects the historically recognized limits of military authority over civilians. The government acknowledges these boundaries and does not overextend its claims of jurisdiction beyond this established framework. Military jurisdiction over individuals, such as Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert, is supported under Article 2, emphasizing that the Constitution remains applicable even during wartime. The case Ex parte Milligan asserts that the Constitution protects all individuals at all times, indicating that no provision can be suspended during governmental emergencies. Madsen v. Kinsella is distinguished as it pertains to trials in occupied enemy territory, where military authorities can establish commissions for trials. The officer convening a court-martial holds significant authority, including deciding whether to bring charges and selecting the trial board and counsel. The independence of the judiciary is underscored by Hamilton, highlighting the dangers of its union with other government branches. Recommendations have been made to Congress to limit protections for accused individuals under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to enhance military efficiency. Notably, the Fifth Amendment's exception regarding grand jury indictments applies to military trials, allowing for different procedural standards. Precedents indicate that the President or commanding officer can return cases for increased sentences, which raises questions about the application of double jeopardy protections. Article 134 of the UCMJ provides further context on military jurisdiction, although specific details are not included in the excerpt. Disorders and neglects that undermine good order and discipline in the armed forces, as well as conduct that brings discredit to the military, are subject to court-martial punishment. In 1942, a ruling by the Judge Advocate General established that a civilian contractor employee could be court-martialed under the predecessor of Article 134 for advising colleagues to reduce work pace. Historical references include Ex parte Quirin, United States v. Eliason, and Swaim v. United States, along with General Orders from the Civil War era. From 1949 to 1955, nearly 95% of civilians tried by army courts-martial were charged with minor offenses. In cases of "petty offenses" by civilians on military reservations, trials are conducted by civilian commissioners unless the individual opts for federal court jurisdiction.