In the case of Gloria J. Bevill v. Ellis M. Bevill, Sr., the Tennessee Court of Appeals reviewed a post-divorce matter stemming from a 1999 divorce settlement. The divorce judgment awarded Gloria J. Bevill alimony in futuro of $1,750 monthly, with a provision for reduction to $1,300 upon Ellis M. Bevill, Sr.'s retirement, contingent upon his post-retirement earnings potentially affecting the obligation. After Ellis retired, he unilaterally reduced his alimony payments to $1,300, prompting Gloria to file a petition for interpretation and modification of the alimony award. The trial court determined that the divorce judgment allowed for an increase in Ellis's alimony obligation based on evidence presented, ultimately raising the amount to $1,900 per month and awarding attorney’s fees to Gloria. Ellis appealed this decision, but the appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling. The original divorce judgment included provisions for spousal support, division of marital assets, and specific payments to Gloria, including $75,000 at the judgment's entry and an additional $50,000 by July 20, 2001, along with $10,000 in alimony in solido.
Husband is obligated to provide health insurance for Wife for her lifetime, including initiating and covering COBRA benefits as long as they are available. He must also indemnify Wife for all her medical expenses not covered by third parties, except for charges from out-of-network providers. Following the divorce, disputes arose regarding Husband's responsibilities for health insurance and medical costs. In December 2002, Wife's COBRA benefits expired, leading her to seek new insurance. Although Husband assisted with the application for TennCare, Wife claimed it was no longer accepting applications and ultimately obtained HIPAA coverage through Blue Cross/Blue Shield, which Husband has been paying.
Wife exceeded her health insurance coverage for psychiatrist visits, and Husband covered the additional costs. After retiring from Erlanger Medical Center, Wife sought a court injunction for a Qualified Domestic Relations Order to access half of Husband’s retirement fund, which she received in June 2002. Husband later worked full-time at Walgreens but reduced his hours and unilaterally lowered his spousal support payment to $1,300 per month in June 2003. In August 2003, Wife filed a petition alleging Husband's reduced payments caused her financial hardship and that he had not complied with the divorce judgment, seeking attorney's fees. Husband countered that he was entitled to reduce support due to changed circumstances and claimed Wife violated the judgment by not paying excess medical bills and not applying for TennCare, opting for a more expensive insurance plan instead.
Husband claimed that Wife's actions amounted to willful contempt of their divorce judgment. During the hearing on Wife’s petition and Husband’s counter-petition, both parties provided testimony, along with an employee from Creekside, where Wife lived, who detailed her living expenses and available services. On December 9, 2003, the trial court issued an order stating: 1) the divorce judgment allowed for modifications to Husband’s alimony obligations post-retirement; 2) Wife was entitled to an increased alimony of $1,900 per month; 3) Husband was responsible for covering Wife's psychiatric visits regardless of insurance limits; and 4) Wife was awarded $4,000 in attorney’s fees. The court found neither party in contempt but noted that Husband misinterpreted the judgment. Husband appealed, arguing that the trial court incorrectly denied his request to reduce alimony due to his retirement, miscalculated his obligation by considering earning capacity rather than actual earnings, and erred in awarding attorney's fees to Wife. He sought a remand for adjustments to spousal support, credits for payments made for Wife's medical visits, cooperation in securing lower-cost health insurance, and reversal of the attorney's fees award. Wife countered that the trial court acted appropriately and sought attorney’s fees for the appeal. The court addressed the appropriateness of considering spousal support modification, affirming that the divorce judgment's provisions allowed for such consideration, particularly regarding Husband’s obligation to disclose earnings post-retirement and seek mediation before litigation. The trial court found that Husband had voluntarily remained employed, justifying its authority to address potential alimony modifications. Husband referenced the Supreme Court case Bogan v. Bogan, arguing that his retirement should have warranted a reduction in his support obligations based on the premise of a substantial change in circumstances.
