A child support action was decided by the Court of Appeals of Tennessee involving Tierany Redmond (Mother) and Cletidus Marquell Hunt (Father), the unmarried parents of a minor child, T.L., born in March 1998. The trial court ordered Father to pay retroactive child support, set at 21% of his net income from March 1998 to July 2002, and also for the period leading to August 2003. Future base child support was established at $2,100 per month. Additionally, Father was directed to contribute $5,000 monthly to a future child support trust fund and another $5,000 to an educational trust fund. He was also required to pay private school tuition, provide health insurance, cover half of non-reimbursed medical expenses, and maintain life insurance for the duration of his support obligation. The court awarded Mother $15,000 in attorney’s fees. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decisions with modifications and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Father raises several issues for the Court's review, including whether the trial court erred in calculating retroactive child support, determining educational trust fund payments, and ordering private education for the minor child. Mother also presents additional issues, questioning the trial court's decisions on prospective child support, the lack of interest on retroactive support, denial of her full attorney's fees, and her entitlement to fees on appeal.
The standard of review for this case is de novo, with a presumption of correctness for the trial court's factual findings, unless evidence suggests otherwise. Legal conclusions are reviewed without such presumption.
The trial court awarded Mother retroactive child support starting from March 1998, calculating Father's obligation as 21% of his net income during specified periods, resulting in a total of $219,670.50 owed to Mother after credits. Of this amount, Father is to pay $165,000 directly to Mother and $54,670.59 into a trust.
Tennessee law establishes a rebuttable presumption that child support amounts calculated under the state guidelines are correct unless a court finds otherwise on the record. The trial court has limited discretion to deviate from these guidelines when determining retroactive support, and any deviation must be supported by written findings that demonstrate such an application would be unjust or inappropriate, particularly in light of the best interests of the child and equity between the parties. Failure to comply with these requirements constitutes an abuse of discretion.
The child support guidelines applicable to high-income obligors were amended between 1998, when T.L. was born, and the July 2003 hearing. Before July 2002, if an obligor parent's net income exceeded $10,000 per month, the court could allow a downward deviation from the guidelines if it was justified as reasonable and in the child's best interest. The presumptive child support amount was set at 21% of the obligor's net income unless the obligor proved otherwise. However, after July 2002, the custodial parent was required to demonstrate that child support based on income over $10,000 was necessary for the child's needs.
The key issue was whether the pre- or post-July 2002 guidelines applied. The father argued that the trial court should have applied the July 2002 guidelines, asserting that the mother failed to prove the necessity of amounts exceeding $2,100 per month for T.L.'s support from birth. Conversely, the mother contended that applying the amended guidelines retroactively would be unjust. The trial court typically applies the statutes effective at the time of the hearing.
Ultimately, the trial court was correct to apply the guidelines in effect at the July 2003 hearing, placing the burden of proof on the mother to justify an upward deviation from the standard amount. The trial court did not find evidence supporting such a deviation. Therefore, the court affirmed the award of retroactive child support but modified it to $2,100 per month from T.L.'s birth until August 2003, accounting for any amounts previously paid by the father. This amount is to be paid directly to the mother.
The trial court determined that Mother did not provide sufficient evidence to justify child support exceeding the guideline amount, which was set at $2,100 per month (21% of Father’s $10,000 monthly income). Despite acknowledging the income disparity and Father's more comfortable lifestyle, the court found no basis for an upward deviation from the guidelines. Mother's appeal was unsuccessful as she failed to meet her burden of proof for increased support.
Regarding the educational trust fund, the court ordered Father to contribute $5,000 per month for T.L.'s education, totaling $750,000 over 150 months. However, it was noted that Mother did not initially request this trust. Father agreed to provide for T.L.'s education at the University of Tennessee but contested the amount required by the court. The court recognized that while parents can voluntarily agree to provide additional support, there was no justification for the specified amount. Consequently, while affirming the establishment of the educational trust, the court modified the order to require Father to fund the trust with an amount equivalent to the projected cost of a University of Tennessee undergraduate education rather than the excessive monthly payment initially mandated.
T.L. is entitled to a post-high school education funded by a trust, which allows for enrollment in any college or technical school. If T.L. does not enroll by age 21 or stops attending for over a year, any remaining funds will revert to Father. Mother prefers T.L. to attend private school, while Father argues against its necessity. However, the court found that Tennessee guidelines permit deviations from minimum support amounts for extraordinary educational expenses. The court ruled in favor of Mother’s request for private schooling based on case law, affirming that the decision serves T.L.'s best interests and does not impose hardship on Father.
