Shirley Patricia Gilliam, Mother and next of kin of LaShun Hall, Decedent v. Michael G. Derrick, Administrator Ad Litem for the Estate of Santres A. Johnson, Decedent
Docket: W2003-01353-COA-R3-CV
Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; September 24, 2004; Tennessee; State Appellate Court
Shirley Patricia Gilliam, mother of the deceased LaShun Hall, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Michael G. Derrick, the administrator for the estate of the deceased driver Santres A. Johnson, following a fatal car accident. The incident occurred on September 30, 1997, when Johnson, while driving intoxicated at high speed, collided with a guard rail on the Hernando Desoto Bridge, resulting in the deaths of both Johnson and Hall, who was a passenger.
During the trial, the jury found Hall to be 50% at fault for the accident, asserting that he knew or should have known about Johnson's intoxication prior to entering the vehicle. Gilliam appealed the jury's decision, and the appellate court reversed the verdict, concluding that there was no substantial evidence indicating that Hall was aware of Johnson's intoxicated state. The judgment of the Circuit Court was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Antonio recounted an evening spent with Santres and Larry, where they met women Santres knew in north Memphis. Plans were made to meet later at a car auction in Arkansas. The group met the women at a BP gas station, where Antonio and Santres consumed Hennessy Cognac; Antonio last drank around 7:40 or 7:45 p.m. They left some cognac for a friend before departing the gas station. Antonio's prior testimony indicated Larry's involvement in drinking was uncertain.
Larry had previously filed a lawsuit against Santres's estate, which was dismissed, and it was agreed that Antonio's deposition could be used as he was incarcerated in federal prison at the time of trial. Antonio passed away from undisclosed causes before the trial. During his testimony, he expressed uncertainty about LaShun's whereabouts but assumed he was with a lady friend. After paging LaShun for a pickup, they left the gas station in a Lexus, following Santres and Larry in an Impala to Santres's house.
At Santres's house, Antonio transferred the Lexus to Santres and went inside, while LaShun chose to join Santres and Larry. The women from the gas station followed them in a gray Toyota Four Runner. After about thirty to thirty-five minutes, Antonio received a call from Santres's sister, informing him of a wreck involving Santres, LaShun, and Larry, which resulted in the deaths of Santres and LaShun.
Two eyewitnesses testified about the accident. Donna Williams described traveling on the Hernando Desoto Bridge around 8:00 or 8:30 p.m. when a light-colored car, traveling at a high speed and weaving through traffic, passed her. This car collided with the guard rail while attempting to pass another vehicle on the right shoulder, flipped, and burst into flames. Williams witnessed others stop to assist and subsequently called 911.
Brandon Hill, an Arkansas resident, was traveling on the Hernando Desoto Bridge at approximately 60-65 mph when he observed three fast-moving cars: a white Lexus, a dark Caprice, and a Toyota Land Cruiser, all exceeding 100 mph and closely spaced. Hill noticed sparks suggesting one car might have hit the guard rail but could not identify which one. After the incident, he went to his brother, a police officer, who contacted the highway patrol for a statement. Toxology tests revealed Santres had a blood alcohol level of 0.19, Larry had 0.15, and LaShun was negative for alcohol, indicating Santres was legally intoxicated at the time of the accident.
Witnesses, including the mothers of LaShun and Santres, provided testimony about their losses. Gilliam, LaShun’s mother, moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied, stating there was sufficient evidence for the jury to evaluate LaShun's decision to ride with the impaired Santres. The jury found both Santres and LaShun equally at fault for LaShun's death, leading to a judgment in favor of the defendant.
Gilliam subsequently filed a motion to overturn the verdict or request a new trial, claiming the jury's conclusion lacked evidentiary support. The trial court denied this motion, prompting Gilliam to appeal, reiterating that no evidence indicated LaShun knew or should have known about Santres's intoxication. The appellate review will apply a "material evidence" standard, assessing if sufficient evidence underlies the jury's findings without reweighing evidence or assessing credibility, ensuring all facts are viewed favorably towards the jury's decision. The jury's determination of fault will similarly be evaluated under this standard.