The trial court considered the Bogan decision regarding the relationship between alimony and retirement but found it irrelevant due to specific language in the divorce judgment allowing for alimony modification. Bogan involved whether a husband's unanticipated retirement constituted a significant change in circumstances for altering alimony, a question not pertinent to the current case, which explicitly required the husband to notify the wife about continued employment post-retirement and stipulated mediation for disputes regarding spousal support. The trial court was affirmed in its right to evaluate potential alimony modifications.
The husband argued that any modification exceeding $1,300 was unjustified and that the judgment capped alimony at $1,750. The court disagreed, stating the retirement provisions did not impose such a cap. It emphasized that spousal support modifications are factually driven and require careful consideration of various factors, with broad discretion granted to trial courts. The appellate court generally refrains from overturning these decisions unless unsupported by evidence or contrary to public policy.
In evaluating alimony modifications, the trial court must consider relevant factors from Tenn. Code Ann. 36-5-101(d), particularly focusing on the obligor’s ability to pay and the recipient's financial need, with both factors holding equal weight in modification decisions.
The trial court awarded Wife $1,900 per month in spousal support, citing significant income disparities: Husband earns approximately $84,000 to $85,000 annually, while Wife earns about $22,000 to $23,000. The court noted that Wife cannot increase her earnings beyond manipulating her investment account funds, which would be depleted quickly if relied upon for support. Instead, the court views these funds as generating a modest income of about $400 monthly for Wife. Despite Husband's argument that Wife did not show increased financial need, the court found she continues to require support, particularly after her rent increased from $1,060 to $1,260, forcing her to give up a carport.
Husband contended that his post-retirement income was significantly reduced and that Wife should deplete her retirement plan assets instead of increasing alimony. However, the court maintained that Wife’s financial need persisted, and her ability to alter her circumstances was severely limited. The court distinguished this case from a prior ruling (Bogan), where the wife received a substantial sum from her husband's retirement plan and had only a minor increase in expenses. Here, the circumstances were different, and the trial court’s findings were supported by the evidence.
The court evaluated the wife's financial needs against the husband's ability to pay spousal support. Mr. Bogan's income, derived solely from retirement investments, had decreased to half of what it was at the time of the initial support award. However, the husband continued to earn income from part-time employment, allowing him to cover expenses without depleting his savings. The trial court ruled that it would be unreasonable to force the wife to exhaust her savings quickly, a decision the husband contested by arguing that the difference in support payments amounted to only $600, suggesting it would take 35 years for the wife to deplete her assets. He also asserted that the wife's substantial checking account balance indicated she was not in dire financial need.
The court found the evidence supported its decision, deferring to the trial court's judgment. The husband disputed the trial court's findings regarding his income, claiming the reported figures of $84,000 to $85,000 annually were unfounded and that the court improperly focused on his earning capacity rather than actual earnings, given his retirement status. He presented his tax returns from 1999 to 2002, which showed varying gross incomes, arguing these figures were irrelevant for the modification petition since he had the right to retire. He referenced the case of Lamberson v. Lamberson to support his claim that alimony should be based on actual earnings rather than earning capacity, contending that he was no longer obligated to work after retirement.
The court found the Husband's arguments against the trial court's judgment to be unfounded. Evidence presented showed that the Husband earned $48,120.86 from Walgreens up to July 4, 2003, and began working at Bi-Lo Pharmacy at a rate of $41.83 per hour for thirty hours per week starting July 17, 2003. Testimony indicated his income allowed him to meet living expenses and make significant purchases, including a $25,000 boat and a $39,260 truck, along with other expenditures. The court determined the Wife demonstrated continued financial need, and the Husband had the ability to pay increased alimony.
The Husband also contested the trial court's award of $4,000 in attorney's fees to the Wife, which are classified as alimony. The trial court assesses such awards based on the same factors as alimony, focusing on the disadvantaged spouse's need and the obligor's ability to pay. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision, as the Wife lacked the ability to pay while the Husband had discretionary income. The Husband's request to credit the $900 spent on psychiatric visits was denied, as the judgment stipulated he must cover all medical expenses not covered by insurance.
Additionally, the Wife requested attorney's fees for the appeal, and the court remanded the case to the trial court to determine these fees, affirming the trial court's judgment overall. The appellate costs were imposed on the appellant, Ellis M. Bevill, Sr.