Additionally, the trial court mandated Father to contribute $5,000 monthly into a trust fund to secure his child support obligations in case of unforeseen circumstances. Father contends this requirement excessively exceeds his obligations and is not justified by the guidelines, while Mother cites regulations and case law supporting the trust’s establishment for children's education and potential future support needs. The cited cases demonstrate that trust funds can be designated for extraordinary expenses during childhood and for college.
On appeal, the court confirmed that income from the trust will be exclusively allocated for the child's college expenses and will undergo strict scrutiny. The trust was established specifically for the child's education, with provisions allowing for potential access to the funds in cases of extraordinary expenses or a reduction in the obligor's income, contingent on court approval and findings of need.
The current case features a distinct educational trust fund alongside a trust set up to secure the Father's child support obligations, which is not necessary for covering child support in the event of the Father's death, as he is required to maintain life insurance for that purpose. The court noted that the trust's intent is to address potential income decreases affecting the Father's ability to meet child support payments.
Comparatively, in *Huntley v. Huntley*, the court affirmed the establishment of a non-educational trust for child support obligations when the obligor's income exceeded the guidelines. The *Huntley* case involved a determination that the obligor failed to justify a downward deviation from the support guidelines, leading to a split in child support payments between direct contributions and trust funding.
The present case diverges from *Huntley* as it involves an implicit deviation from the guidelines, with the trial court imposing a $5,000 monthly child support obligation exceeding the guideline amount to address potential income reduction. The regulations allow for the establishment of trusts beyond educational purposes for high-income obligors, provided there are sufficient findings to support the necessity of such trusts, even if they are not explicitly outlined in the regulations.
Lee and Huntley establish that trusts can be created for non-educational purposes, with Lee indicating that courts may authorize trusts for child support based on a decrease in the obligor's income. In this case, Father, a professional football player, has a high income and faces significant risks such as injury or early retirement that could affect his earning potential. The court finds it appropriate to set up a future child support trust, ensuring that T.L. will have adequate support despite these risks. The trust imposes no financial burden on Father, and any leftover funds will return to him when T.L. turns 18. However, the court modifies the trial order requiring Father to contribute $5,000 monthly into the trust indefinitely, determining instead that payments should continue only until the total in the trust matches Father’s remaining child support obligation.
Regarding the retroactive child support, Mother claims that interest should accrue at 12% annually on the unpaid amounts. The court notes Father argues this issue was not raised during the trial and therefore has been waived, as issues cannot be introduced for the first time on appeal. Consequently, the court declines to consider the interest claim.
Mother also challenges the trial court’s decision to only award her $15,000 in attorney's fees out of the $24,575.05 she claims was reasonable. Father does not dispute the trial court's authority to award fees but contends that the total requested by Mother is excessive. The trial court's discretion in determining the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees is upheld.
An award of reasonable attorney's fees is justified when a parent's attorney's services benefit a minor child, as established in Dalton v. Dalton. The court reviews such awards under an abuse of discretion standard. As of July 2003, Mother's attorney fees totaled $12,155.59, with an additional $1,973.50 incurred during the July 9 hearing. The total fees submitted by Mother's counsel amounted to $24,575.05, with $15,000 awarded by the trial court, which was not deemed an abuse of discretion.
Mother also requests attorney’s fees for the appeal, which the court grants, recognizing that such fees benefit the child and should not be borne by the custodial spouse. The matter is remanded for the trial court to determine the reasonable amount of these fees.
The dissent argues for an upward deviation from child support guidelines due to the disparity in the parties' financial situations and the father's lack of visitation. However, the trial court's retroactive support award was based on improper legal application rather than demonstrated need exceeding guideline amounts. The guidelines provide a presumptive child support amount, and Mother failed to prove her expenses surpassed this amount, which reflects the child's standard of living.
While the guidelines allow for deviations based on reduced visitation, the trial court found that the base support over $2,100 per month was unnecessary despite the father's minimal visitation. The court did determine a deviation was appropriate for private school education and trusts. The trial court's findings were upheld, and the decision was affirmed as modified, with costs taxed equally to both parties.