An examination of the record is necessary to assess whether there is material evidence supporting the conclusion that LaShun was 50% responsible for his own death. Under Tennessee law, passengers have a duty to exercise ordinary care for their safety, which includes avoiding rides with intoxicated or reckless drivers. The case Biscan v. Brown established that prior to the adoption of comparative fault, a passenger's choice to ride with an intoxicated driver could bar recovery due to contributory negligence. However, after the adoption of comparative fault principles in McIntyre v. Balentine, a passenger's negligence does not automatically prevent recovery; their conduct must be weighed against that of the driver.
In determining fault, the key issue is whether LaShun knew or should have known of Santres's intoxication when he chose to ride with him. Gilliam argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that LaShun was aware of Santres's drinking. She notes that LaShun was not present during Santres's drinking and did not observe any signs of intoxication. Citing Edenton v. McKelvey, Gilliam contends that a guest cannot be deemed at fault if the driver does not exhibit clear signs of intoxication. In this case, she maintains that the evidence did not demonstrate that Santres's behavior indicated he was under the influence, thus LaShun should not be considered at fault for riding with him.
The defendant contends that LaShun Hall was aware or should have been aware of Santres Johnson's intoxication, particularly given Santres’s blood alcohol content of 0.19 after the accident. The critical issue is whether LaShun had enough time to assess Santres's condition. The defendant acknowledges that the evidence against LaShun is mainly circumstantial due to both parties being deceased, relying on the fact of Santres's high blood alcohol level and the timeline of LaShun's interactions with him prior to the accident.
The defendant cites the case of Lanier v. Bane, where a passenger sued the driver’s estate following a fatal accident. The jury found the driver fully at fault but also attributed 50% fault to the passenger for not recognizing the driver’s intoxication, supported by evidence of the driver’s blood alcohol level (0.158%) and witness testimonies regarding his behavior that night. The appellate court upheld the jury's decision, inferring that the passenger should have been aware of the driver's condition.
Further cases are referenced, demonstrating that verdicts against passengers have been upheld when evidence indicated their awareness of the driver’s intoxication, such as in Schwartz v. Johnson and LaRue v. 1817 Lake Inc., where passengers were found contributorily negligent for allowing intoxicated individuals to drive. In these precedents, the passengers' negligence barred them from recovering damages for their injuries.
Under comparative fault principles, a passenger can be deemed less negligent than the driver, even with knowledge of the driver's intoxication, which may diminish but not eliminate the passenger's recovery. In Silcox v. Coffee, a jury found the passenger 40% at fault alongside the driver, despite both having been intoxicated. Similarly, in Harvey v. Wheeler, the court upheld a verdict favoring the passenger, despite the passenger's awareness of the driver's drinking and speeding, emphasizing the need for evidence regarding the passenger's reasonableness. However, a different outcome occurs when there is no evidence that the passenger knew or should have known about the driver's intoxication. In Parker v. McDaniel, the court addressed a case where the driver had a blood alcohol content of 0.16% after a fatal accident. The plaintiffs argued that the owner/passenger should be liable under negligent entrustment, but the court found no evidence that the passenger knew or should have known about the driver's intoxication. The court highlighted the absence of proof regarding the driver's drinking history or visible signs of intoxication, leading to the conclusion that knowledge of the driver's intoxication was not established. Thus, the court upheld the trial court's decision not to instruct the jury on negligent entrustment.
The case addresses the issue of comparative fault between the plaintiff and the defendant, centering on whether there was sufficient evidence to determine that LaShun knew or should have known that Santres, the driver, was intoxicated. It is established that LaShun did not have actual knowledge of Santres's drinking, as he was not present when Santres consumed alcohol and did not socialize at the gas station upon arrival. LaShun allowed Antonio to drive the Lexus and subsequently rode in the back seat without any opportunity to exit before Santres took over driving.
The only evidence regarding Santres's intoxication was a blood alcohol level of 0.19% at the time of the accident, with no visible signs of impairment noted, nor expert testimony provided on how such a level would affect Santres's driving. Antonio, who was drinking with Santres, testified that he believed Santres was capable of driving, which the jury could choose to discredit. However, the absence of material evidence indicating LaShun’s awareness or reasonable suspicion of Santres's intoxication led to the conclusion that the trial court's judgment must be reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings, with costs on appeal assigned to the appellee, Michael G. Derrick, Administrator Ad Litem for the Estate of Santres A. Johnson.
